State and Federal Models of the Interaction
between Statutes and Unwritten Law
Caleb Nelsont
This Article argues that modern courts read individualfederal statutes to encompass more issues than identically worded state statutes would be understood to
cover. There are many questions that regularlyarise in the implementation of statutes but that the typical statute does not say anything about. When a state statute
is silent on such questions, state courts often conclude that the questions lie beyond
the statute's domain and that the answers therefore come from the state's version of
the common law. But when a federal statute is silent on the same sorts of questions, courts often act as if answers should be imputed to the statute itself.
As an illustration of this difference, the Article studies how courts decide
whether forum law governs cross-borderevents. When state courts need to determine whether one of their own state's statutes supplies rules of decision for a case
involving cross-borderevents, they commonly apply an overarchingset of choice-oflaw doctrines that they think of as operatingoutside the statute. By contrast, when
a federal statute does not specifically address its applicability to cross-border
events, courts use a canon of construction-thepresumption against extraterritoriality--to import the necessarydistinctionsinto the statute.
Similarexamples abound. In a range of different contexts, general legal questions that would be thought to fall outside the domain of the typical state statute
(and that courts might therefore handle as a matter of unwritten law) are presumed to lie inside the domain of the typical federal statute (with the result that
courts handle them under the rubric of statutory interpretation).To explain this
pattern, the Article points to practical concerns that came into focus after Erie
Railroad Co v Tompkins: under modern doctrine, one way for federaljudges to
avoid having to accept whatever state courts say about questions that arise in connection with the implementation of a federal statute is to read the statute itself to
encompass those questions.
The consequences of shoehorninggeneral legal questions into the domains of
individual federal statutes depend on the interpretive techniques that courts use.
To the extent that the rubricof statutory interpretationleads courts to give statutespecific answers to such questions, the federal model can produce dramaticallydifferent results than the state model would. Those differences will be muted if courts
instead read each individual federal statute as implicitly incorporatinggeneric
principles of unwritten law. Even then, though, the mechanism through which
thoseprinciplesoperate can have subtle effects.
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INTRODUCTION

In the late 1960s, both the California state legislature and
the federal Congress enacted statutes that protect the privacy of
telephone conversations by restricting the use of wiretaps and
secret recording devices., The statutes have somewhat different

substantive provisions,2 but they establish parallel remedial
schemes. In addition to making the willful or intentional violation
1 See 1967 Cal Stat 3584, 3584-88, codified at Cal Penal Code § 630 et seq; Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 197,
212-23, codified at 18 USC § 2510 et seq.
2 Compare Cal Penal Code § 632(a) (establishing a general rule against recording
telephone conversations "without the consent of all parties") (emphasis added), with 18
USC § 2511(2)(d) (Supp IV 1969) (providing, with certain exceptions, that "[i]t shall not
be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a
wire or oral communication where such person is a party to the communication or where
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception")
(emphasis added).
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of its provisions a crime, each statute also creates a private cause
of action in favor of the victims of illicit recording.8 Neither statute, however, specifically addresses the geographic reach of the
rights and duties that it creates.
With respect to the state statute, that issue reached the California Supreme Court in Kearney v Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc.4 The plaintiffs, who lived in California, regularly spoke over
the telephone with the defendant's employees in Georgia. Acting
in Georgia, the defendant's employees allegedly recorded many
of those calls without the plaintiffs' knowledge or consent. Ultimately, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in the California state
courts for violating the California statute. The defendant responded that the California statute did not govern the behavior
of its employees in Georgia. Under Georgia law, moreover, one
party to a phone call has no duty to inform the other party before recording the call.5
The California Supreme Court framed the case as presenting "a classic choice-of-law issue," and it proceeded to apply the
"governmental interest analysis" that California courts now use
for such issues.6 Part of that analysis hinged on interpreting the
California statute and its Georgia counterpart to determine
whether both states had relevant interests at stake. In the
court's view, they did: Each state's statute expressed a policy
that applied whenever either end of a telephone conversation occurred within the state.7 The policy established by the California
statute, moreover, conflicted with the policy established by the
Georgia statute. To resolve that conflict, the court proceeded to
conduct the "comparative impairment" analysis mandated by
California choice-of-law doctrine: the court asked "which state's
interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated
to the policy of the other state."s At least insofar as civil remedies for future acts of recording were concerned, the court concluded that this analysis favored applying California law.* As a

3

See 18 USC § 2520; Cal Penal Code § 637.2.
4 137 P3d 914 (Cal 2006).
5 Id at 918-19.
SId at 917.
7 See id at 928-33. See also id at 930-31 (rejecting the defendant's argument that
interpreting the California statute to impose duties on people in Georgia would amount
to "a disfavored 'extraterritorial' application of the statute').
8 Kearney, 137 P3d at 922, quoting Bernhard v Harrah's Club, 546 P2d 719, 723
(Cal 1976) (quotation marks omitted).
9 Kearney, 137 P3d at 934-37. Because people in Georgia might not have known that
their conduct could be evaluated under California law, the court declined to use California
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result, the court concluded that the California statute gave the
defendant's employees in Georgia an enforceable duty to inform
the plaintiffs before recording telephone conversations to which
the plaintiffs were parties.10
Analogous questions can also arise under the federal statute. Imagine, for instance, that a plaintiff in California places a
telephone call to someone in Mexico, and that a third party in
Mexico secretly intercepts and records this conversation. Unless
the international dimension of this case makes a difference,
Kearney suggests that the plaintiff could assert a cause of action
under the California statute against the third party who surreptitiously recorded the conversation. But can the plaintiff assert a
cause of action under the federal statute too?
This question closely resembles the one that the California
Supreme Court addressed in Kearney. Yet courts have uniformly
held that the federal statute does not restrict wiretaps abroad,
even when the wiretaps are being used to record conversations
with someone in the United States." In reaching this conclusion,
moreover, the courts have structured their analysis quite differently than the California Supreme Court did in Kearney. Instead
of fitting their analysis of the relevant statute into an overarching framework supplied by choice-of-law doctrine, they have
spoken entirely in terms of statutory interpretation. The gist of
their opinions has been that reading the federal statute to prohibit wiretaps in foreign countries would cause the statute to
operate extraterritorially, and the so-called presumption against
extraterritoriality disfavors such interpretations.12
As this example illustrates, the "presumption against extraterritoriality" that courts apply to federal statutes addresses the
law insofar as the plaintiffs were seeking damages for conduct that occurred before the
date of the court's opinion. Id at 937-38. The court also reserved judgment about whether
the criminal aspects of the California statute would apply to people acting outside the
state. Id at 928.
10

Id at 937.

11 See, for example, Morrison v Dietz, 2010 WL 395918, *4 (ND Cal) (dismissing
plaintiffs complaint). See also Stowe v Devoy, 588 F2d 336, 341 (2d Cir 1978) (rejecting a
habeas petitioner's challenge to the admission of recorded conversations between the petitioner in New York and someone in Canada, and explaining that the federal statute did
not prohibit wiretapping in Canada); United States v Cotroni, 527 F2d 708, 711 (2d Cir
1975) (similar).
12 See, for example, Cotroni, 527 F2d at 711 (invoking "the canon of construction
which teaches that, unless a contrary intent appears, federal statutes apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States); id (reasoning that because the federal
statute seeks to regulate the interception of communications, the key question that determines its applicability is "where the interception took place").
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same sort of questions that courts often use choice-of-law doctrines to handle with respect to state law.13 But these two approaches do not always generate the same answers. Modern
choice-of-law doctrine can lead courts to apply state statutes in
ways that would trigger the presumption against extraterritoriality if a federal statute were involved.14
This is a puzzle in its own right, and one of my goals in this
Article is to say something about it. But my principal aim is to
use this puzzle to illuminate some important differences between the modern implementation of state statutes and the
modern implementation of federal statutes. When a state legislature enacts a statute, the state's courts naturally draw upon
various doctrines of unwritten law (such as the state's choice-oflaw principlesa) as they think about how the statute fits into the
13 This point has not completely penetrated the literature about statutory interpretation, but it is well known to choice-of-law scholars. See, for example, David P. Currie,
et al, Conflict of Laws: Cases-Comments-Questions814-22 (West 8th ed 2010) (presenting the presumption against extraterritoriality as a device for handling a choice-of-law
question); William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Choice-of-Law Theory: An Argument
for Judicial Unilateralism,39 Harv Intl L J 101, 143-44, 168 (1998) (noting the "obvious" point that "conflicts and extraterritoriality raise similar problems" and concluding
that discussion of extraterritoriality should shift "from whether a conflicts approach
should be applied to which conflicts approach should be applied"). See also Clyde
Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality,and the Constitutionalizationof Choice of
Law, 1865-1940 *27 (UCLA School of Law Research Paper No 12-01, Feb 15, 2012),
online at http://www.sarn.com/abstract=2006719 (visited May 9, 2013) (agreeing that
questions about the permissible reach of state law have been analyzed in choice-of-law
terms from the 1930s on, but arguing that "to late nineteenth-century jurists, the question
of territorial limits on a state's exercise of its political jurisdiction .. . constituted a problem
of legal and political legitimacy seemingly distinct from the field of conflict of laws").
14 See Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding
the ExtraterritorialEffects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 92 BU L Rev 535, 536 (2012) (observing that because of the differences between
state choice-of-law analysis and the federal presumption against extraterritoriality, "it is
frequently the case ... that state law applies to [multinational fact patterns] where federal law does not"). See also Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: ExtraterritorialApplication
of American Law, 1991 S Ct Rev 179, 202 (complaining that the presumption against
extraterritoriality reflects the choice-of-law thinking of the nineteenth century rather
than of the present day); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of
U.S. Law, 24 L & Pol Intl Bus 1, 61-74 (1992) (making a similar point).
15 I refer to these principles as "unwritten" law because most states have not comprehensively codified them. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law
Revolution: Past, Present and Future 4 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006). Louisiana is different;
its statutory code lays out some overarching choice-of-law doctrines. See id at 4 & n 14.
Oregon has recently followed suit with respect to issues of tort and contract. See generally James A.R. Nafziger, The Louisiana and Oregon Codifications of Choice-of-Law Rules
in Context, 58 Am J Comp L 165 (2010). Even in Oregon and Louisiana, though, the
state's codified choice-of-law rules are thought to operate separate and apart from the
particular statutes that define the substance of the state's law. As a result, most of the
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rest of the state's legal system. Often, the courts think of those
overarching doctrines of unwritten law as operating outside of
the statute, and as having force unless a particular statute opts
out of them. When Congress enacts a federal statute, by contrast, courts face pressure to take a different approach. If they
conclude that a particular question lies beyond the federal statute's domain,e courts will not necessarily be able to fall back on
federal principles of unwritten law; instead, courts may feel
obliged to handle the question according to the local law of an
individual state. That result, however, will not always seem appropriate, because some questions that the statutory language
does not seem to encompass may nonetheless take on a federal
character when they arise in connection with the implementation of a federal statute. To avoid letting the local laws of individual states govern such questions, courts may end up holding
that the federal statute encompasses those questions after all.
Admittedly, courts sometimes go on to conclude that Congress enacted the statute against the backdrop supplied by widely accepted principles of unwritten law and that the statute
should be understood as implicitly adopting those principles.17
When that happens, one might think that there is little practical
difference between the state and federal models for the interaction between statutes and the unwritten law. To be sure, principles of unwritten law are operating through different mechanisms: in the federal model, courts are reading particular
statutes to incorporate principles that would be thought to operate on a different plane if state law were involved. But as long as
the same principles end up being applied, one might not care
whether those principles are operating directly or only through
incorporation into individual statutes.
As we shall see, though, the mechanism through which
principles of unwritten law operate has a tendency to affect the
content of the principles that the courts apply. One manifestation of that tendency crops up when the unwritten law changes.
If the unwritten law applies to a case directly (as in the state
model), courts are likely to apply current understandings of the
points that I will make in this Article are true of Louisiana and Oregon no less than of
other states.
16 By the "domain" of a statute, I mean the set of questions that the statute either
itself answers or authorizes interpreters to answer in its name. See generally Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983) (introducing this terminology).
17 See Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum L Rev 503, 524
(2006) (providing examples, though not tracing this practice to its source).
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unwritten law. But if the unwritten law matters only because a
statute has incorporated it (as in the federal model), courts may
well assume that the incorporation was "static" rather than "dynamic"-with the result that cases arising under the statute will
be decided according to the background doctrines of unwritten
law that existed when the statute was enacted.
The difference between the state and federal models can
have other practical consequences too. To the extent that courts
think of federal statutes as encompassing issues that would lie
beyond the domain of parallel state statutes, and to the extent
that courts proceed to analyze those issues entirely under the
rubric of statutory interpretation, the canons and other interpretive principles that courts apply may well affect their bottomline conclusions. The "presumption against extraterritoriality"
that courts apply to federal statutes is a good example: it does
not always lead to the same conclusions as the choice-of-law
rules that courts use to handle similar questions about the implementation of state statutes.
This Article proceeds as follows. To illustrate what I am
calling the state model for the interaction between statutes and
the unwritten law, Part L.A discusses how state courts determine whether their own state's statutes govern cross-border
transactions or events. Part I.B then describes the emergence of
a separate federal model that courts use to answer analogous
questions about federal statutes. Part II offers a possible explanation for the divergence of the two models. Part III broadens
the picture: it identifies numerous other manifestations of the
federal model across a range of legal questions. The Conclusion
canvasses some practical consequences of the difference between
the state and federal models.
I. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODELS: CHOICE-OF-LAW DOCTRINE
AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Before we can usefully compare the analysis that courts use
to determine the applicability of state statutes with the analysis
that courts use to determine the applicability of federal statutes,
we must structure the comparison properly. Under longstanding
understandings of American federalism, all American courts are
obliged to follow all valid federal statutes that purport to govern
the cases before them. For the most part, state courts do not
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have a similar obligation to apply the statutes of sister states.18
As a matter of state law, though, each state's courts do have an
obligation to apply the statutes of their own state where the
state legislature has validly made those statutes applicable.
This Part therefore compares how all American courts determine the applicability of federal statutes with how state courts
determine the applicability of their own state's statutes.
In conducting this comparison, I will not be addressing
questions of constitutional law. Admittedly, those questions
have some potential to throw off our comparison, because the
federal Constitution has been understood to restrict the geographic reach of state law in certain ways that do not apply to
federal law.19 During what is now called "the Lochner era,"20

18 While this sentence accurately reflects current doctrine, Professor Douglas Laycock has argued that current doctrine conflicts with the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the federal Constitution. In his view, the Founders expected each state's courts to use
the same set of choice-of-law rules to identify which state's law governed which issues,
and the Founders believed that "the Constitution and [the Rules of Decision Act] would
require courts to apply the law of that state." Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal
and TerritorialStates: The ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice of Law, 92 Colum L Rev
249, 290 (1992). See also id at 310 ('The affirmative implication [of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause] is that Congress or the federal courts should specify choice-of-law rules
and that state courts should follow those rules, to the end that the same law will be applied no matter where a case is litigated.").
As a policy matter, there is much to be said for the system contemplated by Professor
Laycock. But as a historical matter, the Constitution probably was not really understood
to require such a system. See generally David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and
Credit, 118 Yale L J 1584 (2009); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early
Congress,95 Va L Rev 1201 (2009); Ralph U. Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitations on
State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 Memphis St U L Rev 1 (1981). See also
Spillenger, Risk Regulation at *18 (cited in note 13) (observing that in antebellum America, "rules of decision, as distinct from judgments, were not seen as raising full-faith-andcredit or any other constitutional concern").
19 See, for example, Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power:
Reflections on the ExtraterritorialityPrinciplein Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 Notre
Dame L Rev 1057, 1084-92 (2009) (discussing territorially based aspects of dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, which restricts the states but not Congress); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: () CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine;(I) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 Mich L Rev 1865, 18841913 (1987) (analyzing modern doctrine about constitutional limits on state legislative
jurisdiction and attributing that doctrine to a structural principle that does not necessarily apply to the federal government). See also United States v Bennett, 232 US 299,
304-07 (1914) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not
limit the territorial reach of Congress's taxing powers in the same way that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the territorial reach of the states' taxing powers). But see Lea
Brilmayer and Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritorialityand Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 Harv L Rev 1217, 1239 (1992) (advocating more parallelism in due process
doctrine).
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those restrictions were thought to be particularly robust.21 Under current doctrine, though, the federal Constitution has less to
say on this topic: in many settings, each state can instruct its
courts to apply the state's own law as long as the state has some
significant contact with the parties or events in suit (and therefore has legitimate "state interests" to protect).22 So as to avoid
unnecessary complications, this Part focuses chiefly on those
settings.

A.

How State Courts Determine the Geographic Reach of Their
Own State's Statutes
1. The presumption that the state's statutes accommodate
the state's normal choice-of-law rules.

In our federal system, it is possible for multiple states to
prescribe legal rules that all purport to govern the same issue
20 For information about the origins of this phrase, see David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive Reform 116-18
(Chicago 2011).
21 See James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution,and Lochner, 94 Va L
Rev 1509, 1513-32 (2008). Even during the Lochner era, of course, the Supreme Court
allowed states to use their police powers and their powers of taxation in ways that impinged upon life, liberty, and property. But the Court recognized significant territorial
limits on the legitimate reach of those powers. In the name of the Due Process Clause,
the Court thus enforced geographic restrictions on what individual states could regulate
and tax. See, for example, Union Refrigerator Transit Co v Kentucky, 199 US 194, 20411 (1905) (holding that the Due Process Clause prevents states from taxing tangible
property that is located outside the state, even if the owner is domiciled in the state);
Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US 578, 590-92 (1897) (holding that each state's police power
"does not and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen from making contracts of the nature
involved in this case outside of the limits and jurisdiction of the State, and which are also to be performed outside of such jurisdiction"). During the same period, the Court interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause to reflect similar ideas. See, for example, New
York Life Ins Co v Head, 234 US 149, 161-62 (1914) (associating both the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause with the idea that Missouri courts could not
let a Missouri statute "extend its authority into the State of New York and there forbid
the parties, one of whom was a citizen of New Mexico and the other a citizen of New
York, from making [a particular] loan agreement in New York simply because it modified a contract originally made in Missouri"); Bradford Electric Light Co v Clapper, 286
US 145, 159 (1932) (holding squarely that the Full Faith and Credit Clause constitutionalizes some choice-of-law principles and thus plays a role in allocating legislative jurisdiction among the states).
22 See PhillipsPetroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 818, 823 (1985) (taking the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses to impose only "modest restrictions" on a
state's power to tell its courts to apply the state's own law); Allstate Ins Co v Hague, 449
US 302, 308, 313 (1981) (Brennan) (plurality). See also Alaska PackersAssn v Industrial
Accident Commission of California,294 US 532, 541-50 (1935) (beginning to signal a
retreat from Lochner-erajurisprudence on this point); Pacific Employers Ins Co v IndustrialAccident Comm'n, 306 US 493, 501-05 (1939) (continuing the retreat).
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with respect to the same people, property, or events.23 If that issue is ever litigated, the court in which the litigation proceeds
will need to identify the applicable rule of decision. That is not
difficult when all of the potentially applicable legal rules say the
same thing. But to the extent that they conflict with each other,
the court will need to decide which one to use. "Choice-of-law
rules" address that topic. More generally, choice-of-law rules tell
courts and other adjudicators which sovereign's law to apply to
which issues under which circumstances.
Because federal law does not supply a comprehensive set of
choice-of-law rules for all American courts to use,24 each state retains control over the choice-of-law rules that its own state's
courts apply.25 But just as Congress has refrained from enacting
comprehensive choice-of-law rules, so too have most state legislatures.26 By and large, then, the choice-of-law rules applicable
in the courts of any particular state are part of the unwritten
law of that state. In the absence of contrary directions from
Congress or the state legislature, the state's courts will use the
state's normal choice-of-law rules to determine which issues are
governed by the law of their own state and which issues are governed instead by the law of some other sovereign.
To be sure, a state legislature can tell its own state's courts to
deviate from this practice with respect to certain issues.27 A few
state statutes explicitly require the state's courts to apply the
state's own law even in circumstances as to which the state's normal choice-of-law rules would otherwise have pointed elsewhere.28
23 See Sun Oil Co v Wortman, 486 US 717, 727 (1988) ("[The legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap.!).
24 Congress has far more power in this area than it has exercised. See Richard H.
Fallon Jr, et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 565
(Foundation 6th ed 2009) (noting that Congress is "generally believed" to have the power
to prescribe choice-of-law rules for both state and federal courts).
25 This statement itself rests on a choice-of-law principle: to the extent that different states have different choice-of-law rules, the courts of each state will use the ones
supplied by their own state. Without exception, however, every American state accepts
this foundational principle. In the unlikely event that the legislature of State A purported to supply choice-of-law rules for use by the courts of State B, its attempt to do so
would not necessarily be "unconstitutional," but it would be ineffectual; the courts of
State B would not feel bound to pay attention (unless the law of State B itself told them
to pay attention).
26 See note 15.
27 See, for example, Generac Corp v Caterpillarlnc, 172 F3d 971, 976 (7th Cir 1999)
("We know of nothing that would prevent the Wisconsin legislature from announcing a
particular choice of law rule for dealership cases in duly enacted legislation.").
28 See, for example, Tex Civ Prac & Remedies Code Ann § 149.006 ("The courts in this
state shall apply, to the fullest extent permissible under the United States Constitution,
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Such a directive amounts to a special choice-of-law rule. If a
state's legislature establishes a rule of this sort (either explicitly
or by implication), the state's courts are bound to pay attention:
unless the federal Constitution or other aspects of federal law
stand in the way, the courts of each state must apply their own
state's law when their state's lawmakers so direct. But explicit
directives of this sort are relatively unusual, and courts are at
least somewhat reluctant to infer them. The normal presumption, which has been around for years, is that "statutes are not
intended to alter principles of conflict of laws."29
To see this presumption at work, think of a state statute
that is cast in seemingly universal terms-a statute that uses
phrases like "all cases" or "any person."30 Assume, however, that
the statute does not appear to focus on the sorts of questions
that choice-of-law rules address, and the legislative history does
not reflect any conscious intention to depart from the choice-oflaw rules that courts would normally use to determine when the
state's law does and does not apply. As a matter of constitutional
law, the state legislature may well have the power to override
those choice-of-law rules (at least as far as the state's own courts
are concerned); it might be perfectly constitutional for the state
legislature to instruct the state's own courts to apply the statute
just as broadly as the statute's words suggest. But in the absence
this state's substantive law, including the limitation under this chapter, to the issue of successor asbestos-related liabilities."). Some other states have enacted much the same provision. See Fla Stat Ann § 774.007; Ga Code Ann § 51-15-7; Miss Code Ann § 79-33-11; Ohio
Rev Code Ann § 2307.97(F); Act No 280 § 3, 2006 SC Acts & Resol 2262, 2267.
29 Note, Preservingthe Inviolability of Rules of Conflict of Laws by Statutory Construction, 49 Harv L Rev 319, 319-20 (1935) (acknowledging that this presumption "is in
accordance with the balance of probabilities," though arguing that courts tend to give the
presumption "undue weight" and advocating a style of interpretation that would make
the presumption easier to overcome).
A more recent student note proceeds from the premise that courts do not currently
apply such a presumption, but argues that they should. See generally Lindsay Traylor
Braunig, Note, Statutory Interpretationin a Choice of Law Context, 80 NYU L Rev 1050
(2005). The real disagreement highlighted by this latter note, though, is less about the
existence of some sort of presumption than about the interpretive methods that courts
should use in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted. See id at 106768 (suggesting that courts should not interpret a state statute to deviate from ordinary
choice-of-law principles unless the text or legislative history establishes that legislators
considered those principles and consciously intended to deviate from them); id at 106567 (criticizing efforts to identify a legislative intent" on this point when "the legislature
did not consider choice of law").
30 I have derived this formulation, though not all of my conclusions, from 50 Am
Jur Statutes § 487 (1944) (discussing the interpretation of "statutes using general words,
such as 'any' or 'all,' in describing the persons or acts to which the statute applies") (citations omitted).
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of some reason to believe that the state legislature really intended
the statute to address and override the state's ordinary choice-oflaw rules, even the state's own courts are unlikely to interpret the
statute as conveying this instruction. Rather than reading the
statute to say anything about the overarching topic of choice-oflaw analysis, the state's courts will presume that the statute
leaves the state's ordinary choice-of-law principles untouched. As
a result, even the state's own courts will not look to the statute for
a rule of decision when the state's ordinary choice-of-law principles tell them to apply the law of some other state instead.3'
This logic is so common that state courts often do not even
make it explicit; without articulating the presumption that generally worded statutes enacted by their own state's legislature
leave room for ordinary choice-of-law analysis, courts move
straight to that analysis. For a good example, consider the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in P. V. v Camp Jaycee.32 In
2003, plaintiff P.V. (a twenty-one-year-old New Jersey resident
with Down syndrome) attended a summer program operated by
defendant New Jersey Camp Jaycee, Inc (a New Jersey nonprofit corporation). The program took place at a campsite in Pennsylvania. While P.V. was there, another camper sexually assaulted her. P.V. and her parents ultimately sued the defendant
in the New Jersey state courts for the tort of negligent supervision.33 In response, the defendant invoked New Jersey's charitable-immunity statute.34 Subject to a few specified exceptions,
that statute reads as follows:
No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes ...
a1 See, for example, McCann v Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P3d 516, 527-37 & n 10
(Cal 2010) (rebuffing the plaintiffes attempt to benefit from a California statute of limitations that seemed, on its face, to govern "any civil action for injury or illness based upon
exposure to asbestos," and using California's ordinary choice-of-law analysis to determine that the plaintiffs claim was governed instead by Oklahoma's stricter statute of
repose); Viacom, Inc v Transit Casualty Co, 138 SW3d 723, 725-26 (Mo 2004) (rejecting
the defendant's argument that Missouri's receivership statutes supplanted Missouri's
ordinary choice-of-law rules, and ultimately applying Pennsylvania law to the issue in
dispute). See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v ANC Rental Corp, 2008 WL
4149006, *2-3 (Ariz App) (acknowledging that the Arizona legislature "can . . . enact a
statute that supersedes choice-of-law principles," but observing that the state's courts
will read a statute to do so "only where [they] can clearly determine" that the enacting
legislature so intended).
32 962 A2d 453 (NJ 2008).
33 Id at 456.

34 Id.
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shall. ..be liable to respond in damages to any person who
shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such
person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of
such nonprofit corporation, society or association.35
The blanket language of this statute might seem to immunize
the defendant from all suits, including suits about events in
Pennsylvania. Notwithstanding the statute's blanket language,
though, all seven members of the New Jersey Supreme Court
assumed that the statute accommodated New Jersey's ordinary
choice-of-law doctrines: the statute applied when those doctrines
called for the immunity question to be governed by New Jersey
law, but not otherwise.36 In P.V.'s case, moreover, the majority
held that New Jersey's choice-of-law doctrines favored the application of Pennsylvania law (which did not recognize charitable
immunity).37
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of the
Conflict of Laws reinforces the premise that individual state
statutes usually do not address, let alone override, the state's
ordinary choice-of-law principles. To be sure, § 6(1) of the Second
Restatement acknowledges the theoretical possibility of such
overrides: "A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law."38 The
official comments to § 6 recognize two different ways in which a
statute might supplant the ordinary choice-of-law rules that the
state's courts would otherwise apply. First, a statute might itself
be cast as a choice-of-law rule; it might explicitly tell the state's
courts which sovereign's law to apply in which circumstances.3"
Second, a statute might simply set forth some substantive rules
that the enacting legislature manifestly intended to govern "outof-state facts," including transactions that might ordinarily be
governed by some other sovereign's law.40 The latter sort of statute can be thought of as containing an implicit choice-of-law directive, to the effect that the state's courts should apply the
statute (and hence the state's own law) without regard to the
state's ordinary choice-of-law rules. But the official comments to
35 NJ Stat Ann § 2A:53A-7(a).
36 See, for example, P.V., 962 A2d at 460-61.
37 Id at 467-68.
33 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(1) (1971).
39 See id at § 6, comment a.
40 Id at § 6, comment b.
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§ 6 suggest that neither sort of directive is common: "Statutes
that are expressly directed to choice of law ... are comparatively
few in number,"41 and "[]egislatures ... rarely give thought to
the extent to which the laws they enact ... should apply to outof-state facts."42 In the usual case, then, the Second Restatement
contemplates that state courts will determine the applicability of
their own state's statutes according to the ordinary choice-of-law
analysis described in the rest of the Second Restatement.
2. Complexities raised by the shift away from traditional
choice-of-law analysis.
Although the Second Restatement encourages each state's
courts to presume that the state's statutes accommodate the
state's ordinary choice-of-law rules, the choice-of-law rules endorsed by the Second Restatement raise some complications for
the application of this presumption. Those complications turn
out to be greater in theory than in practice: modern courts tend
to apply the Second Restatement in a way that allows the presumption to retain some power. To understand these points,
however, we must make a detour into the substance of choice-oflaw analysis as it has changed over time.
a) The traditionalapproach. To speak of a "traditional"
American approach to choice-of-law questions is obviously to
speak somewhat crudely. Scholars agree that American jurists
did not begin to systematize the subject until the 1820s43 and
that the systematization did not really take root until 1834,
when Justice Joseph Story published the first edition of his acclaimed Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws." Over the course
Id at § 6, comment a.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws at § 6, comment c.
43 See Spillenger, Risk Regulation at *14 (cited in note 13) ("It was not until the
1820s that American legal commentators began conceiving choice of law more systematically as a general doctrine, rather than a series of lex loci principles specific to discrete
areas of law like contract and property."); id at *14 n 30 (noting consensus among modern scholars that an 1828 book by Samuel Livermore was "[t]he first systemic treatment
of 'conflict of laws' in the United States').
44 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in
Regard to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages,Divorces, Wills, Successions, and Judgments (Hilliard, Gray 1834). See, for example, R.H.
Helmholz, Continental Law and Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions?,
1990 Duke L J 1207, 1222:
When Story first came upon the subject of conflict of laws .. . he did not find an entirely blank page. Cases on the topic existed. But there were not many, and some of
the cases were merely examples of the invocation of "sound judicial instinct." There
41

42
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of the next century, the field developed both in detail and in theory. 45 Still, the developments remained within the same basic
framework: by and large, legal questions about particular transactions, events, people, or property were supposed to be answered according to the law of the place where those transactions, events, people, or property were deemed to be located.
According to Justice Story's treatise, the fact that "every nation
possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its
own territory" is one of the foundational principles "upon which
all reasonings on the subject must necessarily rest."4* A century
later, both the first Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws
(which the American Law Institute issued in 1934) and the accompanying treatise written by Professor Joseph Beale (who
served as reporter for the First Restatement) continued to share
this focus. Thus, the opening sentence of Professor Beale's treatise summed up the field as follows: "The branch of the law
called for convenience The Conflict of Laws deals primarily with
the application of laws in space."47
As applied to things that had a single definite location, this
approach yielded some relatively uncontroversial choice-of-law
rules. Even today, for instance, American lawyers think it natural for various issues relating to real property to be adjudicated
according to the law of the place where the property is located48
and for the procedures used by adjudicators to be determined according to the law of the forum where the adjudication is occurring. As applied to cross-border transactions, however, a focus
on territorial location does not produce such obvious answers.
When sparks from a train traveling in State A cause a fire that
destroys property in State B, which state's law determines the
was no system. There was no legal order. It was Story's study of the civil law that
supplied the system and the order.
45 Consider Spillenger, Risk Regulation at *11 (cited in note 13) (suggesting that
cases from this period reflect shifts that modern scholars have tended to overlook, and
positing that "the nature of conflicts jurisprudence in any given historical period is determined largely by the types of legal disputes that are likely to raise conflicts problems
in that period").
46 Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws at 19 (cited in note 44). See also id:
The direct consequence of this rule is, that the laws of every state affect, and
bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within its territory; and all
persons, who are resident within it, whether natural born subjects, or aliens;
and also all contracts made, and acts done within it.
47 Joseph H. Beale, 1 A Treatiseon the Conflict of Laws § 1.1 at 1 (Baker, Voorhis 1935).
48 See James Y. Stern, Of Property, Exclusivity, and Jurisdiction*8-10 (working
paper, 2012) (on file with author).
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applicable standard of care?4 When a buyer in State C agrees to
terms via long-distance communication with a seller in State D,
which state's law determines the legal effect of their purported
contract?50
To handle these sorts of problems, the traditional approach
to choice-of-law analysis began by dividing legal questions into
categories (such as questions about the validity of contracts, or
questions about the existence of causes of action in tort, or questions about the internal affairs of corporations, or questions
about the admissibility of evidence, or questions about remedies,
or questions about marital status). For each category of questions, the traditional approach proceeded to establish rules
about where to look for answers. As applied to most legal questions that were classified as matters of substance rather than
procedure, those rules typically (1) homed in on a single aspect
of the fact pattern that had generated the legal question,
(2) treated the larger transaction or relationship at issue as having its "situs" or location at the place of that aspect, and
(3) directed courts to apply the law of that place.5' In tort cases,
for instance, courts determined the existence and elements of a
cause of action largely according to the law of "the place of wrong,"
which the First Restatement generally identified as the place
where the injury had occurred.52 Likewise, the First Restatement
49 See Joseph H. Beale, 2 A Treatiseon the Conflict of Laws § 377.2 at 1287 (Baker,
Voorhis 1935).
50 See id at § 326.1 at 1071-72 (addressing telegraph cases).
61 See, for example, Raleigh C. Minor, Conflict of Laws § 4 at 6 (Little, Brown 1901):
It is of the utmost importance to observe at the outset that every point that
may come up before a court for its decision must have a situs somewhere, and
each point that arises will in general be governed by the law of the State where
that situs is ascertained to be.
See also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L J 1191,
1195 (1987) (noting that for Professor Beale, "the law governing a given legal interaction
was almost always the law of the place in which certain discrete, specified events in that
interaction took place"); Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
Colum L Rev 772, 778 (1983) ("Most traditional choice-of-law doctrine is in the form of
rules ... [that] employ a single specified type of contact with the controversy-usually
either the forum or a party's domicile or the place where relevant events occurred or
property is situated-to identify the state whose local law should govern all conflicts
within a specified substantive field").
52 Restatement (First) of the Law of Conflict of Laws §§ 378-79, 381, 383-84 (1934)
(calling for the law of "the place of wrong" to govern various issues in tort); id at § 377
(defining "[t]he place of wrong" as being "where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place"); id at § 377, comment a (providing rules about
"what constitutes the place of wrong in different types of torts," such as the general rule
that "where a person sustains bodily harm, the place of wrong is the place where the

2013]

The Interactionbetween Statutes and Unwritten Law

673

advised courts to determine many questions about the legal effect
of a purported contract according to the law of "the place of contracting,"ms by which the First Restatement meant "the place of the
principal event, if any, which, under the general law of Contracts,
would result in a contract.""4
Both the traditional approach as a whole and the particular
rules that courts and commentators articulated under its rubric
had costs as well as benefits.5@ Reasonable people can disagree

harmful force takes effect upon the body"). Although the First Restatement emphasized
the law of "the place of wrong," the law of the place where the defendant had acted could
also affect liability in certain ways. See id at § 380(2) (allowing particularized statutes
and judicial decisions from "the place of the actor's conduct" to control the application of
standards of care identified by the law of the place of wrong); id at § 382(2) ("A person
who acts pursuant to a privilege conferred by the law of the place of acting will not be
held liable for the results of his act in another state").
53 Id at §§ 332-40, 346-48.
54 Id at § 311, comment d. See also Beale, 2 Treatise on the Conflict of Laws § 311.1
at 1045-46 (cited in note 49) (acknowledging divisions of authority about how to define
the "place of contracting," but attempting to justify the First Restatement's focus on "the
place in which the final act was done which made the promise or promises binding).
55 On the negative side, rules that ascribe a single situs to multistate transactions,
and that do so by focusing on one feature of those transactions to the exclusion of others,
will seem "arbitrary." Lea Brilmayer and Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the
Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone Trigger,95 Iowa L Rev 1125, 1149 (2010). Insofar as different types of legal questions trigger different rules, moreover, outcomes will depend on
how courts characterize the questions presented in individual cases. To the extent that
certain legal questions can plausibly be characterized in multiple ways, the system will
be more manipulable and less predictable than it might seem on its face. See Currie, et
al, Conflict of Laws at 43-48 (cited in note 13) (noting that in various settings, a single
legal question might plausibly be classified as a matter of either tort or contract); id at
44 ("Characterization problems ... pervaded the traditional choice of law system and
often gave rise to conflicting results.").
On the other hand, the traditional rules may well have been more determinate than
most plausible alternatives. And their content certainly was not wholly arbitrary; many
of the traditional rules had some functional or conceptual justifications. See Korn, 83
Colum L Rev at 778 (cited in note 51) (offering examples); Beale, 1 Treatise on the Conflict of Laws § 8A.8 at 64 (cited in note 47) (advancing an overarching conceptual rationale that explained many of the traditional rules by reference to "the place where a
right arose"). Because most of the traditional rules gave no special weight to the interests of the forum state, moreover, they had the potential to produce the same answers no
matter where a case was adjudicated-which helps people identify their legal obligations
at the time that they are acting, even if they do not yet know where any litigation about
their acts will proceed. See Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 11
(cited in note 15) (criticizing aspects of the traditional system, but praising 'its nonpartiality towards the forum" and "its laudable aspiration to produce interstate uniformity and reduce forum shopping). See also Laycock, 92 Colum L Rev at 310 (cited in
note 18) (alluding to the desirability of a system under which "the same law will be applied no matter where a case is litigated); James D. Sumner Jr, Choice of Law Rules:
Deceased or Revived?, 7 UCLA L Rev 1, 18 (1960) (calling this "the fundamental goal of
conflict of laws rules).
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about whether the costs were greater than the benefits.56 But for
better or for worse, the traditional approach held sway across
the United States from the nineteenth century until the midtwentieth century.57 In each state, then, the presumption that
the state legislature's enactments were not intended to supplant
ordinary choice-of-law analysis meant that the state's courts
tended to use territorially based rules to determine the applicability of the state's statutes.
Commentators of the day summed up this idea with catchphrases such as the following: "[A] statute is prima facie operative only as to persons or things within the territorial jurisdiction of the lawmaking power which enacted it."5* Exactly what
that meant in practice, though, depended on the content of the
relevant choice-of-law rules. Under the traditional approach to
choice-of-law analysis, the net result was something like this:
absent contrary indications from the legislature, state courts
tended to determine the applicability of their state's statutes according to the territorial location of the particular facts that controlled "situs" for purposes of the type of legal question that the
statute addressed.
By way of example, suppose that a state legislature enacted
a generally worded statute prescribing conditions for the validity of contracts. The mere fact that the statute contained no explicit geographic limitations would not usually be enough, on its
own, to make the state's courts treat the statute as applying
universally, without regard to their ordinary choice-of-law analysis.** Even under ordinary choice-of-law analysis, however, the
56 See Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 11 (cited in note 15)
(expressing no view on "[w]hether the [First] Restatement's flaws surpassed its virtues").
57 See id at 10 ("Once upon a time, there existed in the United States a choice-oflaw system.").
58 50 Am Jur Statutes at § 487 (cited in note 30). See also id ("Unless the intention
to have a statute operate beyond the limits of the state or country is clearly expressed or
indicated by its language, purpose, subject matter, or history, no legislation is presumed
to be intended to operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state or country enacting it.") (citations omitted); Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentarieson the Written Laws and
Their Interpretation § 141 at 129 (Little, Brown 1882) ("As, under the unwritten rule,
and in the absence of special circumstances, the laws of a State are for the government
only of persons and things within it, statutes in mere general terms will be construed as
not intended to create offences, or otherwise regulate the conduct of persons, beyond its
territorial limits.") (citations omitted); Sir Peter Benson Maxwell, On the Interpretation
of Statutes 119 (William Maxwell & Son 1875) ("Primarily, the legislation of a country is
territorial").
59 See, for example, Ewen v Thompson-StarrettCo, 101 NE 894, 895 (NY 1913) (referring to "the rule that an intention will not be inferred from general language of an act
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statute was likely to govern some cross-border transactions. For
instance, if the state's courts followed the approach of the First
Restatement, they might well apply the statute to all purported
contracts that they deemed to have been made within the state,
including purported contracts formed by the acceptance within
the state of an offer made outside the state. On the other hand,
the state's courts probably would not apply the statute to contracts that the relevant choice-of-law rules treated as having
been made elsewhere (such as contracts formed by the acceptance outside the state of an offer made within the state).60
The same analysis played out in tort cases. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many states enacted generally worded statutes that made railroads liable for injuries
suffered by their employees as the result of a fellow employee's
negligence.e' Because trains cross state lines, courts confronted
several cases in which a negligent act by an employee in one
state had resulted, some time later, in an injury to another employee in a different state. If a particular state's employerliability statute explicitly addressed this sort of case, then at
least the courts of that state would be bound by its instructions
(within constitutional limits).62 But if the statute was worded

to give it extra-territorial effect"); Coderre v Travelers'Ins Co, 136 A 805, 306 (RI 1927)
("The [statutory] expression 'every policy hereafter written,' though general in its terms,
must, in the absence of specific language to the contrary, be assumed to refer to contracts
of insurance made in Rhode Island."). See also State u Lancashire Fire Ins Co, 51 SW
633, 635 (Ark 1899) ("If it were necessary, hundreds of cases and statutes could be referred to in which general words are thus limited.").
60 See, for example, Restatement (First) of the Law of Conflict of Laws at § 384,
comment b (discussing the applicability of statutes of frauds insofar as such statutes
were understood to address the substantive validity of contracts).
61 See C.B. Labatt, 5 Commentaries on the Law of Master and Servant, Including
the Modern Laws on Workmen's Compensation, Arbitration, Employers' Liability, Etc.,
Etc. §§ 1657-61, 1768-1802 at 5108-23, 5337-5407 (Lawyers Co-operative 2d ed 1913);
Edw. J. White, 1 The Law of PersonalInjuries on Railroads §§ 513-50 at 752-826 (F.H.
Thomas Law 1909). Ultimately, the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) preempted
many applications of these state statutes. See FELA, Pub L No 60-100, ch 149, 35 Stat
65 (1908), codified as amended at 45 USC § 51 et seq; Second Employers' Liability Cases',
223 US 1, 54-55 (1912).
62 For instance, the Indiana Employers' Liability Act purported to give Indiana
courts the following instruction:
In case any railroad corporation [] owns or operates a line extending into or
through the State of Indiana and into or through another or other States, and a
[citizen of Indiana] in the employ of such corporation ... shall be injured as provided in this act[] in any other State where such railroad is owned or operated,
and a suit for such injury shall be brought in any of the courts of this State, it
shall not be competent for such corporation to plead or prove the decisions or
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more generally, courts tended to apply it in light of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti, which often was understood to focus
on the place of the injury. Using this analysis, courts concluded
that their state's statute did not govern a railroad's liability for
injuries suffered outside the state (even if the negligent act that
caused those injuries had occurred within the state),63 but did
govern the railroad's liability for injuries suffered inside the
state (even if the negligent act that caused those injuries had occurred elsewhere).64
To overcome the presumption that any particular state
statute left room for the state's courts to apply ordinary choiceof-law rules, the legislature needed to signal that the statute
was intended to supplant those rules. In an era when the ordinary rules focused on the situs of particular things or events,
one natural way for the legislature to do so was by supplying a
more expansive territorial hook than ordinary choice-of-law
analysis would have supported. The workers' compensation
statutes of the early twentieth century are good examples. Early
on, those statutes did not explicitly address their applicability to
injuries sustained outside the state by workers who had been
hired inside the state, and courts used ordinary choice-of-law

statutes of the State where such person shall have been injured as a defense to
the action brought in this State.
Employers' Liability Act § 4, 1893 Ind Acts 294. But see Baltimore & 0. S. W. Ry. Co u
Read, 62 NE 488, 490 (Ind 1902) (holding this provision unconstitutional on the ground
that if the law of the state of injury recognized a fellow-servant defense, the railroad's
right to avoid liability on this basis "vested" at the time of the accident and amounted to
a species of property that the Due Process Clause prevented Indiana law from subsequently "confiscat[ing]" when the railroad was sued in Indiana). For discussion of how
the Due Process Clause was understood to restrict the geographic reach of state law during this period, see note 21.
63 See Alabama G. S. R. Co u Carroll,11 S 803, 807 (Ala 1892) (reading Alabama's
generally worded Employers' Liability Act "in the light of universally recognized principles of private[ ] international, or interstate law," and understanding the statute to matter only "[w]hen a personal injury is received in Alabama"). Compare Conrad Reno, A
Treatise on the Law of Employers' Liability Acts § 196 at 316-17 (Houghton, Mifflin
1896) (criticizing Carroll and arguing that "as the action is based upon negligence, it
would seem that more weight should be given to the law of the place of negligence than
to the law of the place of injury"), with Frank F. Dresser, The Employers' Liability Acts
and the Assumption of Risks in New York, Massachusetts,Indiana,Alabama, Colorado,
and England § 7 at 44 (Keefe-Davidson 1902) (responding that "the time and place
where the negligence was committed are in the majority of cases indefinite and incapable
of certain proof," and concluding that "the court [in Carroll] was quite right in establishing the plainer rule that the law of the place of injury governed").
64 See El Paso & N. W. Ry. Co v McComas, 81 SW 760, 761 (Tex Civ App 1904).
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analysis to handle such cases. 6 5 Later, however, many legislatures added "extraterritoriality" clauses explicitly extending the
reach of statutes that would not otherwise have covered out-ofstate injuries.66 For instance, the California legislature made its

statute applicable to "injuries suffered without the territorial
limits of this state" if "the injured employee is a resident of this
state at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made
in this state."67 To the extent that ordinary choice-of-law rules
would not have led California courts to apply California law to
such injuries," this provision plainly supplanted those rules: for
the new provision to have any meaning, California tribunals had
to apply the California statute to the out-of-state injuries that
the provision described.69
Many state legislatures did something similar with respect
to statutes defining crimes. Under the prevailing rules of interstate relations, no state would enforce the penal laws of any other state, and so each state's courts entertained criminal prosecutions only under their own state's criminal laws.70 But each
65 See Samuel A. Harper, The Law of Workmen's Compensation: The Workmen's
Compensation Act with Discussionand Annotations, Tables and Forms § 124 at 240-41
(Callaghan 2d ed 1920). As Harper explained, different states had different types of
workers' compensation laws. Some states had "Elective Acts," which operated only with
the consent of the employer and employee; others had "Compulsory Acts." This distinction affected how courts characterized the statutes for choice-of-law purposes. See id:
Although the decisions are not altogether in harmony, .. . according to the
weight of authority Elective Acts which are held to be contractual extend to injuries sustained outside the State, where the contract of employment is made
within the State, while Compulsory Acts, or Acts held not to be contractual in
character, do not, in the absence of either express provisions or language clearly indicating a contrary intention, apply to injuries sustained outside the State.
66 See id at 240 (noting that "later statutes have adopted widely different provisions" on this point).
67 Act of June 3, 1915 § 26, 1915 Cal Stat 1079.
68 See North Alaska Salmon Co v Pillsbury,162 P 93, 94 (Cal 1916) (en banc) (holding that the earlier version of California's statute, which was of the compulsory type, did
not reach any injuries occurring outside California).
69 See, for example, Quong Ham Wah Co v IndustrialAcc. Commission of California, 192 P 1021, 1025 (Cal 1920) (en banc). Because the new provision clearly signaled
the California legislature's intention to supersede the state's ordinary choice-of-law
rules, the key questions in Quong Ham Wah were constitutional rather than statutory.
See id at 1025-26 (upholding the central aspect of the statute as a valid exercise of the
California legislature's power to regulate contracts made within the state); id at 1026-28
(holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the federal Constitution prevented
California from giving only California domiciliaries the right to compensation for out-ofstate injuries, and concluding that the statutory right therefore extended to all workers
hired in California who were citizens of any state).
70 See, for example, Huntington v Attrill, 146 US 657, 669 (1892).
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state's courts still had to determine the geographic scope of
those laws: what exactly did they criminalize, and where? For
each type of crime, the traditional approach told courts to think
about the "nature" of the crime, to determine the "point of consummation" of that type of crime, and to assume (in the absence
of contrary indications) that state law covered the crime only if
"this consummation in fact took place within the state."7' At
common law, for instance, the crime of murder was often said to
have its situs where the victim was stricken-which meant that
if someone standing in North Carolina shot and killed a person
standing across the border in Tennessee, the killer was subject
to prosecution for murder in Tennessee but not North Carolina.72
To avoid such results, some state legislatures specified that anyone who committed a crime "in whole or in part" within the state
was subject to punishment under the state's laws.78 Likewise,
some specific criminal statutes included territorial hooks that
expanded considerably upon the traditional rules.74

Note, StatutoryJurisdictionover Interstate Crime, 39 Harv L Rev 492, 493 (1926).
See State v Hall, 19 SE 602, 604-05 (NC 1894) (reversing murder convictions on
this basis). Of course, a killer in this position would probably have been subject to prosecution in North Carolina for other crimes, such as attempted murder. See Francis Wharton, Conflict of Criminal Laws, 1 Crim L Mag 689, 694-95 (1880).
73 Cal Penal Code § 27 (1872). See People v Botkin, 64 P 286, 287 (Cal 1901) (en
banc) (applying this statute to a woman who mailed poisoned candy from California to a
victim in Delaware). For examples of nearly identical provisions in other states, see
Minn Penal Code § 14(1) (1886), codified as amended at Minn Stat Ann § 609.025; 2 Nev
Rev Laws § 6267 (1912), codified at Nev Rev Stat § 194.020; NY Penal Code § 16(1)
(1881), repealed by NY Penal Law § 500.05 (West 1965); Wash Crim Code § 2(1) (1909),
codified at Wash Rev Code Ann § 9A.04.030.
Interpretation of these statutes proved challenging: When the statutes spoke of
committing a "crime" at least partly within the state, what exactly did they mean? Compare People v Arnstein, 105 NE 814 (NY 1914) (reflecting diverse opinions about whether
the word "crime" required consideration of the law of the other state where relevant conduct occurred), with People v Zayas, 111 NE 465, 466 (NY 1916) (concluding that the
statute should be applied "without regard to the law prevailing in the state where the
crime was consummated") and People v Werblow, 148 NE 786, 789 (NY 1925) (adopting
the limiting construction that "a crime is not committed either wholly or partly in this
state" within the meaning of the statute "unless the act within this state is so related to
the crime that if nothing more had followed, it would amount to an attempt").
74 See, for example, NY Penal Code § 185 (1881) ("A person who, by previous appointment made within the state, fights a duel without the state, and in so doing inflicts
a wound upon his antagonist, whereof the person injured dies. . ., is guilty of murder in
the second degree, and may be [ ] tried ... in any county of this state."); NY Penal Code
§ 676 ("A person who commits an act without this state which affects persons or property
within this state, or the public health, morals, or decency of this state, and which, if
committed within this state, would be a crime, is punishable as if the act were committed
within this state.").
7'
72
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In sum, the territorial focus of traditional choice-of-law
analysis had at least two important consequences for the application of statutes. First, it determined the practical effect of the
presumption that statutes do not supplant ordinary choice-oflaw rules: insofar as those rules focused on territorial location,
the presumption operated to limit the geographic reach of generally worded statutes. Second, it also suggested one way in
which the presumption could be overcome: to the extent that the
ordinary choice-of-law rules were about territorial location, statutes with territorial hooks of their own might well be understood
to supersede those rules.
b) The "conflicts revolution." Over time, choice-of-law
analysis lost its traditional form. The process started in the
1920s, when law professors associated with "legal realism"
started registering sharp disagreements with the orthodoxy represented by Professor Beale.75
To begin with, critics argued that the theory advanced by
Professor Beale (and echoed by many courts) did not really account for the choice-of-law rules that courts used. As Professor
Ernest Lorenzen put the point, "it is a little surprising to find
among the American courts and writers of to-day a tendency to
accept the doctrine of the territoriality of law as the major premise for the solution of the problems of the Conflict of Laws," because the choice-of-law rules that courts used did not reflect
"any uniform theory of territoriality": courts determined the situs of any given event or relationship in different ways for different types of legal questions.76 Whatever courts might say,77
Professor Lorenzen and other critics concluded that the content
of the rules reflected "the social interests involved" in particular
cases.78 According to Professor Lorenzen, moreover, the decisions

75 See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict
of Laws, 33 Yale L J 457 (1924); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and the
Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L J 736 (1924).
76 Lorenzen, 33 Yale L J at 743 (cited in note 75).
77 See Cook, 33 Yale L J at 460 (cited in note 75) (arguing that it is "necessary to
focus our attention upon what courts have done, rather than upon the description they
have given of the reasons for their action').
78 Lorenzen, 33 Yale L J at 750 (cited in note 75) (positing that "in the main,
though not always consciously," Anglo-American courts "have developed the rules of the
Conflict of Laws" with the view "to render a just decision under the circumstances of the
particular case'). See also David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
Harv L Rev 173, 181 (1933) (hypothesizing that within the zone of discretion left by existing doctrine, courts often articulated rules that would let them apply the law they
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that courts reached in practice were somewhat less "rigid" than
either Professor Beale's theory or any other "a priori system"

would suggest. 79
In addition to challenging the explanatory power of the orthodox theory, critics also attacked the normative desirability of
the rules that the theory purported to explain. In keeping with
the intellectual trends of the day, critics questioned the desirability of dividing legal questions into categories and subcategories that would be handled according to prescribed rules.80 Critics also blasted those rules for fixating on the location of a single
event that was only a fragment of a larger transaction or relationship. In any particular case, the critics observed, the event
on which the existing rules focused might have occurred where
it did by the purest happenstance.1 Picking the applicable law
on the basis of "some single, arbitrarily specified territorial connection" struck the critics as bizarre.82 In their view, "a considered appraisal of all the factors" would be preferable to "mechanical rule[s]" that "radically restrict[] the range of facts pertinent
to [their] application."83
By the 1940s, if not before, these criticisms were having some
impact on the courts,84 and in 1952 the American Law Institute
considered substantively best in the case that they were facing, at the potential cost of
having to follow those rules in later cases where they produced less desirable results).
79 Ernest G. Lorenzen and Raymond J. Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws, 83 U Pa L Rev 555, 557-58, 588 (1935).
s0 See id at 574-75, 586-87.
81 See, for example, id at 573-74 (observing that the First Restatement gave overriding significance to the location of the final act necessary to form a contract, even
though that act may have taken place in a particular state "by mere accident, perhaps
because the acceptor forgot to mail a letter in the state of his business location, and
thought of it only upon his arrival in the state of his residence"); Raymond J. Heilman,
Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 43 Yale L J 1082, 1097
(1934) (condemning "rules which rest merely upon the fortuitous element of the territorial
incidence or connection of some artificially designated fact, isolated from the aggregate of
the facts, and bearing no distinctive relation to the case in regard to economic and social
consequences'). See also Brilmayer and Anglin, 95 Iowa L Rev at 1136 n 59 (cited in note
55) (tracing this theme in later judicial opinions that departed from the First Restatement).
82 Heilman, 43 Yale L J at 1088 (cited in note 81).
83 Cavers, 47 Harv L Rev at 185, 194-95 (cited in note 78).
84 See W. H. Barber Co v Hughes, 63 NE2d 417, 423 (Ind 1945) (rejecting lex loci
contractus in favor of an approach that considers "all acts of the parties touching the
transaction in relation to the several states involved" and identifies "th[e] state with
which the facts are in most intimate contact'). See also Lauritzen v Larsen, 345 US 571,
583-92 (1953) (using a multifactor approach to identify the law applicable to a maritime
tort claim).
In addition to affecting subconstitutional law, the critics' arguments probably influenced
the US Supreme Court's understanding of constitutional limitations on each state's legislative and adjudicative authority. In the late 1930s, the Court started relaxing Lochner-era
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named Professor Willis Reese as the reporter for a project to prepare a Second Restatement that would replace Professor Beale's
version.8* By this time, Professor Reese and others had already
hinted at a new approach that would pay more attention to the
purposes behind the particular laws that were thought to conflict.8* At first, however, no one focused single-mindedly on that
idea. Then came Professor Brainerd Currie. Starting in 1958,
Professor Currie published a series of articles that delivered the
"decisive blow" against the traditional approach87
Professor Currie's approach grew out of his understanding
of how courts determined the rules of decision for purely domestic cases--cases in which the relevant events had occurred entirely within the forum state. At the time that Professor Currie
was writing, courts tended to take a "purposivist" approach to
interpreting statutes: if a generally worded statute seemed on
its face to cover the situation presented by a case, but the enacting legislature probably had not contemplated this situation and
applying the statute would not serve any of the purposes that
the legislature had apparently been trying to advance, courts
might well infer an exception to the statute.88 Like most of his
restrictions on each state's power to apply its own law to cases involving cross-border transactions or events. See notes 21-22; Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 192 (cited in note 14) (linking this relaxation of constitutional doctrine to the "realist critique" of "[t]raditional
choice of law theory"). A few years later, the Court also relaxed its understanding of constitutional limitations on the adjudicative jurisdiction that state law can authorize state
courts to exercise. See id at 192-93 (noting that Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's famous opinion in InternationalShoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945), "abandoned the
strict territoriality of Pennoyer[ v Neff, 95 US 714 (1878),] for a flexible approach to adjudicatory jurisdiction"); George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal
Realism, 2001 S Ct Rev 347, 353-58 (showing that although "Stone himself was hardly a
dogmatic Legal Realist," he was aware of and receptive to the realists' "critique of the
formal territorial theories of Beale and the First Restatement").
85 See Stanley H. Fuld, Willis L.M. Reese, 81 Colum L Rev 935, 936 (1981). In addition to serving as the reporter for the Second Restatement, Professor Reese was also the
main law professor behind the development of the LSAT. See generally Willis Reese, The
StandardLaw School Admission Test, 1 J Legal Educ 124 (1948).
86 See Elliott E. Cheatham and Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
Colum L Rev 959, 965-68 (1952) (observing that every statute "was passed in order to
achieve one or more underlying purposes which should receive consideration when it
comes to determining the proper range of the statute's application"). See also William F.
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan L Rev 1, 6 n 14 (1963) (citing articles from the 1940s by Professors Paul Freund and Moffatt Hancock).
87 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 13 (cited in note 15).
88 See, for example, State v Spindel, 132 A2d 291, 295 (NJ 1957) ('The manifest
policy of a statute is an implied limitation on the sense of general terms."); Commonwealth v Welosky, 177 NE 656, 659 (Mass 1931) (conceding that "[s]tatutes framed in
general terms" can cover situations that were "not [] known at the time of enactment" if
those situations "are fairly within the sweep and the meaning of the words and fall[]
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contemporaries, Professor Currie embraced this approach to
statutory interpretation.89 Similar ideas came into play when
courts tried to interpret precedents about the common law. If a
previous court had articulated a principle of common law without considering cases of the sort now at hand, and if applying
the previous court's formulation to such cases would serve none
of the purposes that lay behind the principle, the current court
often would adjust the prior formulation so as not to cover cases
of this sort.
Professor Currie's central claim was that state courts should
take essentially the same approach to choice-of-law problems,
and that this approach would be a complete substitute for traditional choice-of-law rules. Insofar as their own state's law purported to supply a rule of decision for the cases that they adjudicated, courts were obliged to apply that rule of decision unless
federal law preempted it. But determining whether a particular
state statute (or some aspect of the state's unwritten law) really
spoke to situations with out-of-state as well as in-state elements
was not simply a matter of analyzing the surface language of the
statute (or the formulations that past courts had used to describe the relevant legal principle in purely domestic cases).
While that language might well be cast in universal terms,90 its
universality was unlikely to be meaningful; legislatures and
courts were both used to formulating legal directives with only
the domestic context in mind, and the universality of their language usually did not reflect a deliberate decision to reach all
possible cases with foreign elements too.91 In Professor Currie's
within their obvious scope and purpose," but asserting that "statutes do not govern situations not within the reason of their enactment and giving rise to radically diverse circumstances presumably not within the dominating purpose of those who framed and enacted them').
89 See, for example, Brainerd Currie and Mark S. Lieberman, Purchase-Money
Mortgages and State Lines: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 Duke L J 1, 2-3 &
n 5. See also Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum L Rev 277, 290 n 35,
300 & n 65 (1990) (linking Professor Currie's approach to the interpretive method now
called "imaginative reconstruction," under which "'the judge should try to put himself in
the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would have wanted the
statute applied to the case before him"), quoting Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:
Crisis and Reform 286-87 (Harvard 1985).
9 See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts. A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U Chi L Rev 227, 230 (1958) ('Lawgivers, legislative and judicial, are accustomed to speak in terms of unqualified generality").
91 See id at 231 ("The important reason why lawgivers speak in such extravagantly
general terms is that they ordinarily give no thought to the phenomena which would
suggest the need for qualification .... In the history of Anglo-American law the domestic
case has been normal, the conflict-of-laws case marginal."); Currie and Lieberman, 1960
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view, questions about whether and how a particular legal directive might apply to any such case were essentially questions
of interpretation, which courts should approach with the same
purposivist methods that they used to "determine ... how a
statute applies ... to marginal domestic situations."92
For Professor Currie, the first step was to identify "the governmental policy expressed in the law of the forum"-that is, the
interests or purposes that the particular statute or common-law
rule in question was designed to advance.9" The court should
then ask whether the case at hand implicated those interests or
purposes. If the answer was "yes," the court should go ahead and
apply the statute or rule to the case at hand.94 But if the court
concluded that applying the statute or rule to this case would
not serve any of the interests that lay behind the statute or rule,
then the court should stand ready to infer an appropriate limitation that would potentially allow the case to be governed by the
law of some other state or foreign country. In particular, "[i]f the
court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of its policy" to the case at hand, but the case does implicate

Duke L J at 5 (cited in note 89) C'1Most statutes are formulated with regard to only the
ordinary or internal situations.'"), quoting Elliott E. Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws, 89 U Pa L Rev 430, 449 (1941).
92 Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
Duke L J 171, 178.
93
94

Id.

See id ("If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application
of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign state also has
an interest in the application of its contrary policy.); Currie, 25 U Chi L Rev at 261-62
(cited in note 90) ("[A] court should never apply any other law [than its own] except
where there is a good reason for doing so. That so doing will promote the interests of a
foreign state at the expense of the interests of the forum state is not a good reason.") (citation omitted). See also Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 21 (cited in note 15) (noting that "under Currie's analysis, almost all roads lead to the lex fori").
Professor Currie's position on this point softened somewhat over time. At first, he
suggested that courts should apply their own state's law to all cases that implicated the
interests behind that law, even if some other state also had interests at stake and even if
those interests might be considered more important. See, for example, Currie, 1959 Duke
L J at 176 (cited in note 92) ('Wihere several states have different policies, and also legitimate interests in the application of their policies, a court is in no position to 'weigh' the
competing interests, or evaluate their relative merits, and choose between them accordingly.'). In response to critics, however, Professor Currie modified this position. Although he
continued to emphasize that courts were obliged to apply their own state's law wherever
they concluded that it had been intended to apply, he acknowledged that they could take
account of competing states' interests in deciding how far their own state had really intended its law to go. See, for example, Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years:
Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U Chi L Rev 258, 275 (1961).
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the interests behind the law of the other state, then the court
should apply the other state's law.**
Professor Currie emphasized that his analysis was not distinctively about choice-of-law issues. In his view, questions
about whether a state court should apply one of its own state's
generally worded laws to a particular case boiled down to questions about the true meaning and scope of the law in question,
and the process that courts should use to answer such questions
"is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation."96 Given the robust purposivism of his day, Professor Currie
saw nothing special about his analysis of underlying interests:
"[T]he method I advocate is the method of statutory construction, and of interpretation of common-law rules, to determine
their applicability . . ."97

In keeping with his view that the key questions concerned
the interpretation of the particular laws that the courts were being asked to apply, Professor Currie conceded that the analysis
he proposed would have to "proceed[] on an ad hoc basis."9 He
acknowledged that by speaking "only in terms of policies and interests," he was "propos[ing] nothing in the nature of a traditional choice-of-law rule."99 According to Professor Currie,
though, that was an affirmative benefit of his approach: "We
would be better off without choice-of-law rules."100 Professor Currie sharply criticized both the form and the content of the traditional approach, with its "mechanistic" rulesol that sometimes
focused on "totally irrelevant" facts102 and that told courts to ig-

nore the particulars of the laws whose scope they were effectively determining.o3
While Professor Currie's writings were influential, they did
not entirely sweep the field. Even people who accepted Professor
Currie's focus on governmental interests and his analysis of "false
conflicts" (in which only one state turned out to have relevant
9s Currie, 1959 Duke L J at 178 (cited in note 92).
96 Id.

9

Currie, 28 U Chi L Rev at 295 (cited in note 94).

98 Id.

99 Currie, 25 U Chi L Rev at 254 (cited in note 90).
100 Currie, 1959 Duke L J at 177 (cited in note 92).
101 Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan L Rev 205, 210, 230 (1958).
102 Currie, 25 U Chi L Rev at 235-36 (cited in note 90) (describing cases in which
the place where a contract happened to be finalized had "[no]thing whatever to do with
the policy" behind the rule of contract law in question).
103 See id at 250.
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interests) often balked at his proposed approach to "true conflicts"
(in which the interests behind two states' laws really did clash).
Specifically, many of Professor Currie's contemporaries thought
that courts facing "true conflicts" should not simply apply their
own state's law,104 but instead should ordinarily try to compare
the competing states' interests in some way.105 More fundamentally, a number of critics disagreed with Professor Currie about
the feasibility and desirability of scrapping choice-of-law rules
completely.106
At roughly the same time that Professor Currie was publishing his articles, Professor Reese and the American Law Institute were releasing tentative drafts of portions of the proposed Second Restatement. In many important respects, those
drafts took a different approach than Professor Currie advocated. While Professor Reese agreed that "choice of law is too vast
and complicated an area to be governed by a relatively small
number of simple rules of general application,"107 he did not
think that the solution was to do away with choice-of-law rules
entirely and "to pretend that [the court's] only task is one of
statutory interpretation."10

Instead, he advocated developing

104 See note 94 (describing Professor Currie's position).
105 See, for example, Baxter, 16 Stan L Rev at 18-19 (cited in note 86) (arguing that
"a court can and should determine which state's internal objective will be least impaired
by subordination in cases like the one before it" -- an inquiry that arguably avoids "supervalue judgments" about the desirability and importance of the relevant state policies,
and hence steers clear of some of Professor Currie's concerns about interest-balancing).
See also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to
Cavers, 80 Harv L Rev 377, 389 (1966) ("[A]s far as I can see, all courts and writers who
have professed acceptance of Currie's interest language have transformed it by indulging
in that very weighing and balancing of interests from which Currie refrained.") (citations
omitted).
106 See, for example, Sumner, 7 UCLA L Rev at 17, 22-26 (cited in note 55). See also
Alfred Hill, GovernmentalInterest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie,
27 U Chi L Rev 463, 504 (1960) (suggesting that "the traditional learning of the law of
conflict of laws" has more to teach us than Professor Currie thought).
107 Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 L & Contemp
Probs 679, 681 (1963).
10s Id at 686. Of course, Professor Reese acknowledged that state courts were obliged
to follow their own legislature's commands regarding choice-of-law issues. See id at 682
('If there is any convincing indication, on the face of a statute or otherwise, of the desires
of the enacting legislature with respect to the statute's range of application in space, it is
the duty of the courts, subject to constitutional restrictions, to give the statute its intended application."). In keeping with the conventional wisdom, though, Professor Reese
believed that legislatures usually formed no intentions one way or the other about the
geographic reach of their statutes. See id at 684. Because "the legislature never thought
about the matter at all," interpreters would not be able to unearth any actual legislative
intentions. Id at 686. According to Professor Reese, moreover, if a court merely asked
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more choice-of-law rules: "What is needed [ ] is a large number of
relatively narrow rules that will be applicable only in precisely
defined situations."109
Professor Reese himself saw the Second Restatement as a
halfway house on the route to this goal. With respect to some
categories of legal questions, the Second Restatement did supply
crisp and specific rules.110 In other areas, though, the existing
case law and scholarship were in flux, and Professor Reese believed that "it is probably better [for the Second Restatement] to
err on the side of a rule that may be too fluid and uncertain in
application than to take one's chances with a precise and hardand-fast rule that may be proved wrong in the future.""'l With
respect to issues of tort and contract, for instance, the Second
Restatement resorted to a fuzzy formulation: it advised courts to
apply the law of "the state which, with respect to [the particular
issue in question], has the most significant relationship" to the
parties and the relevant transaction or occurrence. 112 To help
courts identify that state, the Second Restatement provided a
nonexclusive list of contacts that might matter in particular cases, 113 and it told courts to evaluate the significance of those contacts in light of a nonexclusive list of general policies that
"what the legislature would have intended, or should have intended, had it thought
about the problem," the court would naturally assume that "the legislature would have
been moved by the same considerations as would have moved the court." Id. Given that
the court would be making the key decisions itself, Professor Reese saw nothing to be
gained by "pretend[ing] to be effectuating the intentions of the legislature." Id.
109 Id at 681.

110 See id at 699 ("Fairly precise rules have in general been stated in the case of status, corporations, and property.").
Ill Reese, 28 L & Contemp Probs at 681 (cited in note 107). See also Symeonides,
The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 31-35 (cited in note 15) (observing that the
Second Restatement handles a few questions with "black-letter rules," a larger number
with "presumptive rules," some others with "mere pointers," and the remainder with "ad
hoc analysis).
112 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws at § 145(1) (addressing tort
issues); id at § 188(1) (addressing contract issues in the absence of an effective choice of
law by the parties themselves).
113 See id at § 145(2) (indicating that for issues in tort, the relevant contacts include
"(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered," and advising courts that "[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according
to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue"); id at § 188(2) (providing a similar list of contacts relevant to issues in contract, including "(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the
location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties").
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choice-of-law rules were supposed to serve.114 For a number of
specific issues in tort and contract, the Second Restatement also
identified a particular state whose law would apply unless the
court concluded that some other state had a "more significant relationship" to the parties and the relevant transaction or occurrence.115 Still, Professor Reese himself conceded that the Second
Restatement was vague about the proper treatment of tort and
contract issues, and he hoped that experience over time would
permit a future Restatement to supply "more definite and precise rules."Ixe

Not surprisingly, Professor Currie did not like either this
aspiration or the Second Restatement.117 He wanted to give up
114 According to § 6 of the Second Restatement, in the absence of contrary statutory
directives,
The factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the
needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id at § 6. See also Cheatham and Reese, 52 Colum L Rev at 981-82 (cited in note 86)
(setting out a similar list).
115 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws at § 146:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties.
See also Nafziger, 58 Am J Comp L at 167 (cited in note 15) (describing provisions of this
sort as using "territorialist rules more or less drawn from the first Restatement as a first
step in seeking to determine the law that bears the most significant relationship to the
parties or a particular event or transaction').
116 Reese, 28 L & Contemp Probs at 699 (cited in note 107). See also Willis L.M.
Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 Cornell L Rev 315, 334 (1972) ("We have
probably reached the stage where most areas of choice of law can be covered by general
principles which are subject to imprecise exceptions. We should press on, however, beyond these principles to the formulation of precise rules.'); Willis L.M. Reese, The Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 Mercer L Rev 501, 517 (1983) ('In choice of
law ... a considerable body of scholarly opinion and some judicial authorities favor an ad
hoc approach. The Restatement Second is to the contrary; it favors keeping what rules
there are and, when possible, developing additional rules.") (citation omitted).
117 See Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in
Conflict of Law, 63 Colum L Rev 1233, 1235 (1963) (referring to "the doom of all attempts ... to solve the problems of conflict of laws by a compendium of choice-of-law
rules and in particular of the Restatement (Second)'s attempt to solve them by reference
to the 'law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence
and with the parties") (emphasis omitted); id at 1239-40 (bemoaning the Second Restatement's "studied avoidance of any suggestion that the answer might be found by construction and interpretation of the respective laws"); Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested
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on choice-of-law rules entirely, and he complained that Professor
Reese "has not changed his basic philosophy of conflict of laws"
since 1952 (notwithstanding the intervening scholarship of Professor Currie and others).1's But while the Second Restatement
did not dismantle the field as thoroughly as Professor Currie
wanted, its multifactor approach to tort and contract conflicts
still represented a significant departure from the First Restatement. Combined with scholarly criticism of the First Restatement, the release of drafts of the Second Restatement inspired a
growing number of courts to repudiate the traditional approach
to tort and contract cases.119 That trend continued after the final
version of the Second Restatement was promulgated in 1969.120
Today, only ten states automatically apply the traditional rule of
lex loci delicti in tort cases, and only twelve automatically apply
the traditional rule of lex loci contractus in contract cases.121 Of
the many states that have abandoned the traditional approach
to tort and contract issues, moreover, well over half purport to
follow the Second Restatement.122

Unfortunately, exactly what it means to follow the Second Restatement is open to dispute. Especially in the realms of tort and
contract, different courts can take its approach in very different directions.123 By emphasizing the provisions of the Second Restatement that establish starting presumptions for specific issues,124
Third State, 28 L & Contemp Probs 754, 755 (1963) ("At this stage we certainly do not
need a new Restatement, although we are threatened with one.") (emphasis omitted).
118 Currie, 28 L & Contemp Probs at 761 n 25 (cited in note 117).
119 See, for example, Babcock v Jackson, 191 NE2d 279, 280-84 (NY 1963) (abandoning the principle that the law of "the place where both the wrong and the injury took
place" should invariably govern the availability of relief in tort, and instead embracing
"the approach adopted in the most recent revision of the Conflict of Laws Restatement").
See also Syneonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 40-41 (cited in note 15)
(reporting that in the 1960s, a total of fifteen states abandoned the traditional rule of lex
loci delicti); id at 45-46 (adding that by 1969, nine states had also abandoned the traditional rule of lex loci contractus).
120 See Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers, and Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws
81 (West 5th ed 2010) (counting ten departures from the lex loci delicti rule in the 1970s,
nine more in the 1980s, five in the 1990s, and one in 2000); id at 85 (reporting that departures from the lex loci contractus rule occurred slightly later, but counting nine in the
1970s, eleven in the 1980s, and nine more in the 1990s).
121 See id at 81, 85.
122 See id at 95.

123 See Symeon C. Symeonides, An Outsider's View of the American Approach to
Choiceof Law *39 (unpublished SJD dissertation, Harvard Law School, 1980) (observing
that the Second Restatement is "broad enough to encompass almost all modern American approaches"), quoted in Symeon C. Symeonides, The JudicialAcceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 Md L Rev 1248, 1279 (1997).
124 See note 115 and accompanying text.
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courts can end up with results quite similar to those produced by
the traditional approach.125 By focusing instead on the multifactor lists of contacts that appear in §§ 145 and 188 of the Second
Restatement,126 courts can pursue the more open-ended, allthings-considered approach that some commentators before Professor Currie seemed to favor.127 And by cherry-picking among
the policies listed in § 6, courts can approximate either Professor
Currie's approach or related forms of interest analysis.128
If the courts of a particular state were to adopt Professor
Currie's approach in its purest form, they could no longer make
much use of the presumption that the state's statutes accommodate the state's normal choice-of-law rules. After all, Professor
Currie did not think that states should have any normal choiceof-law rules. In the ordinary case, where the state legislature
had enacted a generally worded statute without giving any
thought to cases with out-of-state elements, Professor Currie
wanted courts to identify the purposes behind the particular
statute in question, make judgments about how far the statute
needed to reach to serve those purposes, and read corresponding
limitations into the statute so that it did not apply beyond its
purposes in situations where other states had interests at stake.
A presumption that the state's statutes accommodate this analysis might help courts explain why they are not bound by the
statute's literal text, but it would not itself give courts any
pointers about the content of the limitations that they should
read into the statute. Those limitations would instead be driven
entirely by the purposes that the courts imputed to the particular statute that they were purporting to interpret.

125 See Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observationsand an EmpiricalNote, 56 Md L Rev 1232, 1239-40 (1997).
126 See note 113.
127 Compare Symeonides, 56 Md L Rev at 1262-63 & n 110 (cited in note 123) (citing
cases that "use the Restatement (Second) as a camouflage for a 'grouping-of-contacts' approach') (emphasis omitted), with text accompanying note 83.
12s See note 114, quoting Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflicts of Law at § 6
(calling attention to "the relevant policies of the forum" and "the relevant policies of other interested states"); Reese, 34 Mercer L Rev at 508-09 (cited in note 116) (linking this
aspect of § 6 to "the views of Professor Brainerd Currie'). See also Hay, Borchers, and
Symeonides, Conflict of Laws at 114 (cited in note 120) ("[I]nterest analysis is often
heavily employed by states that generally follow the [Second] Restatement.").
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In fact, however, no state uses interest analysis across the
board,129 and the scholar who most closely tracks state choice-oflaw decisions reports that "judicial support for Currie's approach
has decreased dramatically in recent years."130 While interest

analysis is certainly an important part of modern choice-of-law
analysis, it plays a greater role in some areas of law than oth-

ers, 131 and it often operates within a framework supplied by more
traditional choice-of-law doctrines.132 All states retain some generic choice-of-law rules of the sort that Professor Currie pilloried.
Admittedly, the Second Restatement has fewer crisp rules
than the original Restatement, and critics accuse it of having little actual content. 133 But even in tort cases, studies suggest that
the Second Restatement gives courts some guidance.34 In many
other areas of law, moreover, its provisions are considerably more
definite.'>> While the presumption that each state's statutes
129 See Hay, Borchers, and Symeonides, Conflict of Laws at 94-95, 114 (cited in note
120) (identifying no jurisdictions that use pure interest analysis in contract cases and
only two-California and the District of Columbia-that use it in tort cases).
150 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 22 (cited in note 15).
This development is consistent with modern skepticism about the style of statutory interpretation on which Professor Currie's approach rested (and which Professor Currie
viewed as a complete substitute for choice-of-law rules). Free-floating purposivism is
much less common today than it was when Professor Currie wrote his articles. Consider
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L J 1750, 1844 (2010) (positing
that a modified form of textualism is emerging as a consensus methodology in a number
of state courts). To be sure, modern judges may not fully appreciate the link between
Professor Currie's approach to choice-of-law problems and his faith in purposivist interpretation, and so the decline of strong purposivism may not be directly responsible for
any retreat from Professor Currie's views. But the weakening of purposivism probably
does make judges less likely to believe that all choice-of-law problems can be solved
through the ad hoc analysis that Professor Currie advocated.
181 See, for example, Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,Conflict of Laws, and the
UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106 Yale L J 1965, 1998-99 (1997) (predicting
that some states "probably will adopt one of the modern approaches to choice of law for
marriage cases" but adding that "[a]t present, these approaches generally are confined to
tort and/or contract cases in the states that use them").
182 See Gary J. Simeon, Choice of Law after the CurrieRevolution: What Role for the
Needs of the Interstate and InternationalSystems?, 63 Mercer L Rev 715, 722 (2012) (describing how courts that follow the Second Restatement use interest analysis in tandem
with "directives [] patterned after one or another traditional rule').
133 See Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 Ind L J 527,
527 (2000) (calling the Second Restatement "a blend of indeterminate indeterminacy"
and "[a] total disaster in practice"); Laycock, 92 Colum L Rev at 253 (cited in note 18)
('T"rying to be all things to all people, [the Second Restatement] produced mush.").
134 See Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? InternationalChoice of Law in Action, 84 NYU L Rev 719, 757-61, 770-74 (2009).
135 See, for example, Patrick J. Borchers, New York Choice of Law: Weaving the
Tangled Strands, 57 Albany L Rev 93, 98 (1993).

2013]

The Interactionbetween Statutes and Unwritten Law

691

accommodate the state's normal choice-of-law rules is likely to
operate less predictably in states that follow the Second Restatement than in states that follow the traditional approach,
the Second Restatement is not so radically indeterminate as to
scuttle the presumption completely.
Of course, generalizations about how state courts do things
are treacherous. With multiple levels of courts in fifty separate
states, judicial opinions are bound to go in different directions.
Some of those opinions reflect considerable confusion about the
interaction between state statutes and choice-of-law doctrines.
On occasion, for instance, state courts speak as if statutes are
exempt from choice-of-law analysis.1 Especially in areas of
state law that have federal counterparts, moreover, state courts
sometimes base their analysis upon opinions by federal courts
construing the parallel federal statutes-and, as we shall see in
the next Section, those federal opinions tend to be cast entirely
in terms of statutory interpretation. Under the influence of federal precedents, then, state courts sometimes end up invoking a
"presumption against extraterritorial operation of statutes" rather than conducting their normal choice-of-law analysis.8a Con-

cerns about the constitutionality of state legislation sometimes
produce a similar effect: separate and apart from state choice-oflaw doctrines, state courts sometimes apply a presumption
against extraterritoriality as a matter of statutory interpretation in order to preserve the validity of statutes that might be
unconstitutional if they addressed conduct beyond the state's
borders.188

There are other reasons too why state courts might apply
such a presumption in lieu of (or in addition to) their normal
choice-of-law doctrines. In some states, a presumption against
extraterritoriality was established at a time when it may simply
have been a convenient way of expressing the idea that generally
worded state statutes should not lightly be construed to override
136 See, for example, Houston v Whittier, 216 P3d 1272, 1279 (Idaho 2009) ("Because
these two causes of action are created by statute, the issue is not choice of law!").
187 Union Underwear Co v Barnhart, 50 SW3d 188, 190-93 (Ky 2001) (addressing
state antidiscrimination law). For a similar example, see Coca-Cola Co v HarmarBottling Co, 218 SW3d 671, 682-83 (Tex 2006) (addressing state antitrust law).
138 See Abel v Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of New Canaan, 998
A2d 1149, 1157-60 (Conn 2010) (discussing cases applying a presumption against extraterritoriality to state statutes, but concluding that the "primary reason" for this presumption at the staie level "is that states have limited authority to regulate conduct beyond their territorial jurisdiction," and concluding that the presumption does not apply
where that constitutional concern is not present).

692

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:657

normal choice-of-law principles, and it lingers today despite
changes in the content of choice-of-law doctrine.189 In the states
that have come closest to accepting Professor Currie's views,
moreover, the interpretation of individual statutes is an important component of ordinary choice-of-law analysis, and a presumption against extraterritoriality could certainly be part of
that component. 40 In sum, one should not be surprised to find
some state-court opinions that approach questions about the applicability of generally worded state statutes mostly as a matter
of statutory interpretation rather than choice of law.
Still, that approach appears to be significantly less common
at the state level than at the federal level.141 In the mine run of
cases, and in the absence of more specific legislative guidance,
state courts seem to use their ordinary choice-of-law principles
to sort out which state statutes apply to which cross-border
transactions. 142
In general, moreover, state courts seem to think of those
principles as operating outside the confines of the statutes
themselves. Naturally, determining the content of the legal directives established by any particular statute is an exercise in statutory interpretation. But unless that exercise reveals that the
statute itself speaks to the types of questions that choice-of-law
139 See, for example, Avery v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 835 NE2d 801,
852-53 (Ill 2005) (construing the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2, in light
of "the long-standing rule of construction in Illinois which holds that a 'statute is without
extraterritorial effect unless a clear intent in this respect appears from the express provisions of the statute'"), quoting Dur-Ite Co v Industrial Commission, 68 NE2d 717, 722
(Ill 1946). See also note 58 and accompanying text.
140 See, for example, Kearney, 137 P3d at 930-31 (acknowledging a presumption
against interpreting California statutes to have "'extraterritorial' application," though
concluding that this presumption does not disfavor the application of California statutes
"to a multistate event in which a crucial element ... occurred in California").
141 As a crude measure of frequency, I ran the following search in Westlaw's "Allstates" database: "presumption against" /2 extra-territor!. As of April 17, 2013, only 18
state cases came up. The same search in the "Allfeds" database produced 359 federal
cases. Slightly broader searches told a similar story. For instance, the following search(statut! or legislat!) /10 presumption /10 extra-territor!-generated 47 hits in the "Allstates" database and 276 hits in the "Allfeds" database.
Admittedly, these searches did not pick up state-court cases like Avery and Dur-Ite,
which articulated a presumption against extraterritoriality without using the word "presumption." But plugging the language of Avery and Dur-Ite into Westlaw changed the
picture only modestly. The following search-statut! Is extra-territor! Is inten! Is clear!generated 45 hits in the "Allstates" database and 168 hits in the "Allfeds" database.
142 See, for example, Poundersv Enserch E & C, Inc, 276 P3d 502, 505-10 (Ariz App
2012); Jaiguay v Vasquez, 948 A2d 955, 960-76 (Conn 2008); Nordhues v Maulsby, 815
NW2d 175, 186-89 (Neb App 2012); Padula v Lilarn PropertiesCorp, 644 NE2d 1001,
1002-03 (NY 1994). See also notes 31-32 (citing additional examples).
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analysis addresses, state courts tend to act as if those questions
lie beyond the statute's domain. Thus, state courts routinely use
free-standing choice-of-law analysis to determine the effective
reach of a statute's directives, without appearing to treat the results as being built into the statute itself.
B. How Courts Approach Analogous Issues Involving Federal
Statutes
Just as state courts often must decide whether a particular
issue is governed by one of their own state's statutes or instead
by the law of some other state, so too courts sometimes must decide whether a particular issue is governed by a federal statute
or instead by the law of a foreign country. Indeed, similar questions can come up even when no one is talking about foreign law.
After all, the legal rights and duties associated with a transaction sometimes depend on whether a particular federal statute
reaches the transaction. To answer that question with respect to
transactions involving foreign elements, American courts will
have to determine the statute's geographic reach and identify
the triggers for its applicability.
As a matter of constitutional law, of course, Congress can
act only within the limits of its enumerated powers. But many of
Congress's enumerated powers are cast in terms that seem to let
Congress regulate transactions and events occurring beyond
America's borders.143 And while some scholars have urged that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment be interpreted to
restrict that authority,144 courts have been cautious about recognizing such restrictions.'4r Thus, when a federal statute purports
143 See, for example, US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3 (authorizing Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations"); US Const Art I, § 8, cl 10 (authorizing Congress "[t]o
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations"). See also Panama Railroad Co v Johnson, 264 US 375, 386
(1924) (inferring that the Constitution gives Congress substantial power to supply rules
of decision for cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); Note, From Judicial Grant
to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 Harv L Rev
1214, 1233-36 (1954) (describing the latter inference as an innovation of the late nineteenth century). In addition to the powers just listed (which specifically address things
with foreign elements), the Constitution also gives Congress various powers that are
worded in general terms but that might be used to regulate conduct outside the United
States. For instance, in the exercise of its power "[t]o provide for the Punishment of
counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States," Congress might
prohibit foreign as well as domestic acts of counterfeiting. US Const Art I, § 8, cl 6.
14 See generally Brilmayer and Norchi, 105 Harv L Rev 1217 (cited in note 19).
145 See id at 1219-20 n 12.
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to reach cross-border transactions or occurrences, American
courts usually will go ahead and apply the statute (even if foreign
courts would instead apply some other country's law).46
Still, the fact that Congress can regulate cross-border transactions does not tell courts how to determine whether Congress
has actually done so-that is, whether a particular federal statute does indeed supply rules of decision for cases that involve
foreign as well as domestic elements. This Section explores
changes over time in the federal courts' approach to that topic.
Scholars have already ably demonstrated that the federal
courts' bottom line shifted over the course of the twentieth century.147 At first, the courts' results reflected generic territorialist
premises that comported with the general jurisprudence of conflict of laws as it then stood.as By the 1940s, that approach was
giving way to purposive interpretation of individual federal
statutes, and courts seemed increasingly willing to apply federal
statutes to transactions that would not otherwise be governed by
American law.149 Ultimately, however, the Rehnquist Court reversed that trend; it articulated a fairly powerful "presumption
against extraterritoriality" that harks back to the territorialism
of the early twentieth century but that lacks much connection to
general choice-of-law jurisprudence as it now stands in the
United States. 50
Rather than simply retelling a story that has already been
well told, this Section focuses less on the courts' bottom line than
on their conception of the interaction between federal statutes
and principles of unwritten law. The leading exemplar of the approach that prevailed at the start of the twentieth century-an
opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes about the territorial

See id at 1218-21.
For two leading descriptions of the shift, see Born, 24 L & Pol Intl Bus at 6-59
(cited in note 14); Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 184-201 (cited in note 14). For more recent
treatments, see, for example, John H. Knox, A Presumptionagainst Extrajurisdictionality, 104 Am J Intl L 351, 361-78 (2010); Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 Vand L Rev 1455, 1462-78 (2008).
148 See, for example, American Banana Co v United FruitCo, 213 US 347, 357 (1909).
149 See, for example, United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 443-44
(2d Cir 1945) ("Alcoa).
150 See EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 248 (1991) ("Aramco"). See
also Morrison v NationalAustralia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869, 2877-78 (2010) (confirming
this approach); Brilmayer and Norchi, 105 Harv L Rev at 1228 & n 56 (cited in note 19)
(observing that "[r]eferences in modern [federal] extraterritoriality cases to state choice
of law are few and far between," and concluding that "[t]he state choice of law revolution
... had virtually no impact on the development of federal choice of law").
146
147
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reach of the Sherman Act15L--is unclear on this point: Justice
Holmes may have thought that the background choice-of-law
principles operated directly unless the Sherman Act overrode
them, or he may have considered those principles applicable only because he interpreted the Sherman Act to incorporate them.
By the 1940s, though, this ambiguity had vanished; federal
courts were casting the relevant questions entirely in terms of
statutory interpretation. That has continued ever since, even
though the substance of the Supreme Court's answers has
changed over time.
1. The early twentieth century.
In American Banana Co v United Fruit Co,152 the Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Act did not reach conduct in Panama or Costa Rica by which one American company had allegedly blocked a rival from gaining a source of bananas for export to
the United States. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes emphasized that "the acts causing the damage were done ... outside the jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other [countries]."153 Justice

Holmes concluded

that the case

therefore implicated "the general and almost universal rule [ ]
that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done."154 To be sure, Justice Holmes acknowledged exceptions to
this general rule. For instance, "in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas," countries were in the habit of
"treat[ing] some relations between their citizens as governed by
their own law."155 Likewise, it was not unheard of for a country
to threaten that "any one, subject or not, who shall do certain
things" inimical to the country's "national interests" would be
punished under the country's own law if the country ever got
hold of him, notwithstanding the fact that he had acted in another country's territory.156 But "in case of doubt," Justice
Holmes endorsed "a construction of any statute as intended to be

151 Ch 647, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1 et seq.
152

213 US 347 (1909).

15

Id

at 355.

154 Id at 356.

Id at 355-56.
156 American Banana, 213 US at 356.
155
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confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power."157
For Justice Holmes, the seemingly unqualified language of
the Sherman Act was not enough to overcome this presumption.
As Justice Holmes put the point, "Words having universal scope,
such as 'Every contract in restraint of trade,' 'Every person who
shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken as a matter of course to
mean only every one subject to such legislation"rs-and people
were not subject to the Sherman Act with respect to their conduct in Panama or Costa Rica. Implicitly invoking the traditional
rule of lex loci delicti, Justice Holmes added that "not only were
the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not within the
Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of the place and
therefore were not torts at all, however contrary to the ethical
and economic postulates of that statute."1> Even if the conspiracy
alleged by the plaintiff had been orchestrated from the United
States, moreover, "[a] conspiracy in this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make
them unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law."160
As Professor Larry Kramer has observed, "Holmes's analysis of this case is pure conflict of laws."16 Justice Holmes's emphasis on the location of the acts that damaged the plaintiff resonated with the choice-of-law principles of his day,162 and his
citations tend to confirm that "Holmes saw American Banana as
a conventional conflict of laws problem."163
Still, Justice Holmes's opinion did not specify the mechanism through which choice-of-law principles were operating. His
bottom line-"what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica
is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is

157

Id at 357.

Id.
169 Id.
15

160 American Banana,213 US at 359.
161 Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 186 (cited in note 14).
162 See id. Admittedly, a devotee of Professor Beale might have emphasized the location of the plaintiffs injury rather than the location of the acts that caused it. See note
52 and accompanying text. But in American Banana, as in most cases, those locations
coincided. See American Banana,213 US at 354-55 (reciting allegations indicating that
the immediate damage to the plaintiffs property and business had occurred in Panama
or Costa Rica). See also Cuba Railroad Co v Crosby, 222 US 473, 478 (1912) (Holmes)
(citing American Banana for the proposition that "[w]ith very rare exceptions the liabilities of parties to each other are fixed by the law of the territorial jurisdiction within
which the wrong is done and the parties are at the time of doing it!).
16 Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 186 (cited in note 14).
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concerned"164--obviously required some interpretation of the
Sherman Act. But Justice Holmes's rhetoric was consistent with
two possible understandings of the interaction between standard
choice-of-law principles and individual federal statutes, and
hence with two possible formulations of the key interpretive
question.
On one possible understanding, which reflects how state
courts seem to think of choice-of-law problems involving state
statutes, standard choice-of-law principles could operate directly
to tell judges when to look to any given federal statute for rules
of decision. In American Banana, for instance, unless the Sherman Act provided some instructions of its own about the conflict
of laws, that topic would be governed entirely by unwritten principles like lex loci delicti, which operated outside the statute and
which told courts not to apply American tort law (including the
Sherman Act) to the facts that were being alleged. On this view,
the key question of statutory interpretation would be whether
the Sherman Act expressed or implied any choice-of-law rules of
its own, thereby supplanting the unwritten law otherwise applicable to that topic.
The other possible understanding would insist that the applicability of any individual federal statute in American courts is
entirely a matter of statutory interpretation: within constitutional limits, American judges have to apply federal statutes
where Congress makes those statutes applicable, and each individual federal statute should be thought of as supplying a complete set of rules about its own applicability. On this view,
standard choice-of-law principles would not operate directly in
cases like American Banana, but would matter only to the extent that the Sherman Act implicitly incorporated them. The key
question of statutory interpretation would be about the content
of the choice-of-law principles that should be read into the
Sherman Act: Did the Act implicitly incorporate standard principles like lex loci delicti, or did it establish a different trigger for
its own applicability?
In theory, these two possible understandings are distinct. But
in the early twentieth century, the distinction made little difference to the outcome of cases in federal court. Because choice-oflaw principles were still relatively stable, the same principles
were likely to govern the applicability of federal statutes whether
164

American Banana,213 US at 357.
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those principles were thought to operate directly or via implicit
incorporation into each individual statute. Under either way of
thinking, moreover, federal courts were likely to determine the
content of the relevant principles in the same way. To see why,
imagine that each individual federal statute that said nothing to
deviate from ordinary choice-of-law principles was presumed to
incorporate those principles into its text. On that view, the content of the incorporated principles would have been regarded as
a matter of federal law on which federal courts owed no deference to the courts of any individual state. Federal courts therefore would have determined each federal statute's applicability
according to their own best understanding of the relevant choiceof-law principles. But the same would have been true even if
federal courts had thought of choice-of-law principles as operating directly. During the era of Swift v Tyson,16 choice-of-law
principles usually were considered matters of "general law" (on
which federal courts exercised independent judgment) even
when no federal statute was in the picture at all.166 In cases like
American Banana, then, the distinction between the two possible understandings of the interaction between federal statutes
and choice-of-law principles made no practical difference-which
may be why the Supreme Court did not focus on it.
Other opinions from this era resembled American Banana
both in using choice-of-law principles to determine the reach of
federal statutes and in failing to make clear exactly how those
principles came into play. In New York Central Railroad Co v
Chisholm,167 for instance, a railroad worker on a train from New
York to Canada had been fatally injured thirty miles north of
the border. The administrator of his estate asserted a cause of
action under the following provision of the Federal Employers'
Liability Actl68 (FELA):

1es 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
166 See Charles T. McCormick and Elvin Hale Hewins, The Collapse of "General"Law
in the Federal Courts, 33 Ill L Rev 126, 138 (1938) ("Before the Erie case, the rules for
choosing the territorial law to be applied[] apparently were matters of independent determination by Federal courts, unbound by state decisions."). See also Dygert v Vermont Loan
& Trust Co, 94 F 913, 914-15 (9th Cir 1899) (illustrating this point); Ex parte Heidelback,
11 F Cases 1021, 1022 (D Mass 1876) ("When we have ascertained what local law applies to
the case, we follow it; but the ascertainment itself is not a local question.).
167 268 US 29 (1925).
168 Pub L No 60-100, ch 149, 35 Stat 65 (1908), codified as amended at 45 USC § 51
et seq.

2013]

The Interactionbetween Statutes and Unwritten Law

699

[E]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or
between ... any of the States or Territories and any foreign
nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce, or, in the case of the death of such employee, to
his or her personal representative,... for such injury or
death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or
by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
roadbed,

...

or other equipment.169

Despite this broad language, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that the FELA did not make carriers liable for torts that
occurred in Canada. Instead, in keeping with standard choice-oflaw principles, "[t]he carrier was subject only to such obligations
as were imposed by the laws and statutes of the country where
the alleged act of negligence occurred."170
In one sense, Justice James McReynolds cast his opinion in
Chisholm in terms of statutory interpretation. The crux of his
analysis was that the FELA "contains no words which definitely
disclose an intention to give it extraterritorial effect, nor do the
circumstances require an inference of such purpose."7' But
choice-of-law jurisprudence accounts for the importance of this
fact: absent congressional override, the Court was unwilling to
read a generally worded federal statute to depart from the baseline rule of lex loci delicti. Again, moreover, the Court did not
specify the legal status of this baseline rule: Was the lex loci delicti rule operating directly to make American tort law172 inapplicable, or was the Court reading the rule into the FELA itself?
Whichever view they took, federal courts would have needed
to engage in the kind of statutory interpretation that Justice
McReynolds conducted in Chisholm. After all, courts that were
169 FELA § 1, 35 Stat at 65, codified as amended at 45 USC § 51.
170 Chisholm, 268 US at 32. Like Justice Holmes's opinion in American Banana,this

statement arguably departs from Professor Beale by focusing on the place of the defendant's negligence rather than the place of the victim's injury. See note 162. Again, though,
that potential subtlety did not matter, because the victim was injured at the scene of the
negligence. See Brief for Defendant, Plaintiff in Error, New York Central RailroadCo v
Chisholm, No 306, *2 (US filed Mar 11, 1925).
171 Chisholm, 268 US at 31.

172 According to the Court, "[D]emands under [the FELA] are based wholly upon
tort." Id.
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being asked to apply a federal statute beyond the limits suggested by general choice-of-law jurisprudence needed to interpret
the statute to decide whether it supplied a special trigger for its
own applicability. On occasion, the very subject matter of a statute led judges to infer that Congress had intended to regulate
behavior no matter where it occurred. (The classic example is
United States v Bowman,173 where the Supreme Court interpreted a generally worded federal statute to criminalize certain
schemes to defraud the federal government no matter where the
relevant acts took place.'74) In other cases, judges divided about
whether laws that addressed their own territorial scope should
be understood to displace more fine-grained choice-of-law principles's and about the extent of the displacement.176
260 US 94 (1922).
At the time relevant to Bowman, § 35 of the federal criminal code forbade both
the knowing presentation of false claims upon the federal government (or any corporation in which the federal government owned stock) and related conspiracies. See Pub L
No 65-228, ch 194, 40 Stat 1015, 1015-16 (1918). Bowman concerned a false claim upon
the government-owned US Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. The indictment accused three American citizens-the master and the engineer of an American vessel and an agent for the Standard Oil Company in Rio de Janeiro-of working together to
seek payment from the Emergency Fleet Corporation for fuel that had not actually been
delivered to the vessel. Different counts in the indictment alleged different locations for
the conspiracy: aboard the vessel on the high seas, aboard the vessel in Brazilian territorial waters, or ashore in Rio de Janeiro. See Bowman, 260 US at 95-96.
A federal district judge quashed the indictment on the ground that § 35 should not be
understood to criminalize acts committed beyond American borders. See United States v
Bowman, 287 F 588, 693 (SDNY 1921). The Supreme Court, however, unanimously disagreed. Given "the nature of the offense" that § 35 covered, the Court inferred that Congress had enacted § 35 as a means of protecting the federal government against fraud
"wherever perpetrated," at least if the perpetrators were "[the government's] own citizens, officers or agents." Bowman, 260 US at 98. The Court supported this conclusion
with references to some of the surrounding provisions in the relevant chapter of the federal criminal code, which had an international flavor. See id at 99-100. In addition, the
Court suggested that when Congress had amended § 35 to include corporations in which
the federal government owned stock, members of Congress had specifically been thinking
about the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and they had known that "vessels of the United
States on the high seas and in foreign ports" were a natural location for frauds against
the Corporation. See id at 101-02.
175 During Prohibition, for instance, the Supreme Court had to decide whether foreign-flagged vessels traveling between the United States and foreign ports could carry
liquor while they were in the territorial waters of the United States. By its terms, the
Eighteenth Amendment forbade "transportation of intoxicating liquors within . . . the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes."
US Const Amend XVIII, § 1 (emphasis added), repealed by US Const Amend XXI, § 1.
Congress had used similar language in the National Prohibition Act. See An Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act § 3, Pub L No 67-96, ch 134, 42 Stat 222, 223
(1921). On the other hand, the law of the flag generally governed a vessel's internal affairs wherever the vessel went. See, for example, Wildenhus's Case, 120 US 1, 12 (1887).
Should the Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act be interpreted as
173
174
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As American Banana and Chisholm illustrate, however,
courts commonly used general choice-of-law rules to determine
the applicability of federal statutes that said nothing one way or
the other on this topic. In the early twentieth century, moreover,
federal courts had little occasion to decide whether those rules
were operating directly (unless a particular federal statute overrode them) or only by incorporation into each individual statute
(unless the statute incorporated some other choice-of-law rule
instead).
2. The shift toward reading each federal statute to
encompass all questions about its applicability.
In the mid-twentieth century, federal courts focused on this
issue and embraced a particular position: ever since the 1940s,
judicial opinions have tended to portray choice-of-law doctrines
as being embedded in each federal statute. In this respect, opinions about the applicability of federal statutes in international
contexts now take a different form than opinions about the applicability of state statutes in interstate contexts. (As we saw in
Part I.A, state courts tend to think of choice-of-law doctrines as
operating separate and apart from individual state statutes;
while a particular state statute might override the state's ordinary choice-of-law rules, those rules are thought to operate directly unless a statute trumps them.)
Part II speculates about the reasons for the divergence of
these two models. As we shall see, the judiciary's increasing
"statutification" of the choice-of-law principles that determine
the effective scope of federal legislation may have been a response to pressures created by the Supreme Court's decisions in
overriding this normal choice-of-law principle? Compare Cunard Steamship Co v Mellon,
262 US 100, 125-26 (1923) (answering yes), with id at 132-33 (Sutherland dissenting)
(answering no).
176 See, for example, Sandberg v McDonald, 248 US 185 (1918). As amended in
1915, a federal statute made it a misdemeanor "to pay any seaman wages in advance of
the time when he has actually earned the same" and added that "[t]he payment of such
advance wages ... shall be no defense" if a seaman sued for a second payment after doing his work. Act of Mar 4, 1915 § 11, Pub L No 63-203, ch 153, 38 Stat 1164, 1168, codified as amended at 46 USC § 10505. The statute specified that "this section shall apply
as well to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States, as to vessels of the United
States." Act of Mar 4, 1915 § 11, 38 Stat at 1169. But what exactly did that mean? Suppose
wages had been advanced to foreign seamen in England before they boarded a British vessel bound for the United States. If the seamen sued for payment of wages in an American
court while the vessel was in an American port, did the statute prevent the master from
using the advance payment in England as a defense? Compare Sandberg,248 US at 19697 (answering no), with id at 203-04 (McKenna dissenting) (answering yes).
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Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins"' and Klaxon Co v Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co.17s Before we worry about the reasons for the
shift, though, we need to document that a shift really did occur.
The rest of this Part aims to do so.
Scholars agree that by the 1940s, there were signs of change
in the substance of the federal courts' approach to questions
about the "extraterritorial" application of federal statutes.1 79 The
classic example is Judge Learned Hand's opinion for the Second
Circuit in United States v Aluminum Co of America'se ("Alcoa").
There, Judge Hand held that the Sherman Act reached anticompetitive agreements that were entered into outside American territory, and among foreign corporations, "if they were intended to affect imports [into the United States] and did affect
them."51 Phrased narrowly, this conclusion did not necessarily
depart from established doctrine about conspiracies outside the
United States that were aimed at producing injury within the
United States.82 To judge from the Second Circuit's opinion,
however, the Sherman Act might not require proof that the defendants had been specifically targeting the United States; perhaps it was enough that the defendants had conspired abroad to
restrict their exports in general and that the ill effects of this
conspiracy had been felt in the American market (as well as
elsewhere). In keeping with this focus on the domestic effects of
177
178

304 US 64 (1938).
313 US 487 (1941).

179 See, for example, Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 192-93 (cited in note 14); Parrish, 61
Vand L Rev at 1471-72 (cited in note 147).
180 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945).
181 Id at 444.
182 Even at the height of territorialist thinking in the criminal law, when treatises

recognized "[t]he general proposition . . . that no man is to suffer criminally for what he
does out of the territorial limits of the country," the treatise writers added a qualification: someone's actions might be deemed to occur within the country even while he himself is outside the country. Joel Prentiss Bishop, 1 Commentaries on the Criminal Law
§ 577 at 600 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1858) (illustrating this point with the example of a man
standing in Canada who shoots and kills someone within the United States). See also
note 72 and accompanying text; John Bassett Moore, Report on ExtraterritorialCrime
and the Cutting Case 23 (GPO 1887) (reporting that "the criminal jurisprudence of all
countries" recognizes "[t]he principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts
in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done").
By the time of Alcoa, the Supreme Court had already held that in certain circumstances,
the generic federal anti-conspiracy statute reached conspirators who were outside the
United States and who had not personally done anything in the United States. See Ford
v United States, 273 US 593, 619-20 (1927) (affirming convictions of offshore defendants
who had conspired with people in the United States to import liquor illegally into the
United States).
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international conspiracies, Judge Hand put a narrow spin on
American Banana,citing it only for the proposition that generally worded federal statutes should not be construed to reach
"conduct which has no consequences within the United
States."188 Alcoa has come to be associated with an "intended effects" test that spread throughout the lower courts and that
gave federal antitrust laws substantially farther reach than
American Bananahad suggested.184

As many scholars have noted, the shift from American Banana to Alcoa was consistent with contemporaneous changes in
choice-of-law theory.185 In Alcoa itself, indeed, Judge Hand
acknowledged that federal statutes should be interpreted in
light of "the limitations customarily observed by nations upon
the exercise of their powers," and he added that the relevant
limitations "generally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict
of Laws. "186 Thus, while Alcoa and American Banana reached
different bottom lines, each arguably reflected the choice-of-law
thinking of its day.
For our purposes, though, I am less concerned with the substance of the courts' analyses than with the form of those analyses-and, in particular, with the courts' understanding of the
interaction between federal statutes and unwritten choice-of-law
principles. Unlike American Banana, which was ambiguous
about precisely why choice-of-law principles affected the applicability of the Sherman Act, Judge Hand's opinion in Alcoa
seemed to take a position on that question. While Judge Hand
acknowledged that the Sherman Act should be interpreted in
light of "limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by
the 'Conflict of Laws,"'187 he strongly suggested that the relevant

choice-of-law principles did not apply directly. Instead, they had
legal effect in cases like Alcoa only to the extent that the Sherman Act should be understood to incorporate them. In that
sense, Judge Hand saw Alcoa and similar cases as being purely
about statutory interpretation. As he formulated the issue,
"[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach
liability to the conduct outside the United States of persons not

183 Alcoa, 148 F2d at 443.
184 See Jonathan Turley, 'When in Rome" MultinationalMisconduct and the Presumption againstExtraterritoriality,84 Nw U L Rev 598, 611 (1990).
185 See, for example, Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 192 (cited in note 14).
186 Alcoa, 148 F2d at 443.
187 Id.
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in allegiance to it."188 Consistent with that view, Judge Hand's
rhetoric proceeded from the premise that determining the applicability of a federal statute to cross-border events required the court
to "impute to Congress an intent" on the relevant question.1se
Even in cases that did not deem federal statutes applicable
to cross-border events, the Supreme Court soon adopted similar
rhetoric. Take Foley Bros., Inc v Filardo.190 As enacted in 1912, a
federal statute called the Eight Hour Lawlil specified that
every contract hereafter made to which the United
States ... is a party ... which may require or involve the
employment of laborers or mechanics shall contain a provision that no laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work
contemplated by the contract, in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor..., shall be required or permitted
to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon
such work.192

In 1940, Congress relaxed this requirement somewhat, specifying that "work in excess of eight hours per day shall be permitted upon compensation for all hours worked in excess of eight
hours per day at not less than one and one-half times the basic
rate of pay."193 Later, in 1941, the United States entered into a
contract with Foley Brothers to undertake some construction
projects on behalf of the United States in Iraq and Iran. The
contract obliged Foley Brothers to "obey and abide by all applicable laws ... of the United States of America," but it did not
single out the Eight Hour Law or include any specific requirement that Foley Brothers pay laborers time-and-a-half for overtime.194 In due course, Foley Brothers hired Filardo, an American citizen, to go to Iraq and Iran and work as a cook at the
construction sites. While performing that job, Filardo often
worked overtime, but he did not receive extra pay for doing so.
He ultimately sued Foley Brothers, alleging that the Eight Hour
Law (as revised by the 1940 statute) entitled him to overtime pay.
188 Id.
1s9 Id.
190 336 US 281 (1949).

191 Act of June 19, 1912, Pub L No 62-199, ch 174, 37 Stat 137. For predecessors of
this statute, see Act of Aug 1, 1892, ch 352, 27 Stat 340; Act of June 25, 1868, ch 72, 15
Stat 77.
192 Act of June 19, 1912 § 1, 37 Stat at 137.
198 Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941 § 303, Pub L No
76-781, ch 717, 54 Stat 872, 884 (1940).
194 Foley Bros., 336 US at 283 (quotation marks omitted).
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But the Supreme Court disagreed. Casting the relevant question
entirely in terms of statutory interpretation, the Court concluded
that Congress had intended the Eight Hour Law to cover only
contracts for work in "places over which the United States has
sovereignty or [ ] some measure of legislative control."195
This bottom line arguably comported with traditional
choice-of-law jurisprudence. After all, even if Foley Brothers and
the federal government had made their contract in the United
States, the wages that Foley Brothers paid its employees in Iraq
and Iran might be characterized as going to "the manner of performance" of that contract, and hence as presumptively being
governed by "the law of the place of performance."196 Without
making any explicit references to choice-of-law jurisprudence,
however, the Court invoked what it called "[t]he canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."197
195 Id at 285. See also id at 286 n 2 (declining to be more specific about "the precise
geographic coverage of the Eight Hour Law" because such specificity "is unnecessary for
this decision").
196 Restatement (First) of the Law of Conflict of Laws at § 358. But consider id at
§ 332, comment c (noting the difficulty of "deciding whether a question in a dispute concerning a contract is one involving the creation of an obligation or performance thereof").
197 Foley Bros., 336 US at 285. The case that the Court cited in support of this canon, Blackmer v United States, 284 US 421 (1932), also did not refer to choice-of-law jurisprudence. But such references would have been beside the point in Blackmer because
the statute at issue in that case plainly trumped ordinary choice-of-law analysis.
In Blackmer, Congress had explicitly authorized federal courts to issue subpoenas
requiring American citizens living abroad to return to the United States to testify in
criminal prosecutions. Act Relating to Contempts § 2, Pub L No 69-483, ch 762, 44 Stat
835, 835 (1926). See also Act Relating to Contempts § 3, 44 Stat at 835-36 (prescribing a
mechanism for extraterritorial service); Act Relating to Contempts §§ 4-7, 44 Stat at 836
(treating disobedience of such subpoenas as contempt of court and authorizing fines that
could be collected by selling the witness's property in the United States). Notwithstanding the plain terms of this statute, an American citizen living in France disobeyed a subpoena and was duly held in contempt. In rebuffing his subsequent attack on the statute's
constitutionality, the Supreme Court made the following observation:
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is
construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
the question of its application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign
countries are concerned, is one of construction, not of legislative power.
Blackmer, 284 US at 437. At first glance, the statement that the relevant question was
entirely "one of construction" may seem to anticipate the approach that the Court later
took in Foley Bros. In context, however, this statement was simply a way of saying that
Congress has the constitutional power to authorize American courts to issue subpoenas
directed at American citizens abroad. Because the statute at issue in Blackmer plainly
did so, the Court did not have to consider the ordinary choice-of-law principles that
might have come into play if the statute had not explicitly overridden them.
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To the extent that the Court was thinking about choice-oflaw principles at all in Foley Bros., the Court plainly did not believe that those principles applied of their own force. Instead,
the Court's locution suggests that such principles would be relevant only if the federal statute in question incorporated them.
As the Court framed the case, determining the geographic reach
of the Eight Hour Law required ascribing some intention on that
point to the enacting Congress. Thus, the Court described its
"canon of construction" as a guide to "unexpressed congressional
intent," predicated on "the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions."19> In the Court's view,

moreover, nothing in the text or legislative history of the Eight
Hour Law supported "the belief that Congress entertained any
intention other than the normal one in this case."199 To the contrary, the Court took the legislative history to suggest that the
statute had been motivated by "domestic labor conditions," and
the Court thought that the statute's failure to distinguish between "laborers who are aliens and those who are citizens of the
United States" also suggested "that the statute was intended to
apply only to those places where the labor conditions of both citizen and alien employees are a probable concern of Congress."200
The same tendency to downplay any independent role for
choice-of-law principles and to speak entirely in terms of statutory interpretation continued in Steele v Bulova Watch Co.201
Sidney Steele, a US citizen who resided in Texas, established a
watchmaking business in Mexico. He allegedly discovered that
the "Bulova" trademark had not been registered in Mexico, and
he registered it there himself. His business in Mexico proceeded
to stamp the name "Bulova" on the watches that it made and
sold in Mexico. All this conduct occurred in Mexico; Steele's
business made no sales in the United States. Nonetheless, some
of the watches found their way to the United States, where
Bulova was a registered trademark of the Bulova Watch Company (a well-known American corporation). Ultimately, Bulova
198 Foley Bros., 336 US at 285.

199 Id.
200 Id at 286. See also id at 287 (drawing a similar inference from the fact that when
Congress expanded the statute to cover dredgers, the amendment referred only to people
who were employed "to perform services similar to those of laborers and mechanics in
connection with dredging or rock excavation in any river or harbor of the United States
or of the District of Columbia") (emphasis added), quoting Act of Mar 3, 1913 § 1, Pub L
No 62-408, ch 106, 37 Stat 726, 726.
201 344 US 280 (1952).
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sued Steele and his Mexican business in a federal district court
in Texas. Bulova argued that by putting the Bulova mark on the
watches that they made in Mexico, the defendants were violating the Lanham Act.202 The district court disagreed and dismissed Bulova's suit, but the circuit court reversed.208
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Mexico
officially nullified Steele's registration of the Bulova mark. With
the case in this posture, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act did potentially reach the case and authorize the district
court to enjoin Steele's manufacture, in Mexico, of watches with
the Bulova mark.204 Again, the Court's analysis sounded entirely
in statutory interpretation.205 As enacted in 1946, the Lanham
Act supplied a cause of action against anyone who, "in commerce," used a copy or colorable imitation of a federally registered trademark, without the registrant's consent, in connection
with the sale of goods and in a manner "likely to cause confusion ... or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of
such goods."206 The Act also defined "commerce" to mean "all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress."207 For
the Court, this "broad" language, combined with the Act's stated
purposes, proved decisive.208 As the Court noted, Steele had engaged in some relevant activities in the United States: although
he had not sold any of the watches in this country, he had
bought some of the necessary components here.209 The Court also
emphasized that his activities had harmful "effects" inside the
United States: "[S]purious 'Bulovas' filtered through the Mexican border into this country," and the watches made by Steele in
Mexico "could well reflect adversely on Bulova Watch Company's
trade reputation" in the United States.21o Given the fact that
202

Pub L No 79-489, ch 540, 60 Stat 427 (1946), codified as amended at 15 USC

§ 1051 et seq.

Bulova Watch Co v Steele, 194 F2d 567, 567-68, 572 (5th Cir 1952).
Steele, 344 US at 285, 289.
See, for example, id at 285 ("The question [] is 'whether Congress intended to
make the law applicable' to the facts of this case.'), quoting Foley Bros., 336 US at 285.
206 Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 60 Stat at 437.
207 Lanham Act § 45, 60 Stat at 443.
208 See Steele, 344 US at 283, 286.
209 See id at 286. See also id at 287 (conceding that "his purchases in the United
States when viewed in isolation do not violate any of our laws," but calling them "essential steps in the course of business consummated abroad" and arguing that "acts in
themselves legal lose that character when they become part of an unlawful scheme").
210 Id at 286. See also id at 288 (denying that American Banana "confer[red] blanket
immunity on trade practices which radiate unlawful consequences here, merely because
they were ... consummated outside the territorial limits of the United States").
208
204
205
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Steele was an American citizen, reading the Lanham Act to restrict his behavior abroad would not violate international norms
about the limits on each country's prescriptive jurisdiction,211
and the Court thought that an intent to reach Steele's behavior
should indeed be imputed to Congress.
Not only did the Court cast this opinion entirely in terms of
statutory interpretation, but it did not seem to draw even indirectly on choice-of-law principles. Indeed, the conclusion that it
reached is hard to reconcile with those principles. In the wake of
Steele, some lower courts tried to reintroduce choice-of-law ideas
into analysis of the Lanham Act's reach.212 Some academic work
pointed in the same direction. For instance, while agreeing that
"[iun American practice, the question [of a federal statute's applicability to events with both American and foreign elements]
ordinarily arises as one of interpretation,"218 Professor Donald
Trautman argued that "conflicts thinking has provided significant
informing principles," and he spoke of "an organic relation between 'statutory interpretation' and conflict-of-laws thinking."214
211 Id at 285-86, citing Skiriotes v Florida,313 US 69, 73 (1941). See also Bowman,
260 US at 97-98 (acknowledging that the courts' interpretations of federal criminal statutes should take account of "the territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of
a government to punish crime under the law of nations," but noting that it is consistent
with international law for a nation to forbid its own citizens from conspiring to defraud
it, even if the fraud occurs abroad). For the seminal case about the interaction between
international law and statutory interpretation, see Murray v Schooner CharmingBetsy,
6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804):
[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is
warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.
For discussion of the CharmingBetsy canon and a sophisticated proposal about how "the
international law of legislative jurisdiction" should affect the interpretation of federal
statutes in modern times, see Knox, 104 Am J Intl L at 355-61 (cited in note 147).
212 See, for example, Vanity FairMills, Inc v T Eaton Co, 234 F2d 633, 638-40 (2d
Cir 1956) (discussing "usual conflict-of-laws principles" in this context, though conceding
that the Lanham Act could depart from those principles); id at 642 (holding that while
the Constitution might well enable Congress to "provide infringement remedies so long
as the defendant's use of the mark has a substantial effect on the foreign or interstate
commerce of the United States," Steele did not require such an "extreme interpretation"
of the Lanham Act); id ("[W]e do not think that Congress intended that the infringement
remedies provided in § 32(1)(a) and elsewhere should be applied to acts committed by a
foreign national in his home country under a presumably valid trademark registration in
that country.").
213 Donald T. Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach ofAmerican RegulatoryLegislation, 22 Ohio St L J 586, 586 (1961).
214 Id at 586, 592. See also id at 589 (adding that the "fundamental and desirable
change" then taking place in choice-of-law thinking "can be of immeasurable assistance
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's decision to frame the relevant
questions entirely in terms of statutory interpretation certainly
facilitated departures from generic choice-of-law ideas.
Contemporaneous developments in choice-of-law theory reinforced this trend. By the end of the 1950s, after all, Brainerd
Currie was hard at work urging courts to scrap traditional
choice-of-law analysis and to replace it with the purposive interpretation of particular statutes. 215 Professor Currie's vigorous
advocacy may have encouraged federal judges to discount the
value of generic choice-of-law ideas and to believe that any given
federal statute should apply wherever its purposes seemed to
warrant.
Whether because of Professor Currie's influence in dismantling traditional choice-of-law analysis or because of the course
set by Alcoa's interpretation of the Sherman Act and Steele's interpretation of the Lanham Act, many federal courts were soon
taking expansive views of the territorial reach of particular federal statutes. For instance, in a series of cases that began in the
1960s and continued for the next four decades, the Second Circuit held that the antifraud provisions in the Securities Exchange Act2l6 covered transactions consummated abroad if they
satisfied either an "effects test" or a "conduct test." The effects
test allowed the statute to reach fraudulent acts that "were all
committed outside the United States" and that related to securities in "foreign compan[ies] doing no business in the United
States"217 if the fraud nonetheless "had a substantial effect in the
United States or upon United States citizens."218 The conduct
in the process of understanding the context in which Congressional legislation occurs');Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Law Approach, 70
Yale L J 259, 264-66 (1960) (pointing out that the conclusions reached in both American
Banana and Alcoa were "based upon principles of the conflict of laws," but arguing that
"[a]n attempt to define the boundaries of permissible extraterritoriality in these terms
... requires a fresh look at conflict-of-law doctrines" because "[t]raditional conflict-oflaws doctrines ... are not adequate to deal with the complex problems presented by the
interdependent economies of the contemporary world"); id at 286-87 (ultimately advocating an interest-balancing approach).
215 See notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
216 Pub L No 73-291, ch 404, 48 Stat 881 (1934), codified as amended at 15 USC
§ 78a et seq.
217 Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp v Maxwell, 468 F2d 1326, 1333 (2d Cir
1972) (emphasis omitted).
218 SEC v Berger, 322 F3d 187, 192 (2d Cir 2003). For other statements of the effects
test, see Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v Minorco, SA, 871 F2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir
1989) (indicating that the federal statutes against securities fraud apply "whenever a
predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects within the United States," and
discussing what counts as "substantial"); Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 F2d 974,
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test allowed the statute to reach some additional frauds that
had been perpetrated in part through conduct in the United
States, even if the losses occasioned by the fraud were felt entirely overseas. 219 (As applied by the Second Circuit, the conduct
test was somewhat easier to satisfy when the overseas victims
were "Americans resident abroad" than when they were all foreign citizens, but the test could be applied in either case.220)
In developing these tests, the Second Circuit acknowledged
that "[t]he Securities Exchange Act is silent as to its extraterritorial application" and that the Act's legislative history provided
no real guidance either.221 But the court still framed the issue as
being "a question of the interpretation of the particular statute."222 Faced with generally worded statutory language that
might be read to cover all securities transactions worldwide, the

court used its sense of "the underlying purpose of the anti-fraud
provisions"223 to try to imagine which "predominantly foreign"
transactions the enacting Congress would and would not have
wanted to cover.22' The court then read those judgments into the
statute.

At least two things are notable about this line of cases.
First, the Second Circuit cast questions that might once have
been handled by generic choice-of-law doctrines as being questions about the meaning of the particular federal statute at
hand. Second, because that statute said nothing one way or the
993 (2d Cir 1975) ("[Tihe anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws ... [a]pply
to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the United States whether or
not acts ... of material importance occurred in this country.").
219 See Alfadda v Fenn, 935 F2d 475, 478-79 (2d Cir 1991); Leasco, 468 F2d at 1334.
220 See Bersch, 519 F2d at 993. See also IT v Vencap, Ltd, 519 F2d 1001, 1017 (2d
Cir 1975) ("We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a
base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners.").
221 Alfadda, 935 F2d at 478. See also Bersch, 519 F2d at 993 ("We freely acknowledge
that if we were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history,
that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable to respond.").
222 Leasco, 468 F2d at 1334.
225 Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, SA v Banque Paribas London, 147
F3d 118, 125 (2d Cir 1998).
224 Bersch, 519 F2d at 985, 993. See also Leasco, 468 F2d at 1337 ("[W]e must ask
ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about the point, it would not have wished to
protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and fraudulently
induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad."); Europe and Overseas Commodity
Traders,147 F3d at 125 (describing past cases as having reached conclusions about what
"Congress would want"). The interpretive technique reflected in these passages is the
one that Professor Currie favored. See note 89 (associating Professor Currie's approach
with "imaginative reconstruction").
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other about those questions, the Second Circuit used a purposive
style of interpretation to answer them as best it could. The conduct and effects tests, which spread both to other federal circuits225 and to some other statutes, 226 reflected the court's "best
judgment as to what Congress would have wished if these problems had occurred to it."227
In the 1970s, two student commentators-including Edith
Jones, now a prominent federal circuit judge-criticized this approach for paying too little attention to choice-of-law jurisprudence.228 In keeping with what seemed to be the trend in choiceof-law analysis, though, neither commentator suggested that
courts should use generic choice-of-law rules to help decide when
generally worded federal statutes applied to cases with foreign
elements. Instead, Jones called for "interest analysis" in the
style of Professor Currie,229 and the other commentator called for
"interest-balancing" of the sort favored by some other contemporary scholars.20 Each of these approaches boiled down to purposive interpretation of the particular federal statute in question,
moderated to some extent by the interests that other countries
might be trying to promote through their own laws.31 Thus,
even critics of the courts' opinions agreed that the key questions
should be cast as matters of statutory interpretation.
225 See, for example, Robinson v TCI/US West Cable Communications,Inc, 117 Fad
900, 905 (5th Cir 1997); Tamari v Bache & Co (Lebanon), 730 F2d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir
1984); GrunenthalGmbH v Hotz, 712 F2d 421, 424-26 (9th Cir 1983); Continental Grain
(Australia)Pty Ltd v Pacific Oilseeds, Inc, 592 F2d 409, 416-17 (8th Cir 1979); SEC v
Kassar, 548 F2d 109, 112-15 (3d Cir 1977).
226 See, for example, Liquidation Commission of Banco Intercontinental,SA v Renta,
530 F3d 1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir 2008) (reading the tests into RICO and emphasizing
that "[t]his is a question of statutory interpretation ... not a question of choice of law'),
quoting Orion Tire Corp v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 268 F3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir
2001); Psimenos v E.F. Hutton & Co, 722 F2d 1041, 1044-46 (2d Cir 1983) (reading the
tests into the Commodities Exchange Act).
227 Bersch, 519 F2d at 993.
228 See generally Edith Hollan Jones, Note, An Interest Analysis Approach to ExtraterritorialApplication of Rule 10b-5, 52 Tex L Rev 983 (1974); Bruce Alan Rosenfield,
ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Laws: A Conflict of Law Approach, 28 Stan
L Rev 1005 (1976).
229 Jones, 52 Tex L Rev at 991-92 & n 38 (cited in note 228).
230 Rosenfield, 28 Stan L Rev at 1025-29 (cited in note 228).
231 See, for example, Jones, 52 Tex L Rev at 993 (cited in note 228):
The broad goal of United States securities laws is the promotion of securities
markets whose integrity and reliability will protect investors and warrant
their confidence. A domestic court should apply these laws if this will advance
their broad purpose and will not substantially interfere with the policies of another interested jurisdiction.
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3. The modern version of the "presumption against
extraterritoriality."
When dealing with federal statutes, modern courts still tend
to think of these issues entirely under the rubric of statutory interpretation. The form of the courts' analysis has therefore remained stable since the 1940s. To the consternation of some
commentators, however, the substance of the courts' analysis
has shifted back toward old ideas of territoriality.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist set the tone in 1991 with
his majority opinion in EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co232
("Aramco"). Aramco was an American corporation, but it had its
principal place of business in Saudi Arabia. A Texas-based subsidiary hired Ali Boureslan, an American citizen, to work for the
subsidiary in Texas. Soon thereafter, however, Boureslan transferred to work for Aramco in Saudi Arabia, where he was fired
after running into trouble with his supervisor. Alleging that his
supervisor in Saudi Arabia had subjected him to discriminatory
treatment on the basis of race, religion, and national origin,
Boureslan sued Aramco and its subsidiary under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.233 A divided Supreme Court ultimately
held that the then-existing version of Title VII should not be interpreted to have any "extraterritorial application"-which, according to the Court, meant that it did not reach discrimination
against Boureslan in Saudi Arabia.234
As in past cases, the majority formulated the issues entirely
in terms of statutory interpretation.235 With purposive interpretation on the wane, however, the Court did not try to imagine
what members of the enacting Congress would have wanted to
do about multinational situations that had not occurred to them.
Instead, the majority relied heavily on the canon of construction
that the Court had articulated in Foley Bros. more than four
decades earlier. In the majority's words, "It is a longstanding
232 499 US 244 (1991).
233 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, 253-66, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et
seq. See Boureslan v Aramco, 857 F2d 1014, 1016 (5th Cir 1988), rehg 892 F2d 1271 (5th
Cir 1990) (en banc).
234 Aramco, 499 US at 250-59. Congress subsequently amended Title VII to restrict
discrimination by American corporations against American citizens in overseas employment. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, 1077-78, codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e, 2000e-1.
235 See, for example, Aramco, 499 US at 248 ("It is our task to determine whether
Congress intended the protections of Title VII to apply to United States citizens employed by American employers outside of the United States.").
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principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'"236 According to the majority, moreover, this "presumption against extraterritorial application" controlled interpretation of Title VII unless there were
sufficiently strong indications that members of the enacting
Congress had formed an "affirmative [ ] intent [ ] to extend the
protections of Title VII beyond our territorial borders."237 Thus,
rather than speculating about what members of the enacting
Congress would have decided if they had considered questions
about the statute's geographic reach, the Court looked for signs
that they had consciously "intended Title VII to apply abroad"and in the absence of sufficiently powerful signs to that effect, the
Court read an implicit geographic limitation into the statute. 238
Even the dissenters accepted the structure of this analysis.
In their view, however, the presumption against extraterritoriality should be relatively weak in cases like Aramco (where reading Title VII to regulate how American employers treat American citizens overseas would not have violated international law
or complicated our foreign relations), and the dissenters were
persuaded "that Congress did in fact expect Title VII's central
prohibition to have an extraterritorial reach."239 As the dissenters emphasized, § 702 of the statute specified that Title VII
"shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment
of aliens outside any State."240 The dissenters inferred that Congress had intended Title VII to apply worldwide with respect to
the employment of American citizens.241 The majority, on the
other hand, suggested that the proper inference might be limited
to areas that were not within a "State"242 but that were still under

236 Id at 248, quoting Foley Bros., 336 US at 285.
237 Aramco, 499 US at 249, 258.
238 Id at 259. See also id at 248 ("We assume that Congress legislates against the
backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
239 Id at 264-65, 267 (Marshall dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
240 Id at 267 (emphasis omitted), quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 78 Stat at
255, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e-1.
241 See Aramco, 499 US at 267 (Marshall dissenting) (deeming this inference "more
than sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality").
242 Title VII defined "State" broadly to "include[] a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake
Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(i), 78 Stat at 255, codified at 42
USC §2000e(i).
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American control-such as "leased bases in foreign nations."243 n
any event, the majority thought that the negative inference suggested by § 702 was offset by "other elements in the statute suggesting a purely domestic focus."244 In the face of what it saw as
uncertainty about "[t]he intent of Congress as to the extraterritorial application of this statute,"245 the majority fell back on the
presumption that such applications had not been intended.
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
Aramco should not obscure substantial areas of consensus. All
nine Justices cast the case entirely in terms of statutory interpretation.246 What is more, all nine Justices acknowledged a
"presumption against extraterritoriality" that controlled the interpretation of federal statutes absent evidence that the enacting Congress had "inten[ded] that a particular enactment apply
beyond the national boundaries."247 The disagreement among the
Justices was simply about the strength of that presumption in

cases like Aramco and about whether the negative inference
supported by § 702 was enough to overcome it.
In the wake of Aramco, the Supreme Court has continued to
apply "the presumption that Acts of Congress do not ordinarily
apply outside our borders,"248 and the Court has continued to
hold that this presumption can be overcome only by "affirmative
evidence of intended extraterritorial application."249 One of the
most recent examples is Morrison v National Australia Bank
Ltd,250 which swept away the conduct and effects tests that the
243 Aramco, 499 US at 254.
244 Id at 255-56 (discussing the statute's venue provision, the limited reach of the
subpoena authority that the statute gave the EEOC, and the absence of provisions about
how to handle "conflicts with foreign laws and procedures").
245 Id at 250-51.
246 See, for example, id at 260 (Marshall dissenting) ("Like any issue of statutory
construction, the question whether Title VII protects United States citizens from discrimination
by United States employers abroad turns solely on congressional intent.").
247
Aramco, 499 US at 260-61, 263 (Marshall dissenting).
248 See Sale v HaitianCenters Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 173 (1993).
249 Id at 170, 176 (holding that what was then § 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which established a general rule that "ft]he Attorney General shall not
deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," did not apply
to aliens whom the Coast Guard intercepted on the high seas). See also, for example,
Smith v United States, 507 US 197, 203-04 (1993) (invoking the presumption against
extraterritoriality as one of many reasons to conclude that the Federal Tort Claims Act
does not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity for torts allegedly committed by federal employees in Antarctica).
250 130 S Ct 2869 (2010).
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Second Circuit had developed to determine the transnational
reach of the antifraud provisions in federal securities laws. The
provision at issue in Morrison, § 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act, read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.251
Though superficially universal, the language of § 10(b) did not
specifically address questions of "extraterritorial application."252
As we have seen, the Second Circuit-in a line of cases dating
back to the 1960s-took that fact as an invitation to speculate
about which types of multinational fact patterns the enacting
Congress would have wanted § 10(b) to reach "if these problems
had occurred to it."258 In Morrison, however, the Supreme Court
repudiated that approach as being contrary to Aramco and the
presumption against extraterritoriality. In place of the Second
Circuit's approach, Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion endorsed a simple rule: "When a [federal] statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none."254
Again, the Court cast the relevant issues entirely in terms
of statutory interpretation. In Justice Scalia's words, the presumption against extraterritoriality is "a canon of construction,
or a presumption about a statute's meaning."255 To be sure, the
contrary approach taken by the Second Circuit was also rooted
in statutory interpretation. But Justice Scalia preferred the
251 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat at 891, codified as amended at 15 USC
§ 78j. See also SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.lob-5 (forbidding frauds and material misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of a security).
252 Morrison, 130 S Ct at 2878.
258 See Bersch, 519 F2d at 993. See also notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
254 Morrison, 130 S Ct at 2878.

255 Id at 2877.
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more rule-like style of interpretation reflected in the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ad hoc speculation necessitated by the Second Circuit's approach.256 In his view, the presumption against extraterritoriality reflects a "perception [about
how] Congress ordinarily legislates," and it also "preserv[es] a
stable background against which Congress can legislate with
predictable effects."257 By contrast, the Second Circuit's approach-which required judges to "guess anew" with respect to
each statute and each case "what Congress would have wanted
if it had thought of the situation before the court"-had proved
"unpredictable."258

Having reaffirmed the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court proceeded to apply it to the language of
§ 10(b). Without getting precise about the details, the Court
suggested that § 10(b) does reach overseas transactions in securities that are registered on American exchanges. But the Court
held that § 10(b), interpreted in light of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, does not reach any overseas transactions in
securities that are not registered on American exchanges, even if
those transactions have substantial effects in the United States
and even if important aspects of the fraudulent conduct leading
up to the transactions occurred in the United States. According
to the majority, when § 10(b) refers to "the purchase or sale
of ... any security not so registered," it is implicitly referring only to purchases and sales that occur "in the United States."259
As this Article went to print, the Court reached a similar
conclusion in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.260 That case
256 Consider Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347, 376 (2005) (discussing modern-day textualists' view that deviations from the surface meaning of statutory language should be "guided by relatively rule-like principles"); id at 383-98 (discussing the role of canons in textualism).
257 Morrison, 130 S Ct at 2877, 2881.
258 Id at 2878, 2881.
259 Id at 2885-88. See also id at 2884 (interpreting § 10(b) to cover "only transactions
in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities").
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued this opinion, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act in a way that apparently is designed to let the federal government itself (though not private plaintiffs) bring antifraud suits in connection with foreign transactions that satisfy a version of either the conduct test or the effects test. See DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b)(2), Pub L No 111-203,
124 Stat 1376, 1865 (2010), codified at 15 USC § 78aa(b). But consider Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank ExtraterritorialJurisdictionProvision: Was It Effective, Needed or
Sufficient?, 1 Harv Bus L Rev 195 (2011) (noting questions about the meaning of this
provision).
260 133 S Ct 1659 (2013).
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concerned the legal effect of 28 USC § 1350, which reads as follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." When the
First Congress enacted the precursor of this provision as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789,261 people would have understood it as
simply granting jurisdiction, not as supplying causes of action or
other substantive rules of decision for the cases that it described.262 Reading the statute to be entirely jurisdictional would
not have defeated its purpose, because in 1789 causes of action
did not need any source other than the general common law;
while the common law of that era might have recognized only a
"modest number" of violations of the law of nations that would
give rise to personal liability for damages,263 the First Congress
would have expected the jurisdiction conferred by the precursor
of § 1350 to make it possible for federal courts to entertain some
such claims.264 According to the modern Supreme Court, however, "the prevailing conception of the common law has changed
since 1789,"265 and federal judges might now doubt whether they
can derive rules of decision from the common law "without further statutory authority."266 In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,267 the
Supreme Court expressed concern that this development risked
denying all practical effect to § 1350.268 To avoid that result, the
Court took § 1350 as itself inviting courts to recognize certain
causes of action as a matter of "federal common law."269

261 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, ch 20, 1 Stat 73, 77 (giving the district courts "cognizance ... of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States).
262 See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 712-14 (2003).
26s Id at 724.

264 See id at 712 ('[A]t the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts
to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at
common law.').
265 Id at 725.

266 Sosa, 542 US at 729 (reciting the view that "federal courts have no authority to
derive 'general' common law').
267 542 US 692 (2003).
268 See, for example, id at 714 (refusing to accept the position "that the [statute] was
stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a further statute expressly
authorizing adoption of causes of action").
269 Id at 729-32. See also id at 730 ("We think it would be unreasonable to assume
that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because the common law might lose some
metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism.'); Fallon, et al, The Federal Courts
at 676, 682-83 (cited in note 24) (taking Sosa to raise a "question of translation" about
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In Kiobel, the Court addressed the geographic scope of that
invitation. Specifically, the Court asked "[w]hether ... [§ 1350]
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States."270 A majority of the Court used the presumption against extraterritoriality to answer this question "no":
with the possible exception of claims about piracy, § 1350 should
not be understood to give federal courts "authority to recognize a
cause of action under U.S. law" for "conduct occurring in the territory of another sovereign."271 Invoking Morrison, the majority held
that "the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under [§ 1350], and [] nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption" by "evinc[ing] a 'clear indication of extraterritoriality."'272
Although Aramco, Morrison, and Kiobel reflect a different
style of statutory interpretation than some of their predecessors,
they have not caused the Supreme Court to overrule glosses that
it had authoritatively given particular federal statutes before
Aramco. In Aramco itself, for instance, the Court declined to
criticize the interpretation of the Lanham Act that it had adopted in Steele.273 Lower courts have therefore continued to apply the
Lanham Act to the alleged misuse of American trademarks even
when that misuse occurs abroad, if it has a substantial effect on
United States commerce (especially if that effect was intended or
at least foreseeable).274 Likewise, Alcoa's interpretation of the
Sherman Act275--which, by the 1980s, both the Supreme Court

how modern courts should interpret § 1350 given "the profound shift in jurisprudential
assumptions" that has occurred since 1789).
270 Kiobel, 133 S Ct at 1663.
271 Id at 1666, 1669.
272 Id at 1665, 1669, quoting Morrison, 130 S Ct at 2883.
278 See Aramco, 499 US at 252-53 (distinguishing rather than overruling Steele).
See also notes 201-11 and accompanying text (describing Steele).
274 See, for example, Pauleson Geophysical Services, Inc v Sigmar, 529 F3d 303, 309
(5th Cir 2008). See also id at 307 (suggesting that when the defendant is an American
citizen, claims might be able to proceed under the Lanham Act even without evidence of
any effect on United States commerce); McBee v Delica Co, 417 F3d 107, 111, 120 n 9 (1st
Cir 2005) (indicating that the Lanham Act reaches "foreign activities of foreign defendants ... if the complained-of activities have a substantial effect on United States commerce, viewed in light of the purposes of the Lanham Act," but reserving judgment on
"whether a defendant's intent to target United States commerce plays any role[] ... either, for example, as a requirement in addition to the substantial effect requirement, or
instead as a factor that, if present, may reduce the amount of effects on United States
commerce that a plaintiff must show").
276 See notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
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and Congress itself seemed to have accepted27--has survived Aramco.277 The principle associated with United States v Bowman,2 78 to the effect that federal statutes defining certain kinds
of crimes either are not subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality or implicitly overcome that presumption by virtue of their subject matter, also remains robust in many circuits.279 But where the Supreme Court is not constrained by its
own pre-Aramco precedent, and where there is no solid reason to
believe that a particular federal statute was consciously designed to have "extraterritorial application," both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts are likely to read geographic limitations into the statute so that it "appl[ies] only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."280

276 See Matsushita ElectricIndustrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 582 n 6
(1986) ('The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the
conduct has an effect on American commerce."); Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982 § 402, Pub L No 97-290, 96 Stat 1233, 1246, codified at 15 USC § 6a (restricting the application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce in ways that are easiest to
understand if one accepts Alcoa). See also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v EmpagranSA, 542
US 155, 161-75 (2004) (interpreting the 1982 statute).
277 See HartfordFire Ins Co v California,509 US 764, 795-96 (1993) ("Although the
proposition was perhaps not always free from doubt, see American Banana,it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.") (citation
omitted). See also id at 814 (Scalia dissenting) (agreeing that "it is now well established
that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially" but observing that "if the question were
not governed by precedent, it would be worth considering whether th[e] presumption
[against extraterritoriality] controls the outcome here").
278 See note 173-74 and accompanying text.
279 See Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S.
CriminalLaw After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 NYU Ann Surv Am L 137,
165-72 (2011) (citing cases that express a range of views about how broadly to read
Bowman in the wake of Aramco). For a recent example, see United States v LeijaSanchez, 602 F3d 797, 798-99 (7th Cir 2010) ("Whether or not Aramco and other post1922 decisions are in tension with Bowman, we must apply Bowman until the Justices
themselves overrule it").
280 Morrison, 130 S Ct at 2877 (quotation marks omitted). For examples from the
lower courts, see Asplundh Tree Expert Co v NLRB, 365 Fad 168, 179 (3d Cir 2004) (relying upon the presumption against extraterritoriality to conclude that the National Labor
Relations Act does not reach an American employer's alleged decision to fire employees
in Canada for complaining about working conditions there, even though the employees
were based in the United States and were in Canada only on a short-term assignment);
Nieman v Dryclean U.S.A. FranchiseCo, 178 Fad 1126, 1129 (11th Cir 1999) ("The presumption against extraterritoriality can be overcome only by clear expression of Congress' intention to extend the reach of the relevant Act beyond those places where the
United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.").
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As we have seen, that formulation of the canon dates back
to Foley Bros.,5e which in turn drew upon language in Blackmer
v United States,282 which in turn cited American Banana,which
in turn quoted nineteenth-century statements to the effect that
"[a]ll legislation is prima facie territorial."283 When those statements were made, they comported with the general choice-of-law
jurisprudence of the day. Indeed, that jurisprudence was probably expected to supply the details necessary to put the sentiment
behind these statements into practical operation.
Such details have to come from somewhere, because abstract statements to the effect that a statute "applies" within
certain territorial limits get us only part of the way toward resolving concrete cases. To appreciate the problem, think of a
regulatory statute that addresses compound transactionstransactions consisting of more than a single event. The statement that this statute "applies" only within the United States
may be adequate to resolve simple cases in which all of the
events that might conceivably be relevant occurred outside the
United States. But what about cases about transactions in
which some of the relevant events occurred in the United States
and others occurred abroad?284 To give practical content to the
idea that the typical federal regulatory statute supplies rules of
decision only for transactions that occur within the United
States, one needs some way of assigning a location to crossborder transactions.
Traditional choice-of-law jurisprudence included various
rules for doing just that. When trying to answer any given legal
question, courts typically were supposed to start by using the
rules associated with that type of question to ascribe a legal situs to the set of events that raised the question in the case at
hand. Under the traditional approach, that often entailed focusing on a single component of a broader transaction and treating
the whole transaction as being localized at. the place where that

281 See Foley Bros., 336 US at 285 ('he canon of construction which teaches that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.").
282 284 US 421, 437 (1932). See note 197 (discussing Blackmer).
283 American Banana, 213 US at 357, quoting Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch 522, 528 (1879).
284 Consider Trautman, 22 Ohio St L J at 592 (cited at note 214) (observing that
when courts face such cases, "it is important to be more precise about what is meant
when one says that legislation does not apply'extra-territorially'").
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component occurred.285 Once courts had assigned a legal situs to
the relevant set of events, traditional choice-of-law rules usually
told courts to apply the law of the situs that they had identified. If
a party asked them to apply the law of some other place instead,
they might well describe the requested application as "extraterritorial," because the legal situs of the relevant events lay beyond
the territory of the sovereign whose law the party was invoking.
But what was considered "extraterritorial" depended on the situsascribing rules of traditional choice-of-law jurisprudence.
Under the influence of Professor Currie and other critics of
the traditional approach, choice-of-law jurisprudence lost this
cast. At least in tort and contract cases, the dominant American
approaches to choice-of-law questions no longer start by ascribing a single legal situs to the relevant transaction or occurrence.
While modern courts still take note of the locations of the various components of that transaction or occurrence, their analysis
is no longer purely territorial, and it often includes substantial
attention to the purposes behind each of the potentially applicable laws.286
In theory, the concept of "extraterritoriality" that the Supreme Court uses to give content to the presumption against extraterritoriality could simply have tracked these changes. Assuming that it remains possible to speak of a general American
approach to the conflict of laws, or at least of patterns in the
choice-of-law principles that various American jurisdictions recognize, courts could piggyback upon those principles to determine the presumptive reach of federal statutes. Specifically,
courts could understand "extraterritoriality" as a term of art
that connotes applying American law beyond the limits suggested by general American choice-of-law jurisprudence. The upshot
of the presumption against extraterritoriality would then be
something like this: if general American choice-of-law jurisprudence would not ordinarily call for a particular issue in a particular case to be governed by American law, then the typical federal statute should not be interpreted to reach that issue unless
there are signs that the enacting Congress intended the statute
to apply notwithstanding normal choice-of-law principles.
When the modern Supreme Court invokes the "presumption
against extraterritoriality," however, it does not appear to have

285
286

See notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
See notes 110-35 and accompanying text.
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current choice-of-law jurisprudence in mind. Perhaps that is because current choice-of-law jurisprudence in the United States
has become so fragmented that it can no longer supply any unified principles for interpreting federal statutes. (In Dean
Symeonides's words, the choice-of-law principles currently recognized by the various American states may no longer "share
sufficient common denominators and similarities as to constitute ... a single law susceptible to meaningful treatment as
such."287) Or perhaps the Supreme Court's reluctance to define
"extraterritoriality" in terms of current American choice-of-law
jurisprudence simply reflects distaste for the content of that jurisprudence. (After all, modern choice-of-law jurisprudence requires courts to make more ad hoc, all-things-considered judgments than many members of the current Supreme Court might
like. To the extent that modern choice-of-law jurisprudence continues to show the influence of Professor Currie, moreover, it encourages a style of statutory interpretation that a majority of
the current Court has repudiated.) But for whatever reason, the
modern presumption against extraterritoriality that courts use
to interpret federal statutes does not draw its content from current American jurisprudence about the conflict of laws. Instead
of using current choice-of-law jurisprudence to determine the
presumptive reach of federal statutes, the modern Supreme
Court continues to quote the territorially based formulation of
the canon that Foley Bros. articulated in 1949.
To be sure, the modern Court does not use the situsascribing rules of the original Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws to flesh out the concept of extraterritoriality. Instead of
treating "extraterritoriality" as a legal term of art that refers to
either old or new doctrines about the conflict of laws, the Court
approaches it as a commonsense concept that simply refers to
physical facts. As a result, the Court ends up relying upon its
own intuitions about what amounts to extraterritorial application of American law.288 Often those intuitions match what traditional choice-of-law analysis would suggest,289 but sometimes
287 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution at 5 (cited in note 15). See
also id at 64-65.
288 See, for example, Quality King Distributors,Inc v L'Anza ResearchInternational,
Inc, 523 US 135, 145 n 14 (1998).
289 Compare Small v United States, 544 US 385, 387-89 (2005) (concluding that 18
USC § 922(g)(1), which restricts the possession of firearms by "any person ... who has
been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," refers only to convictions in American courts and does not attach legal
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they arguably do not.290 Still, the general thrust of the Court's
presumption against extraterritoriality has much more in common with traditional choice-of-law rules than with modern interest-balancing approaches-which is why the most prominent
modern choice-of-law scholar who defends interest analysis has
condemned Aramco for "slipp[ing] back to the nineteenth century."291 As with pre-Aramco cases like Steele, which had moved
doctrine in the opposite direction by giving federal statutes a
more expansive reach than contemporary choice-of-law jurisprudence suggested,292 this slippage was facilitated by the Court's
having framed the relevant issues entirely in terms of statutory
interpretation rather than choice of law.
II. EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF THE FEDERAL MODEL

Part I established that while modern American courts use
freestanding choice-of-law principles to determine the applicability of the typical state statute, they frame parallel questions
about the applicability of federal statutes entirely in terms of
statutory interpretation. When the typical state legislature enacts a statute that does not say anything about the kinds of
questions that choice-of-law jurisprudence addresses, those
questions are understood to lie beyond the statute's domain. But
when Congress does the same thing, courts assume that the
statute itself controls all questions about its applicability. As we
have seen, the answers that courts have read into the typical
consequences in the United States to foreign convictions), with Logan v United States,
144 US 263, 803 (1892) (indicating that "[a]t common law, and on general principles of
jurisprudence, when not controlled by express statute," a conviction in another jurisdiction "can have no effect, by way ... of personal disability or disqualification, beyond the
limits of the State in which the judgment is rendered) and Bishop, 1 Commentarieson
the CriminalLaw § 647 at 661 (cited in note 182) (noting disagreements about whether
the rule barring testimony by convicted criminals extends to people who were convicted
in "a foreign tribunal," but suggesting that the weight of authority opposes giving foreign
convictions this legal consequence, and explaining that "laws do not have extraterritorial
force-).
290 See, for example, Pasquantinov United States, 544 US 349, 359-72 (2005) (reading the federal wire-fraud statute to reach "a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of
tax revenue" and arguing that this application of federal law does not offend either the
presumption against extraterritoriality or the common-law rule against "the enforcement
of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the courts of another sovereign"); Smith, 507 US at
203-04 (suggesting that if the Court were to read the Federal Tort Claims Act as waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity from being sued in federal court for
torts allegedly committed by federal employees in Antarctica, the Court would be reading the Act to have "extraterritorial application").
291 Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 202 (cited in note 14).
292 See text accompanying notes 201-12.
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federal statute have gone through some cycles: the canon of construction endorsed by Foley Bros. gave way to more purposive
interpretation, before being revived (and arguably strengthened)
in the form of the modern presumption against extraterritoriality. Ever since the 1940s, though, each federal statute has been
interpreted as implicitly or explicitly providing instructions on
these matters. This Part tries to explain the federal courts'
"statutification"293 of choice-of-law jurisprudence.
A. The Practical Pressures Created by Erie and Klaxon
The key moment in the transition may have come in 1938,
in a case that was not about the scope of federal statutes at all.
In Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins,294 the Supreme Court overthrew its prior understanding of the relationship between state
and federal courts with respect to matters of general law. The
Court's actual holding in Erie was something like this: on issues
that lie within the prescriptive jurisdiction of an individual
state, federal courts must apply rules of decision reflected in the
settled decisions of the state's highest court to the same extent
that federal courts would apply identical rules contained in a
statute enacted by the state legislature. In the course of reaching this conclusion, however, Justice Louis Brandeis's majority
opinion made some broad statements about unwritten law in our
federal system.
To begin with, Justice Brandeis agreed with Justice Holmes
that "law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it."295 So far as domestic law was concerned, the relevant authority had to be either the federal government or an individual state. But according to Justice Brandeis, "There is no federal general common
law"296-which meant, for the most part, that the unwritten law

293 Here and throughout, I use this term with apologies to Judge Guido Calabresi.
See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1-2 (Harvard 1982) (discussing "[t]he 'statutorification' of American law"). To avoid confusion, I should note that
what Judge Calabresi meant by "statutorification" (the accretion of written laws on topic
after topic) is not exactly what I am discussing (an expansion in the presumed domain of
each individual statute to encompass issues that the statute does not specifically address
and that the unwritten law might once have been thought to govern directly).
294 304 US 64 (1938).

295 Id at 79, quoting Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co v Brown and Yellow
Taxicab and Transfer Co, 276 US 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes dissenting).
296 Erie, 304 US at 78.
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in force in each state "'exist[s] by the authority of that State."297
To be sure, the Constitution might mark out some special enclaves in which states cannot legislate and in which the rules of
decision articulated by courts have the status of federal law.298
Within the limits of its enumerated powers, Congress might also
enact particular federal statutes that produce similar effects in
other areas. 299 But outside the enclaves marked by the Constitution and particular federal statutes or treaties, any rules of unwritten law that apply domestically are matters of state rather
than federal law. After Erie, moreover, federal courts lack authority to disagree with the highest court of the relevant state
about the content of those rules.300
As soon as the Court issued its decision in Erie, Professor
Herbert F. Goodrich-a prominent choice-of-law scholar who was
then Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School301-took
the decision to have important consequences for the choice-of-law
rules applied in federal court. Before Erie, Professor Goodrich observed, federal courts had felt free to follow their own understandings of the general law, and hence they "have often applied
a Conflict of Laws rule which differed from that of the courts of
the state in which they sat."302 According to Professor Goodrich,
however, Erie "has abolished this doctrine." As he put the point,
"[T]oday the federal courts have no independent rules of common
law and therefore Conflict of Laws, but must follow the rules established in the state courts of their district."303
At least in the view of modern scholars (and in the view of
some of his contemporaries too), Professor Goodrich reached this

Id at 79, quoting Black and White Taxicab, 276 US at 533 (Holmes dissenting).
See, for example, Hinderliderv La PlataRiver & Cherry Creek Ditch Co, 304 US
92, 110 (1938) (Brandeis) ("[Whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither
the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.'). See also Alfred Hill,
The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts. ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 Colum L
Rev 1024, 1030-68 (1967) (discussing Hinderlideras an example of "areas that are federalized by force of the Constitution itself).
299 See Hill, 67 Colum L Rev at 1028-30 (cited in note 298).
300 See Erie, 304 US at 78-80.
301 See Roger K. Newman, ed, The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law
227-28 (Yale 2009) (noting that after his deanship, Professor Goodrich went on to the
Third Circuit and was almost nominated to the Supreme Court).
302 Herbert F. Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws § 12 at 24 (West 2d ed
1938). See also note 166.
303 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 12 at 24 (cited in note 302).
297
298
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conclusion too hastily.304 Even when the substantive rules of decision for a case come entirely from state law, the logic of Erie
does not necessarily extend to the choice-of-law rules that federal courts use to determine which state's law is relevant. Perhaps
the choice-of-law rules applied in federal court fall into one of
the enclaves that the Constitution itself federalizes. (In this
sense, choice-of-law questions might be like questions of procedure or evidence, which state law does not control of its own
force in federal court.805) In any event, no matter how federal

courts decide whether to apply the law of one American state or
the law of another American state in the typical diversity case,
it seems natural for federal courts to use a federalized version of
choice-of-law principles when deciding whether to apply the law
of the United States or the law of a foreign country in cases that
implicate federal statutes.
Without getting into these subtleties, however, the Supreme
Court soon unanimously endorsed Professor Goodrich's view. In
Klaxon, the Court rebuked the Third Circuit for having determined the applicable law in a diversity case without reference to
the choice-of-law doctrines applied in the courts of the forum
state. Justice Stanley Reed's brief opinion treated choice-of-law
questions exactly like the substantive questions of tort law that
had been at issue in Erie.o6 Citing Professor Goodrich, Justice
Reed declared that "[t]he conflict of laws rules to be applied by

504 For references to scholarship from the 1950s on, see Fallon, et al, The Federal
Courts at 565-68 (cited in note 24) (canvassing various criticisms of the "simplistic" extension of Erie to choice-of-law rules); Larry L. Teply and Ralph U. Whitten, Civil Procedure 446 n 123 (Foundation 4th ed 2009) (citing modern authors who oppose requiring
federal district courts to follow the choice-of-law doctrines of the state in which they
happen to sit). For earlier criticisms, see Note, Congress, the Tompkins Case, and the
Conflict of Laws, 52 Harv L Rev 1002, 1005, 1007 (1939) (describing Professor Goodrich
as having "casually assumed that the Tompkins doctrine extends to this sphere," but noting strong arguments against his position); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Federal Courts
and the Conflict of Laws, 36 M L Rev 493, 497-504 (1942) (agreeing that the matter is
"not so simple" and arguing that neither Justice Holmes nor Justice Brandeis ever suggested that their criticisms of Swift v yson extended to the choice-of-law rules used by
federal courts).
305 See, for example, Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 Va L Rev
813, 815 (2008) ("Federal procedure, like the traditional enclaves addressed by substantive federal common law, is a matter that the constitutional structure places beyond the
authority of the states").
06 See Klaxon, 313 US at 496 ("We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in
Erie, against such independent determination by the federal courts, extends to the field
of conflict of laws.") (citation omitted).

2013]

The Interactionbetween Statutes and Unwritten Law

727

the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing
in Delaware's state courts."07
Because Klaxon was a standard diversity case, it did not
necessarily tell federal courts how to approach choice-of-law
questions when federal statutes were in the picture. But Klaxon
certainly left room for the possibility that if those questions fell
beyond the domain of the particular federal statute at issue,
then federal district judges should handle them according to the
choice-of-law doctrines of the state in which they sat. Indeed,
even today-when Erie is not always read as aggressively as it
was in Klaxon, and when Klaxon itself has come in for considerable criticismao-some distinguished federal judges might take
this view.309
Most lawyers and judges, though, would surely think it odd
to let the local law of an individual state determine the applicability of a federal statute. To avoid the possibility that Erie and
Klaxon might produce that result, judges might well be tempted
to hold that choice-of-law questions lie within the domain of the
typical federal statute. After all, if each federal statute implicitly
federalized all questions about its own applicability (including
questions of the sort that choice-of-law doctrines address), courts
could confidently explain why they did not have to answer those
questions according to the choice-of-law doctrines of the forum
state. While there might have been other routes to the same
conclusion, treating the questions as matters of statutory interpretation (rather than freestanding common law) was one way
to ensure that the answers had the status of federal law-which,
notwithstanding Klaxon and Erie, certainly seems like the sensible result.o10
807 Id at 496 & n 2.
308 See note 304.
809 See, for example, A.I. Trade Finance,Inc v PetraInternationalBanking Corp, 62

F3d 1454, 1463-64 (DC Cir 1995) (suggesting that in general "a federal court applies
state law when it decides an issue not addressed by federal law, regardless of the source
from which the cause of action is deemed to have arisen for the purpose of establishing
federal jurisdiction," and adding that "[a] choice-of-law rule is no less a rule of state law
than any other"). But see Edelmann v Chase ManhattanBank, NA, 861 F2d 1291, 1294
n 14 (1st Cir 1988) ("When jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship, choice of
law questions are appropriately resolved as matters of federal common law.").
a10 A recent paper by Professor Abbe Gluck about the jurisprudential status of the
canons that courts use to interpret federal statutes argues that classifying questions as
matters of statutory interpretation does not automatically eliminate the need to worry
about Erie. As Professor Gluck observes, many current canons of interpretation reflect
policy-tinged ideas that have been articulated more by courts than by Congress. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of
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I suspect, then, that the statutification of these questionswhich, as we have seen, apparently occurred in or around the
1940s-was a response to the pressures created by Erie and
Klaxon. Admittedly, that is speculation; I am not aware of any
direct statements in which members of the Supreme Court even
acknowledged a transition in how they were treating these questions, let alone any statements in which they used Erie and
Klaxon to explain that transition. But the timing of the transition is suggestive. As the next Section argues, moreover, other
circumstantial evidence also supports my speculation.
B. An Instructive Exception: Determining the Reach of Federal
Statutes about Maritime Law
One indirect sign that the statutification of choice-of-law
principles may be the fruit of Erie and Klaxon comes from admiralty and maritime law. That field is distinctive because Erie
and Klaxon play relatively little role in it.a11 Two decades before
Erie, the Supreme Court began speaking as if the baseline rules
of unwritten law in this area have the status of federal rather
than state law,312 and the Court has persisted in that view ever
since.313 While Congress is said to have broad power to deviate
Statutes, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 753, 760-69 (2013). Without necessarily endorsing the
content of all these canons, Professor Gluck herself is comfortable classifying them as
matters of "federal common law" insofar as they bear on the interpretation of federal
statutes, but she notes that people who read Erie broadly might resist this way of talking. See id at 760-75. Still, as Professor Gluck explains, no one is likely to argue that
Erie obliges federal courts to determine the meaning of federal statutes according to
whatever canons the courts of a particular state have adopted for the interpretation of
state statutes. See id at 773. Where federal statutes are concerned, then, questions that
are classified as matters of statutory interpretation will be thought of as having federal
answers.
311 See, for example, Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83
Notre Dame L Rev 1639, 1671 (2008) (calling admiralty "the land that Erie forgot').
312 See Southern Pacific Co v Jensen, 244 US 205, 215 (1917) (declaring that unless
displaced by Congress, "the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction!); PanamaRailroad Co v Johnson, 264 US 375, 386 (1924) (asserting
that once the Constitution took effect, the general maritime law "was not regarded .. . as
being only the law of the several States, but as having become the law of the United
States," subject to Congress's power "to alter, qualify or supplement it as experience or
changing conditions might require").
313 See, for example, Exxon Shipping Co v Baker, 554 US 471, 489-90 (2008) ("Exxon raises an issue of first impression about punitive damages in maritime law, which
falls within a federal court's jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law court,
subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial
result.'); Norfolk SouthernRailway Co v James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd, 543 US 14, 22-23 (2004)
('When a contract is a maritime one, and the dispute is not inherently local, federal law
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from the general maritime law, states have only limited legislative competence in this area; they can affect the general maritime law "to some extent," but they cannot "work[ ] material
prejudice to [its] characteristic features.

.

. or interfere[] with

the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations."314 In keeping with the idea that
the general maritime law is what is now called "federal common
law,"315 moreover, state courts are supposed to defer to the fed-

eral Supreme Court about its content316which is the opposite of
the pattern that Erie established for questions of unwritten law
on topics that lie beyond the domains of federal statutes in other
areas.
When Congress enacted statutes in the maritime field, then,
the Supreme Court did not have to worry that choice-of-law
questions would be relegated to state law unless Congress's
statutes were read to encompass them. And the Court's 1953
opinion in Lauritzen v Larsen317-the leading modern case about
the relationship between federal statutes and choice-of-law doctrines in the maritime context-took a correspondingly different
form than opinions about similar questions in other fields.
Evald Larsen was a citizen of Denmark and a member of the
Danish Seaman's Union. While he was in New York, he joined
the crew of a ship that was owned by another Danish citizen
(Lauritzen) and that sailed under the Danish flag. Later, while
the ship was in Havana, Larsen suffered an injury allegedly
caused by the negligence of a fellow crewman. After being taken
back to New York for treatment, Larsen sued Lauritzen in a
federal district court under the so-called Jones Act,318 which
controls the contract interpretation."). See also Pope & Talbot, Inc v Hawn, 346 US 406,
410 (1953) ("[Flederal power . .. is dominant in this field.").
314 Jensen, 244 US at 216. The Jensen Court conceded that "it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be
changed, modified, or affected by state legislation." Id. See also David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 S Ct Rev 158, 167, 220 (noting "inconsistencies" and "diverging lines of precedent" on this topic).
315 Texas Industries,Inc v Radcliff Materials,Inc, 451 US 630, 641 (1981) (observing
that "absent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision,
federal common law exists only in [] narrow areas," but identifying "admiralty cases" as
one of those areas).
316 See David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and Its Sometimes Peculiar Relationship with Congress, 55 SLU L J 491, 495 (2011) (observing that subject to
the possibility of congressional override, "[tihe federal courts, led by the Supreme Court,
are in charge of the field of admiralty and maritime law").
317 345 US 571.
318 Merchant Marine Act, 1920 ("Jones Act"), Pub L No 66-261, ch 250, 41 Stat 988.
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gives injured seamen the same sort of cause of action for damages that the FELA makes available to injured railway employees.
The relevant statutory language was broad:
[A]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action
for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply.*1*
But the Supreme Court refused to read this general language to
supplant the choice-of-law principles by which American courts
"accommodat[e] the reach of our own laws to those of other maritime nations."820 In the Court's view, generally worded federal
statutes about shipping had long "been construed to apply only to
areas and transactions in which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law,"321
and the Jones Act was no different: the enacting Congress must
have known that "in the absence of more definite directions," the
statute "would be applied by the courts to foreign events, foreign
ships and foreign seamen only in accordance with the usual doctrine and practices of maritime law."322 The Court proceeded -to
identify and discuss what it called "the connecting factors which
either maritime law or our municipal law of conflicts regards as
significant in determining the law applicable to a claim of actionable wrong."323 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Jones Act
did not govern Larsen's rights against Lauritzen.

319 Lauritzen, 345 US at 573 n 1, quoting Jones Act § 33, 41 Stat at 1007, codified as
amended at 46 USC § 30104.
320 Lauritzen, 345 US at 577.
321

Id.

322 Id at 581.

828 Id at 592. The Court's laundry list of factors included the flag that the ship flew,
the nationality or domicile of the victim, and the nationality or domicile of the shipowner. See id at 584-88. The Court also identified some factors that it viewed as less
significant, including the location of the wrongful act (which the Court described as being of 'limited" relevance in the maritime context), the place where the seaman had
signed his contract (which the Court suggested was relatively unimportant in tort cases,
and which was further marginalized by the fact that the contract that Larsen had signed
in New York specifically provided for Danish law to govern his rights), and the forum in
which the plaintiff had chosen to sue (which the Court discounted because "[t]he purpose
of a conflict-of-laws doctrine is to assure that a case will be treated in the same way under the appropriate law regardless of the fortuitous circumstances which often determine
the forum"). Id at 583-84, 588-91.
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That conclusion rested on statutory interpretation in at
least the following sense: despite the superficial generality of the
statutory language, the Court did not read the Jones Act to displace the choice-of-law doctrines supplied by "either maritime
law or our municipal law of conflicts." Indeed, in an effort to
claim doctrinal support for his own preferred approach to choiceof-law problems, Professor Currie portrayed the Court's opinion
as being entirely about the proper construction of the Jones
Act.824 But in discussing the factors relevant to choice-of-law
analysis in the maritime field, the Court did not tie its analysis
to the Jones Act in particular. Instead, the Court seemed to be
approaching its task in the same way that state courts determine the applicability of state statutes-by applying "ordinary
conflict of laws rules" except to the extent that the legislature
had superseded those rules.825
Admittedly, the Court's opinion in Lauritzen was not explicit about this point: Did the ordinary rules operate directly (because the Court did not interpret the Jones Act to supplant
them), or were they relevant only insofar as the Court read them
into the statute? But this ambiguity in Lauritzen is itself reminiscent of pre-Erie decisions about federal statutes in other areas.326 And while definitive resolution of the ambiguity in Lauritzen may not be possible, the content of the Court's analysis is
at least suggestive. Leading scholars agree that Lauritzen's multifactor analysis reflected the choice-of-law ideas of the Court's
day rather than the doctrines that had prevailed in 1920, when

324 See Currie, 28 U Chi L Rev at 276-77 (cited in note 94) (asserting that in Lauritzen, the Court "approached the problem as one of statutory construction); Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar and All That. A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U Chi L Rev 1, 65-66
(1959) ("In Lauritzen there was only a construction of the Jones Act"); Brainerd Currie,
Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U Chi L Rev 341, 844 (1960):
[The Supreme Court ... did not [ ] resort to a detached, international science
of law in space to determine the scope of the [Jones] act; it construed the act,
striving to ascertain the congressional policy and the circumstances in which
the act must be applied to effectuate the policy, as well as the circumstances in
which the policy requires no such application.... The construction is parcel of
the act.
325 Lauritzen, 346 US at 579 & n 7, quoting Cheatham and Reese, 52 Colum L Rev
at 961 (cited in note 86). See also Lauritzen, 345 US at 581-82 (appearing to link the applicable choice-of-law ideas to "a non-national or international maritime law of impres.
sive maturity and universality," which the Court described as having "the force of law"in
its own right).
326 See Part I.B.1.
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Congress enacted the Jones Act.327 At the very least, then, the
Court did not read the Jones Act to incorporate (and freeze into
place) the choice-of-law doctrines that might have been familiar
to members of the enacting Congress.
A few years after Lauritzen, moreover, the Court made clear
that "[t]he broad principles of choice of law and the applicable
criteria of selection set forth in Lauritzen" operated even in the
absence of any statute that could be read to incorporate themmeaning that they mattered not only to claims under the Jones
Act but also to claims under "the maritime law of the United
States" more generally.328 As the Court explained, "While Lauritzen v. Larsen involved claims asserted under the Jones Act,
the principles on which it was decided did not derive from the
terms of that statute."329
In 1970, Justice William Douglas's terse opinion for the
Court in Hellenic Lines Ltd v Rhoditis380 redescribed Lauritzen
as having shoehorned its multifactor analysis into the Jones Act
itself.331 But whatever the Justices' current views on this point,
the statutification of choice-of-law doctrines occurred significantly later in the maritime field than in other fields that federal
statutes address. That contrast tends to support the hypothesis
that in the 1940s and 1950s, when the Supreme Court started
reading generally worded federal statutes in other fields to encompass choice-of-law questions, the Court may have been concerned that Erie and Klaxon would otherwise cause those questions to be governed by state law.
III. OTHER EXAMPLES OF THE FEDERAL MODEL

The statutification of choice-of-law doctrine at the federal
level is a window into a broader phenomenon. In the aftermath of
Erie, federal courts had to decide how to handle a host of topics
327 See, for example, Kramer, 1991 S Ct Rev at 180 & n 7 (cited in note 14) (describing Lauritzen as having jettisoned prior ideas about extraterritoriality in favor of "a
more flexible analysis of state interests").
328 Romero v InternationalTerminal Operating Co, 358 US 354, 381-82 (1959).
329 Id at 382.
330 398 US 306 (1970).
331 Id at 308 ('The Jones Act speaks only of 'the defendant employer' without any
qualifications. In Lauritzen, however, we listed seven factors to be considered in determining whether a particular shipowner should be held to be an 'employer' for Jones Act
purposes") (citation omitted). Contrary to Justice Douglas's suggestion, the Court's opinion in Lauritzen did not quote the portion of the Jones Act that uses the word "employer," and the Court gave no indication that it was construing that word.
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that involved the implementation of federal statutes, but on
which courts had previously drawn the necessary rules of decision
from general law. This issue arose in various contexts and
proved remarkably complex; many articles could be written
about all the topics that it affected and all the different ways in
which courts responded. One common response, though, was to
interpret the relevant federal statutes as themselves covering
certain topics that they did not explicitly address in any way,
but that courts were reluctant to handle according to the law of
individual states.
It would be a mistake to attribute this development entirely
to Erie. Changes in doctrine about the dormant Commerce
Clause are also part of the story. As Professor Stephen Gardbaum has explained, cases from the early twentieth century had
held that when Congress enacted a regulation of interstate
commerce, the Constitution itself displaced state law throughout
the field that Congress had addressed.332 Starting around the
1930s, however, doctrine under the dormant Commerce Clause
moved toward its current form.>>3 Under modern doctrine, the
extent to which federal regulatory statutes occupy particular
fields to the exclusion of state law is a matter of statutory interpretation, not an automatic consequence of the Constitution.> <
As a result, where courts think it inappropriate for states to
have prescriptive jurisdiction over some issue connected with a
federal statute, the courts have an incentive to interpret the
statute as federalizing the issue.
In the years before Erie, though, courts often did not need to
worry about whether states had prescriptive jurisdiction over
any particular issue. To be sure, if a particular state had addressed the issue by statute, courts would have to decide whether the issue really did come within the reach of state law. But if
332 See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L Rev 767,
801-02 (1994). For an illustration of Professor Gardbaum's point, see Southern Railway
Co v Railroad Commission of Indiana,236 US 439, 446 (1915) ("Under the Constitution
the nature of [the power to regulate interstate commerce] is such that when exercised it
is exclusive, and ipso facto, supersedes existing state legislation on the same subject").
333 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich L Rev 1091, 1093-94 (1986). See also id
at 1206-87 (observing that in "movement-of-goods" cases, modern doctrine treats the
Commerce Clause as establishing an "anti-protectionism principle" that forbids states
from acting for certain purposes, but that does not otherwise limit the states' prescriptive jurisdiction).
334 See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U Chi L Rev 483, 536 (1997); Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 806 (cited in note 332).
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no written state law was in the picture, and if the federal courts
categorized the issue as a matter of "general" law rather than "local" law, federal courts would apply their own understanding of
the applicable rule of decision. That was true whether or not the
issue came within the prescriptive jurisdiction of individual
states. As a result, federal courts often had no need to classify
the issue as being one of state law or one of federal law.
Erie created many more occasions on which federal courts
had to decide whether particular issues lay within the reach of
the states' lawmaking powers. Even when no written state law
was in the picture, Erie told federal courts to defer to state
courts about the content of the unwritten law on all matters
over which the states had lawmaking authority. Conversely, on
matters that either the Constitution or Congress had federalized, the relationship between state and federal courts was reversed: state courts were supposed to accept what the federal
Supreme Court said about the content of the applicable rules of
decision, even if those rules were not spelled out in any written
law.335 That accounts for what Professor Henry Hart once called
"the sharpened sense of state-federal relations induced by
Erie."336

As courts focused on whether states had lawmaking authority over particular issues connected with the implementation of
federal statutes, they frequently concluded that the answer was
"no." The Supreme Court set the pattern shortly after Erie, declaring that "the doctrine of that case is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so
dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations
which they affect must be deemed governed by federal
law... ."337 But given the contemporaneous changes in doctrine
about the dormant Commerce Clause, the easiest way for the
Court to explain this conclusion was to read the federal statutes
themselves as encompassing the relevant issues. In a variety of
335 See, for example, Henry J. Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 NYU L Rev 383, 407 (1964) ("Just as federal courts now conform to
state decisions on issues properly for the states, state courts must conform to federal decisions in areas where Congress, acting within powers granted to it, has manifested, be it
ever so lightly, an intention to that end.").
336 Henry M. Hart Jr, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum L
Rev 489, 533 (1954).
337 Sola Electric Co v Jefferson Electric Co, 317 US 173, 176 (1942). For another example of the same point, see Prudence Realization Corp v Geist, 316 US 89, 95 (1942)
("In the interpretation and application of federal statutes, federal not local law applies.").
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cases, the Court therefore held that the domains of federal statutes extend beyond the statutes' explicit provisions. As the
Court put it,
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the
extent and nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination,
are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are
to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which
I
it has adopted.=>
To illustrate this expansion in the recognized domains of
federal statutes, the remainder of this Part offers an array of
examples. Part III.A considers the concept of "implied" causes of
action to enforce duties created by federal statutes. Part III.B
discusses the subsidiary details of federal causes of action.
Part III.C addresses uncodified defenses to federal criminal
statutes. Part III.D briefly contrasts the situation in the states.
A. "Implied" Causes of Action for Damages
Imagine that a private plaintiff wants to seek damages for
losses caused by the defendant's violation of a federal statute.
Before Erie, there were three primary categories of domestic
American law that might give the plaintiff a private cause of action. First, the federal statute might itself be interpreted as creating a cause of action for people in the plaintiffs position. Second, the local law of an individual American state might create a
generic cause of action into which the plaintiff could slot the duties created by the federal statute. Third, the general law might
be understood to do the same thing.
To understand the second and third categories, consider
how the common law of torts might interact with statutes. In
many contexts, the common law has long made- defendants liable
to plaintiffs for injuries proximately caused by the defendants'

338 Sola Electric, 317 US at 176. The Court used essentially identical language in
Deitrick v Greaney, 309 US 190, 200-01 (1940). According to Justice Robert Jackson, "the
source materials of the common law" could also sometimes guide the Court's answers to
federal questions that federal statutes themselves did not answer. D'Oench,Duhme & Co
v FDIC, 315 US 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson concurring) (indicating that at least in the
purer enclaves of federal common law, the Court could use the common law as "an aid to,
or the basis of, decision of federal questions," and the Court did not need to attribute all
of those answers to federal statutes).
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negligence.339 At common law, moreover, what counts as negligence for this purpose can sometimes include the violation of
statutory duties that a legislature validly imposed upon the defendant in order to protect people like the plaintiff against
harms of the sort that the defendant's violation has caused.340
That is so even though the statute does not itself create any private causes of action. As long as the statute is not interpreted to
preclude other sources of law from giving private plaintiffs remedial rights of this sort, plaintiffs often can use the duties established by the statute to help make out the elements of a
cause of action supplied by the common law.
This sort of argument unquestionably requires some interpretation of the relevant statute. Not only do courts have to
identify the duty that the statute created, but they also have to
think about why the legislature created it: Was the statute designed to protect people like the plaintiff, as individuals, against
the harm that the defendant has caused?3' Even if they answer
that question "yes," so that the duty created by the statute
might be seen as running to the plaintiff in the sense necessary
for the common law to attach liability, courts must ask a further
interpretive question: To the extent that the statute creates enforcement mechanisms of its own, does it implicitly supplant

389 Scholars generally agree that something like the modern concept of negligence
emerged as an organizing principle for American tort law in the nineteenth century,
though they disagree about what came before. Compare Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 85-99 (Harvard 1977) (arguing that negligence
supplanted concepts of strict liability and thereby operated to subsidize economic
growth), with Robert L. Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Fault Principle:A Reinterpretation,15 Ga L Rev 925, 959 (1981) (arguing to the contrary that "negligence law
developed, in the nineteenth century, out of a continuing struggle with the principle of
no-liability') and Gary T. Schwartz, The Characterof Early American Tort Law, 36
UCLA L Rev 641, 678-79 (1989) (finding little evidence to support Professor Horwitz's
thesis, but taking issue with Professor Rabin too).
340 See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts 220-33 (West
5th ed 1984) (discussing the doctrine of "negligence per se'). For one take on the history
of this doctrine, see H. Miles Foy III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 Cornell L Rev 501, 540-46
(1986) (discussing nineteenth-century developments, but presenting negligence doctrine
as having replaced a stricter form of liability for losses caused by statutory violations).
See also note 339 (reporting disagreements among scholars about the nature of tort law
before the nineteenth century).
341 See Keeton, et al, Law of Torts at 222-26 (cited in note 340) (discussing the relevance of this question and providing citations dating back to the nineteenth century);
Restatement (First) of the Law of Torts §§ 286, 288 (1934) (similarly describing conditions under which the violation of a statute will and will not support civil liability on this
theory).
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whatever causes of action might otherwise be available at common law?42
As one might expect, courts did not always speak with precision about exactly where these questions of interpretation
stopped and the common law picked up. Writing in 1914, Professor Ezra Ripley Thayer observed that when courts discussed the
availability of private causes of action for damages caused by the
violation of state criminal statutes, they sometimes seemed to
take the interpretive questions too far: they engaged in "speculation as to unexpressed legislative intent" regarding whether the
statute itself "was intended to give [private individuals] a right
of action."34> According to Professor Thayer, however, when a
state statute made certain conduct a crime without addressing
private remedies, the availability of such remedies "has not been
passed on one way or the other as a question of legislative intent."s" In his view, the proper approach for the courts was "to
ascertain the legislature's expressed intent, to refrain from conjecture as to its unexpressed intent (except insofar as that inquiry is necessary in order to give effect to what is expressed),
and then to consider the resulting situation in the light of the
common law."sts Later commentators shared this understanding
of the relevant framework. As Professor Charles Lowndes put
the point in 1932, "There are two problems which are not always
clearly distinguished: the statute must be construed; and the
construed statute must be fitted into the framework of the common law."346
In the years leading up to Erie, opinions from the US Supreme Court reflect uncertainty about these issues as they related to federal statutes.347 As Professor Miles Foy has already

342 For discussion of the different implications of different enforcement provisions,
see Restatement (First) of the Law of Torts at § 287.
343 Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Hary L Rev 317, 320
(1914).
344 Id.
845 Id.
346 Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Minn
L Rev 361, 361 (1932).
347 Compare Texas & PacificRailway Co v Rigsby, 241 US 33, 39-40 (1916) (appearing to hold that the Safety Appliance Act implicitly created a private right of action in
favor of railroad employees who suffered injury because of violations of the Act), with
Moore v Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co, 291 US 205, 215-16 (1933) (indicating that
although the Safety Appliance Act prescribed a duty, "the right to recover damages sustained by the injured employee through the breach of duty sprang from the principle of
the common law .. . and was left to be enforced accordingly," except where other relevant
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noted, however, questions about the legal sources of remedial
rights for violations of duties created by federal law came into
sharper focus after Erie.348 In the immediate aftermath of Erie,
the Supreme Court suggested broadly that when written federal
law creates a substantive entitlement without specifically addressing "the nature and extent of relief in case loss is suffered
through denial of [this entitlement]," the written law can be understood as having "left such remedial details to judicial implications," and the details that courts articulate are "ultimately
attributable to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States."a4e Lower courts, moreover, soon applied this idea to
questions about the existence of private causes of action to enforce duties created by federal statutes.
Some of the earliest cases in this vein may have reflected
the continuing influence of old views about the dormant Commerce Clause. To the extent that the Constitution was still
thought to strip the states of lawmaking power over all issues
state or federal statutes supplied a cause of action) and Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault
Ste. Marie Railway Co v Popplar,287 US 369, 372 (1915):
The action [for death of a railroad employee allegedly caused by noncompliance
with the Safety Appliance Act] fell within the familiar category of cases involving the duty of a master to his servant. This duty is defined by the common
law, except as it may be modified by legislation. The Federal statute, in the
present case, touched the duty of the master at a single point and, save as provided in the statute, the right of the plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by the law of the State.
For a modern debate about Rigsby, compare Foy, 71 Cornell L Rev at 552-54 (cited in
note 340) ("The Court held .. . that the Act implicitly created a federal right of action for
damages."), with John E. Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and Misuse of
Precedent, 56 U Cin L Rev 145, 172 (1987) ("[Tihe Supreme Court viewed the existence of
a private cause of action in Rigsby as a general common law issue.").
348 See Foy, 71 Cornell L Rev at 549 (cited in note 340) (claiming that federal courts
had traditionally recognized a broad principle to the effect that "wrongs defined by legislation were supposed to give rise to private remedies by implication of law," but observing that "during the mid-twentieth century. . . the federal judges were becoming increasingly sensitive to questions" about "where [ ] this 'law' [was] to be found in the federal
system'); id at 550 (arguing that Erie is "the key to the development of the modern federal law of implied private actions," because the idea that "there was no federal general
common law" led the federal courts "to view their role in American government as one of
upholding and enforcing the specific decisions of federal legislative authority").
349 Board of County Commissioners of the County of Jackson, Kansas v United
States, 308 US 343, 349-52 (1939) (distinguishing Erie on this basis, though ultimately
concluding that equitable considerations supported "absorb[ing]" one particular aspect of
state law "as the governing federal rule" in the case at hand). See also Steele v Louisville
& Nashville RailroadCo, 323 US 192, 207 (1944) (concluding that the Railway Labor Act
not only gives unions a duty to represent their members without discriminating on the
basis of race but also "contemplates resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction
and award of damages when appropriate for breach of that duty").
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that lay in the same field as a federal statute regulating interstate commerce,350 questions about private remedial rights within that field might be classified as matters of "federal common
law" even if those questions fell outside the domain of the statute itself.51 By the mid-1940s, though, federal courts were explaining the federalization of these questions by reading the relevant statutes to have more expansive domains. In various cases
involving different federal statutes, courts construed the statutes themselves as creating private causes of action by implication.852 Even when courts spoke of "federal common law" as determining the details of the resulting liability, moreover, they
made clear that "the statute created the liability."5* Later cases
continued to speak of "read[ing] into the statute by implication a
Federal cause of action."3**
a50 See note 332 and accompanying text (describing the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine of the early twentieth century).
851 See, for example, O'Brien v Western Union Telegraph Co, 113 F2d 539, 541 (1st
Cir 1940) (describing "the ... liability or immunity of [a] telegraph company" for transmitting a defamatory message interstate as a matter of "federal common law"); id (explaining that "questions relating to the duties, privileges and liabilities of telegraph
companies in the transmission of interstate messages must be governed by uniform federal rules" because the Communications Act of 1934 "occupied the field" to the exclusion
of state law, but supporting this conclusion with precedents from the early twentieth
century about the legal effect of federal statutes regulating interstate commerce).
852 See, for example, Reitmeister v Reitmeister, 162 F2d 691, 694 (2d Cir 1947)
(Learned Hand) (invoking "the doctrine which, in the absence of contrary implications,
construes a criminal statute, enacted for the protection of a specified class, as creating a
civil right in members of the class, although the only express sanctions are criminal,"
and concluding that "the Communications Act of 1984 ... imposes a civil, as well as a
criminal, liability upon anyone who 'publishes' a telephone message"); Baird v Franklin,
141 F2d 238, 244 (2d Cir 1944) (Clark dissenting, in part from the opinion, and from the
judgment) ("Our considered opinion is that the [Securities Exchange] Act itself grants
the right of action [in favor of investors who suffered losses because of the New York
Stock Exchange's breach of duties imposed by § 6(b)]."). Although Judge Clark's opinion
in Baird bears the caption of a partial dissent, he was speaking for the panel on this
point. See id at 246 (losing colleagues' votes only with respect to the mechanics of proving damages); Goldstein v Groesbeck, 142 F2d 422, 427 (2d Cir 1944) ("[W]e have recently
upheld broadly the private rights of action impliedly granted by the Securities Exchange
Act.").
858 Remar v Clayton Securities Corp, 81 F Supp 1014, 1017 (D Mass 1949) (concluding that § 7(c) of the Securities Exchange Act "created [a] liability by implication" and
that "once the liability was created, its extent was to be measured by what is sometimes
called a federal rather than a state common law).
354 Wills v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 200 F Supp 360, 367 (SD Cal 1961) (addressing
§ 404(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938). See also Fitzgeraldv PanAmerican World
Airways, 229 F2d 499, 501-02 (2d Cir 1956) (addressing the same provision and reaching
the same conclusion); Laughlin v Riddle Aviation Co, 205 F2d 948, 949 (5th Cir 1953)
(recognizing an implied cause of action under a different provision of the same statute
and attributing this conclusion to "[t]he implications and intendments of [the] statute");
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The courts' opinions in these cases tended to make two major arguments.355 First, they invoked the general principle that
the violation of a statutory duty amounts to a tort (supporting
liability at common law) if the duty was designed to protect the
individual interests of people like the plaintiff and if the defendant's violation proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer the type
of harm that the legislature was trying to avoid.>>< Admittedly,
advancing this argument required some finesse: to the extent
that courts were slotting statutory duties into causes of action
supplied by the common law of torts, Erie might lead one to expect the operative tort law to vary from state to state. But to
keep the enforcement of federal duties from depending on potentially idiosyncratic rules of state law, courts often concluded that
individual federal statutes implicitly brought the general law of
torts into the statutes' own domains, effectively creating federal
causes of action based on conventional principles of tort law.357
Second, and independently of these arguments about the relationship between federal statutes and the general law of torts,
courts frequently portrayed private causes of action as an appropriate means of effectuating "the object or purposes of a particular statute."3>< In keeping with the era's purposivist approach
to statutory interpretation, courts reasoned that certain remedial
rights were necessary to help advance Congress's chosen policies,
that Congress would not have wanted the effectiveness of those
policies to depend on whether individual states happened to recognize suitable causes of action, and that the relevant federal
statutes should therefore be interpreted as implying some federal

Brown v Bullock, 194 F Supp 207, 217 (SDNY 1961) (speaking of the relevant issues as
"pos[ing] a problem of statutory interpretation").
355 See Foy, 71 Cornell L Rev at 559 (cited in note 340).
356 See note 340 and accompanying text. Many decisions about implied causes of action to enforce federal statutory duties cited § 286 of the first Restatement of the Law of
Torts, which stated a version of this principle. See, for example, Fitzgerald,229 F2d at
501; Fischman v Raytheon Manufacturing Co, 188 F2d 783, 787 n 4 (2d Cir 1951); Reitmaster, 162 F2d at 694 n 2; Remar, 81 F Supp at 1017; Kardon v National Gypsum Co,
69 F Supp 512, 513 (ED Pa 1946). Other cases invoked the same principle without citing
the Restatement. See, for example, Laughlin, 205 F2d at 949; Baird, 141 F2d at 245
(Clark dissenting, in part from the opinion, and from the judgment).
357 See, for example, Fitzgerald, 229 F2d at 501-02 (asserting that "[n]o federal
common law of torts exists" and concluding that the statute itself should be understood
to create a cause of action "by implication").
358 Wills, 200 F Supp at 364.
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remedial rights that state law might be able to supplement but

could not eliminate.359
In 1964, the Supreme Court embraced this purposivist approach in J. L Case Co v Borak.so0 But as interpretive methodology changed, so did the Court's conclusions about the existence
of federal causes of action to enforce duties created by federal
statutes. Under current doctrine, even if judges believe that private enforcement would help effectuate the purposes behind a
federal statute, judges are not supposed to recognize a private
cause of action as a matter of federal law unless they conclude
that Congress itself intended to create one. In the Supreme
Court's words,
The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has
passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create
not just a private right but also a private remedy .... Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative .... Without
it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create
one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. 361
At the same time, the Court seems to have come to terms
with the idea that the existence of private causes of action to recover damages caused by violations of federal statutes can depend on varying rules of state law. The upshot of current doctrine is that when a federal statute imposes duties without
359 See, for example, Laughlin, 205 F2d at 949 ("Congress did not intend to create a
mere illusory right, which would fail for lack of means to enforce it.'); Baird, 141 F2d at
244-45 (Clark dissenting, in part from the opinion, and from the judgment) ("One of the
primary purposes of Congress in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to
protect the general investing public.... [I]f the investing public is to be completely and
effectively protected, § 6(b) must be construed as granting to injured investors individual
causes of action to enforce the statutory duties imposed upon the exchanges.").
m 377 US 426, 433 (1964) ('[U]nder the circumstances here it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.").
361 Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 286-87 (2001). See also Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 US 148, 164 (2008) ('Though the rule
once may have been otherwise, see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, it is settled that there is an
implied cause of action only if the underlying statute can be interpreted to disclose the
intent to create one") (citation omitted); Transamerica MortgageAdvisors, Inc (TAMA) v
Lewis, 444 US 11, 15-16 (1979) (observing that "[tihe question whether a statute creates
a cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory
construction," and indicating that "our recent decisions" have taken a different approach
than Borak); Touche Ross & Co v Redington, 442 US 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can
improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law").
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saying anything one way or the other about private causes of action for damages, that topic is usually presumed to lie beyond
the statute's domain: the statute typically is not understood to
imply a private cause of action as a matter of federal law, but it
also typically is not understood to preempt the application of generic causes of action supplied by state law.62 Thus, modern
courts no longer consider it bizarre for "divergent rules of state
law"363 to control the availability of private remedies for losses
occasioned by violations of federal statutes. But during the period when courts were struggling to avoid that result, the jurisprudence of implied causes of action fit precisely the same pattern that Part I describes: issues that might otherwise have
been handled according to crosscutting principles of tort law
were shoehorned into individual federal statutes and treated as
matters of interpretation.
B. Details of Causes of Action
Even when federal statutes do create causes of action, they
often fail to specify all the associated details. Does the cause of
action survive the death of the original claimant and the original
defendant? Can it be assigned? Is prejudgment interest available? Under what circumstances can a defendant be held vicariously liable for someone else's misconduct?
The old case of Schreiber v Sharpless54 illustrates how the
Supreme Court handled these sorts of questions before Erie.
Francis Schreiber and his sons were photographers in Philadelphia, where Charles Sharpless ran a dry-goods store. Without
the Schreibers' permission, Sharpless allegedly caused one of
their copyrighted photographs to be reprinted in labels for his
See, for example, Wigod v Wells FargoBank, NA, 673 Fad 547, 581 (7th Cir 2012):
The absence of a private right of action from a federal statute provides no reason to dismiss a claim under a state law just because it refers to or incorporates some element of the federal law.... To find otherwise would require
adopting the novel presumption that where Congress provides no remedy under federal law, state law may not afford one in its stead.
See also Hofbauer v Northwestern National Bank of Rochester, Minnesota, 700 F2d 1197,
1201 (8th Cir 1983) ("Even though the [plaintiffs] cannot assert a private cause of action
arising under federal law, the federal statutes may create a standard of conduct which, if
broken, would give rise to an action for common-law negligence [under state law].");
Iconco v Jensen Construction Co, 622 F2d 1291, 1296-99 (8th Cir 1980) (holding that
federal law does not preempt state-law claims of unjust enrichment based on standards
supplied by the federal Small Business Act).
363 O'Brien, 113 F2d at 541.
864 110 US 76 (1884).
862
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goods. 6 5 If this allegation was true, a federal statute made
Sharpless liable to "forfeit one dollar for every sheet of the [infringing copies] found in his possession," with half of this penalty going to the Schreibers and the other half to the United
States.366 The Schreibers sued Sharpless in a federal district
court to collect this penalty, but Sharpless died while the suit
was pending. The Schreibers argued that their suit could continue against his estate by virtue of a Pennsylvania statute to
that effect.867 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court held that
such state statutes "can have no effect on suits in the courts of
the United States for the recovery of penalties imposed by an act
of Congress."a65 In the absence of any relevant federal statute
addressing survival and abatement, the matter was controlled
by the common law, and "[a]t common law actions on penal statutes do not survive.">69
Other questions of the same sort frequently arose in actions
under the FELA-the federal statute making interstate rail865 Petition of Plaintiff for a Rule for a Mandamus, Schreiber v Sharpless, No 14
(Orig), *2 (US filed Dec 17, 1888).
866 See Rev Stat § 4965 (1874).
867 See Act of Feb 24, 1834 I 28, 1834 Pa Laws 70, 78 (providing that with the exception of "actions for slander, for libels, and for wrongs done to the person," the executor or
administrator of a decedent's estate "shall be liable to be sued in any action . . . which
might have been maintained against such decedent if he had lived"). See also Rev Stat
§ 955 (1874) ("When either of the parties ... in any suit in any court of the United
States[] dies before final judgment, the executor or administrator of such deceased party
may, in case the cause of action survives by law, prosecute or defend any such suit to final judgment.").
*6 Schreiber, 110 US at 80.
869 Id. In keeping with this analysis, lower courts of this era routinely invoked their
understanding of the common law to determine the survival or abatement of causes of
action created by federal statutes. See, for example, Sullivan v Asociated Billposters
and Distributors,6 F2d 1000, 1004 (2d Cir 1925):
[Tjhe statutes of a state are plainly without application to cases which origi.
nate under an act of Congress. A cause of action which is given by a federal
statute, if no specific provision is made by act of Congress for its survival, survives or not according to the principles of the common law.
See also Van Choate v General Electric Co, 245 F 120, 121 (1 Mass 1917) ("In causes of
action which arise solely under the laws of the United States, survivorship is determined
according to the principles of the common law."); Imperial Film Exchange v GeneralFilm
Co, 244 F 985, 987 (SDNY 1915) ("There is no statute of the United States either preventing or permitting the survival of such a cause of action as this. Therefore the rules of
the common law become applicable."). But consider Van Beeck v Sabine Towing Co, 300
US 342, 351 (1937) (noting that the 'legislative policy" reflected in statutes can itself be
"a source of law, a new generative impulse transmitted to the legal system," and concluding that the cause of action that the Jones Act gave the mother of a deceased seaman to
compensate her for the pecuniary loss that she suffered because of her son's death should
not be held to abate on the mother's own death).
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roads liable in damages for injury or death suffered by their employees in interstate commerce as a result of the negligence of
the railroad's officers, agents, or other employees.37 In certain
respects, the FELA specifically overrode traditional rules of tort
law.371 But it said nothing one way or the other about burdens of
proof, measures of damages, or various other topics connected
with the liability that it created. Whether by virtue of the statute itself or the combination of the statute and the dormant
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court quickly held that states
lacked legislative competence over those topics.372 Rather than
"piec[ing] out this act of Congress by resorting to the local statutes of [a] State,"373 the Court used the general common law to
answer questions that the FELA put beyond the reach of state
law but that the FELA did not itself address. As the Court repeatedly noted, the upshot was that "[i]n proceedings brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act[,] rights and obligations depend upon it and applicable principles of common law as
interpreted and applied in federal courts."374 And while the
Court did not specify whether the common law operated directly
or only through incorporation into the statute, its rhetoric was
generally consistent with the former view.375
370 See FELA § 1, 35 Stat at 65. See also text accompanying note 169.
371 See, for example, FELA § 1, 35 Stat at 65 (creating a cause of action for wrongful
death and abrogating the fellow-servant rule); FEIA § 3, 35 Stat at 66 (substituting a
principle of comparative negligence for the traditional defense of contributory negligence); FELA § 4, 35 Stat at 66 (specifying that a railroad employee "shall not be held to
have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by [the railroad] of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or
death of such employee").
372 See, for example, New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Co v Harris, 247 US
367, 371 (1918) (refusing to apply a state statute about the burden of proof); Michigan
Central Railroad Co v Vreeland, 227 US 59, 67 (1913) (refusing to apply state statutes
about the survival of personal-injury claims). See also Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 US 1, 54-55 (1912) ("[Now that Congress has acted, the laws of the States, in so far
as they cover the same field, are superseded.").
373 Vreeland, 227 US at 66.
374 Harris,247 US at 371. For examples of other cases using much the same formulation, see Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co v Kuhn, 284 US 44, 46-47 (1931); Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co v Aeby, 275 US 426, 429 (1928); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway Co v Coogan, 271 US 472, 474 (1926); Southern Railway Co v Gray, 241 US 333,
338-39(1916).
375 See, for example, Seaboard Air Line Railway v Horton, 233 US 492, 507 (1914)
(holding that to the extent that the FELA did not address the traditional defense of assumption of risk, "the necessary result ... is ... to leave the matter. . . open to the ordi-

nary application of the common law rule"). See also Walsh v New York, N. H. & H. R. Co,
173 F 494, 495 (CC D Mass 1909) (noting that the FELA as originally enacted "says
nothing" about whether its cause of action for personal injuries survives the death of the
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In the immediate aftermath of Erie, a few judges took a
fresh look at the states' ability to supply interstitial details for
federal causes of action. In one case from 1941, for instance,
Judge Alfred P. Murrah concluded that "the rectifying doctrine
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins" had cut back on the implications of cases like Schreiber.376 Noting that "[t]he Sherman AntiTrust Act is silent" about whether the causes of action created
by the Act are assignable, Judge Murrah decided that the local
law of individual states governed that question.37' Another federal court similarly held that in reparations cases under the Interstate Commerce Act,378 "Erie. .. now compels conformity by

this Court with the [relevant state's] law" about the availability
of prejudgment interest.37 But these decisions proved to be blips.
In modern times, courts overwhelmingly hold that "the question
of how to fill in the gaps of a federal right of action is governed by
federal rather than state law."80 As they did before Erie, moreover, courts often draw the content of the necessary rules from a

injured worker, and concluding that courts were therefore "remitted to the common
law"); McCormick and Hewins, 33 Ill L Rev at 143 (cited in note 166) (speaking of the
common law as governing matters "not covered by the statute itself").
Admittedly, the principles of judicial federalism that governed articulation of the
common law in FELA cases differed from the principles of judicial federalism that governed articulation of the common law in many other legal realms. During the era of
Swift v Tyson, state and federal courts usually could exercise independent judgment on
questions of general law. In FELA cases, by contrast, state courts were supposed to follow the federal judiciary's lead. See Kuhn, 284 US at 46 (noting that the federal courts'
understanding of the common law applied to FELA cases "wherever brought"). One way
to explain this arrangement is to speculate that the relevant principles of common law
were being read into the FELA itself, so that questions about their content were really
questions about the meaning of a federal statute. See Nelson, 106 Colum L Rev at 520
(cited in note 17) (leaping to this conclusion); Central Vermont Railway Co v White, 238
US 507, 512 (1915) (appearing to speak in these terms). But an alternative explanation
is equally plausible: the role of federal precedents in FEIA cases in state court may
simply have reflected the realities of appellate jurisdiction. Whatever the precise relationship between the FELA and the general law, judgments rendered by state courts in
FELA cases could be appealed to the federal Supreme Court, and everyone would save
time if state courts followed Supreme Court precedent in those cases. Consider Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,46 Stan L Rev
817, 823-25 (1994) (noting that doctrines of precedent ordinarily follow lines of direct
appeal).
376 Momand v Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp, 37 F Supp 649, 654-55 (WD Okla
1941).
377 Id at 651, 655-56.
378 Ch 104, 24 Stat 379 (1887).
879 City of Danville v Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co, 34 F Supp 620, 636 (WD Va 1940).
380 Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary InternationalLaw, Foreign Affairs, and Federal
Common Law, 42 Va J Intl L 513, 536 (2002).
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species of common law.381 Nowadays, though, courts often explicitly cast this conclusion in terms of statutory interpretation.
The Supreme Court's treatment of prejudgment interest in
FELA cases provides a clear illustration of this shift. The FELA
does not itself say anything one way or the other about prejudgment interest. Before Erie, courts therefore "[t]reat[ed] the
question ... as one of general law."82 Shortly after Erie, however, they began reading the answer into the FELA itself. In the
Fifth Circuit's words, "[T]he silence of [the FELA] upon the subject of interest may not be construed as leaving the subject unlegislated upon in the Act, but is indicative of the considered
purpose that no interest should be allowed in such actions prior
to verdict."383 The Supreme Court has now endorsed this interpretation of the statute. In Monessen Southwestern Railway Co v
8 4 the Court emphasized that "[i]n 1908, when Congress
Morgan,3
enacted the FELA, the common law did not allow prejudgment
interest in suits for personal injury or wrongful death."385 Because the FELA said nothing to deviate from this rule, the Court
argued that the statute should be understood to incorporate
(and freeze into place) the background principle of common law
that existed at the time of enactment.386
Cases about the interaction between federal causes of action
and principles of agency law have followed a similar sequence.
Imagine that a federal statute prohibits certain behavior and
backs up the prohibition with a private cause of action for damages. If A engages in the prohibited behavior during the course
of working for B, under what circumstances should B be held either to have violated the statute himself or to be responsible for
A's violation? Many federal statutes that create private causes of
action do not specifically address this sort of question: they may
say that anyone who violates the statute is subject to suit,387 but
they do not provide rules about when one person's acts should be
attributed to another person or entity. Before Erie, federal
381 See Nelson, 106 Colum L Rev at 520-21, 545-49 (cited in note 17).
82 Chicago,M., St. P. & P. R. Co v Busby, 41 F2d 617, 619 (9th Cir 1930).

383 Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co v Pratt,142 F2d 847, 848-49 (5th Cir 1944) (noting
that "[a]t the time the Act was enacted, interest was not allowable on claims for personal
injuries until the amount of damages had been judicially ascertained," and reading the
FELA to absorb this principle).
384 486 US 330 (1988).
385 Id at 337.
388 See id at 337-39 & n 9.

887 See, for example, 17 USC § 501 (creating a private cause of action against
"[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner").

2013]

The Interactionbetween Statutes and Unwritten Law

747

courts said that "Itihe rule of the common law applies" to this issue, and they proceeded to articulate their understanding of the
relevant common-law principles.3 Although these courts were
imprecise about the mechanism through which the common law
was operating, their rhetoric was generally consistent with the
notion that the common law operated directly on matters that
the written federal law did not address.389
After Erie, a few judges have argued that in cases of this
sort, when a federal statute creates a cause of action without
addressing the circumstances in which a defendant is responsible for other people's conduct, the statute leaves that topic to be
handled according to the local law of individual states. For instance, in a prominent modern case about a company's liability
to an employee for sexual harassment by her boss,390 Judge
Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit took this position with
respect to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because Title
VII "is silent" about questions of agency law and because Erie
established that "there is no free-floating common law," Judge
388 M. Witmark & Sons v Calloway, 22 F2d 412, 414 (ED Tenn 1927) (invoking the
principle that "the master is civilly liable in damages for the wrongful act of his servant
in the transaction of the business which he was employed to do," and applying this principle to determine responsibility for acts of copyright infringement by the person whom a
theater had hired to operate its player piano). See also M. Witmark & Sons v Pastime
Amusement Co, 298 F 470, 475 (ED SC 1924) (holding that even where a performer is an
independent contractor, "[h]e who employs a musician to perform in an exhibition for profit,
under a contract by which the musician has authority to play whatever compositions are, in
accordance with her judgment, appropriate and fitting, must be held responsible" for the
performance on the theory that "the employer acquiesces in and ratifies" it), affd 2 F2d
1020 (4th Cir 1924). Consider Peter S. Menell and David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 Cal
L Rev 941, 998 (2007) (noting that "courts developed the law of indirect copyright liability
based upon general tort principles," though adding that the application of those principles
to copyright cases produced some "distinct copyright doctrines").
389 For an example involving agency-law principles of vicarious liability, see McDonald v Hearst, 95 F 656, 658 (ND Cal 1899):
The principle [of agency law] which protects the master against liability for
punitive damages will, unless it is otherwise expressly provided by the statute,
also protect him against liability for a statutory penalty when the action to recover such penalty from him is founded upon the wrongful act of the servant,
done without the knowledge, authority, or consent of the master.
For examples involving tort-law principles of joint liability for acts undertaken as part of a
common design, see Cramerv Rry, 68 F 201, 205 (CC ND Cal 1895) ("What is the nature of
an action for an infringement of a patent? Undoubtedly a tort, and the rule [of joint and
several liability for all who participate in the wrong] necessarily applies, unless the statute
relieves from it."); Fishel v Lueckel, 53 F 499, 500 (SDNY 1892) ("The defendants procured
the infringing act to be done. They are therefore liable as joint tort feasors").
390 Jansen v Packaging Corp of America, 123 F3d 490 (7th Cir 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam), affd BurlingtonIndustries,Inc v Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998).
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Easterbrook thought that courts should use state law to determine whether the boss's acts counted as those of the company. 391
Most of Judge Easterbrook's colleagues, however, concluded that
the attribution of responsibility in Title VII cases was a matter
of federal law.392 To fit that conclusion into our post-Erie world,
then-Chief Judge Richard Posner argued that the necessary
principles of agency law could be imported into Title VII itself
under the rubric of statutory interpretation. In his words,
Deciding what agency principles shall govern liability under
a liability-creating statute such as Title VII is not freewheeling common-law rulemaking; it is filling a statutory
gap, a standard office of interpretation. There is no novelty
in formulating federal principles of agency law in interpreting federal statutes that are silent on agency. 393
The Supreme Court agreed: it decided the case in light of "'the
general common law of agency, rather than [ ] the law of any
particular State,"' and it read the relevant principles of agency
law into Title VII.394 Not a single Justice took Judge Easterbrook's more limited view of the statute's domain.395
In the specific context of Title VII, Congress had provided a
textual hook for the Court's approach. Although the statute did
not supply any substantive principles of agency law, its definition of "employer" included "any agent of such a person,"96 and
the Court took this definition as explicitly "direct[ing] federal

391 Jansen, 123 F3d at 553 (Easterbrook concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Relations such as agency that are undefined by federal statute, like other elements of
the background against which federal rules operate, come from state law--either directly, when the Rules of Decision Act ... requires, or indirectly when federal law absorbs a
needed rule from state law.").
392 See id at 493-94 (per curiam) (summarizing the common conclusions set forth in
various separate opinions). See also id at 506-07 (Posner concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "the question of agency is central to [Title VII's] administration"
and refusing to accept the "striking geographical disuniformities" that could result from
Judge Easterbrook's position). But see id at 571 (Wood concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (siding with Judge Easterbrook).
393 Id at 507 (Posner concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id at 523
(Coffey concurring in part and dissenting in part) (endorsing Judge Posner's position).
394 Burlington Industries, 524 US at 754-55, quoting Community for Creative Nonviolence v Reid, 490 US 730, 740 (1989).
396 See, for example, Burlington Industries, 524 US at 766-74 (Thomas dissenting)
(agreeing that the relevant agency principles are matters of federal law in this context
but disagreeing with the majority about their content).
396 42 USC § 2000e(b).

2013]

The Interaction between Statutes and Unwritten Law

749

courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles."397 But
even in the absence of such a hook, the modern Court routinely
reads general principles of agency law into individual federal
statutes. Indeed, the Court has recently articulated a canon to
that effect: "[G]eneral principles of. .. agency law ... form the
background against which federal tort laws are enacted,"398 and
each individual federal statute that creates a tort-like cause of
action should be presumed to "incorporate" the general common
law with respect to vicarious liability (in the absence of contrary
guidance from Congress).399
In keeping with the idea that these questions come within
the domain of each individual federal statute that creates a
cause of action, the courts' answers in the years since Erie have
tracked changes in styles of statutory interpretation. When
judges embraced purposivism, they sometimes stood ready to attribute unusually broad doctrines of vicarious liability to individual federal statutes that said nothing explicit about that topic.4oo The modern Supreme Court has cut back on that approach;
in its view, "Congress' silence, while permitting an inference that
Congress intended to apply ordinary background tort principles,
cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modification of
those rules."401 But when the Court uses the general common law
to determine vicarious liability for violations of federal statutes,
se Burlington Industries, 524 US at 754. For a contemporaneous case using different principles to attribute responsibility in the context of the implied cause of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-318, 86 Stat 235, 37375, and distinguishing Title VII partly on the basis that "Title IX contains no comparable
reference to an educational institution's 'agents,'" see Gebser v Lago Vista Independent
School District, 524 US 274, 283 (1998).
398 Staub v ProctorHospital,131 S Ct 1186, 1191 (2011).
399 Meyer v Holley, 537 US 280, 285 (2003). See also id at 285-87 (using this canon
to conclude that even though the Fair Housing Act "says nothing about vicarious liability," it implicitly "provides for vicarious liability" in line with "ordinary rules" of agency
law); id at 287-88 (treating the administering agency's view that "ordinary vicarious liability rules apply in this area" as an "interpretation of [the] statute").
400 See, for example, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc v Hydrolevel
Corp, 456 US 556, 574-76 (1982) (invoking "the purposes of the antitrust laws" to support holding an organization liable for treble damages because of the anticompetitive behavior of agents acting with apparent authority); Shapiro,Bernstein & Co v H. L. Green
Co, 316 F2d 304, 307 (2d Cir 1963) (asserting that "the open-ended terminology" of the
Copyright Act has forced courts to make case-by-case determinations about the "business
relationships which would render one person liable for the infringing conduct of another," and arguing that "[wihen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials[,] ... the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the
beneficiary of that exploitation").
401 Meyer, 537 US at 286.
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the Court does not think of the common law as operating directly.
Instead, the Court speaks as if "Congress ... imported common
law principles" into each statute that creates a federal cause of
02

action.4

Admittedly, modern federal judges do not all speak in exactly the same way about issues of the sort canvassed in this Section-issues that courts consider so tightly connected to federal
causes of action as to lie beyond the reach of state law, but that
the statutes creating the causes of action do not explicitly address. Some opinions refer to such issues as matters of statutory
interpretation, but others use the label "federal common law."403
That label seems to be especially prevalent in modern opinions
about whether federal causes of action survive a party's death,404
but it also crops up in lower-court opinions about prejudgment
interesto5 and vicarious liability.406 Still, the judges who use this
label may not mean anything very different than the judges who
speak in terms of statutory interpretation; in modern jargon, the
phrase "federal common law" is both capacious and imprecise,407
and some judges use it to refer to gap-filling constructions of

402 Kolstad v American Dental Assn, 527 US 526, 537 (1999). For an example of the
same locution at the circuit-court level, see American Telephone and Telegraph Co v
Winback and Conserve Program,Inc, 42 F3d 1421, 1428-29 (3d Cir 1994) ("[Tlhis appeal
requires us to decide a question of statutory construction, namely, the extent to which
federal courts interpreting federal statutes may import into such statutes common law
doctrines of secondary liability.").
403 See Meltzer, 42 Va J Intl L at 536 (cited in note 380) (noting both usages).
404 See James v Home ConstructionCo of Mobile, 621 F2d 727, 729 (5th Cir 1980)
C'Mhe question of survival of a federal cause of action has usually been described as a
question of federal common law, in the absence of an expression of contrary intent."). But
see Mallick v InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers, 814 F2d 674, 676 (DC Cir
1987) C'Mhe Supreme Court has stated that the question of whether a federal statutory
claim survives the death of one of the parties is essentially a question of how to interpret
the statute that provides for the action.").
405 See, for example, William A. Graham Co v Haughey, 646 F3d 138, 144 (3d Cir
2011); Rivera v Benefit Trust Life Ins Co, 921 F2d 692, 696 (7th Cir 1991).
406 See, for example, Browne v Signal Mountain Nursery, LP, 286 F Supp 2d 904,
915 (ED Tenn 2003); Newman v CheckRite California,Inc, 912 F Supp 1354, 1371 (ED
Cal 1995).
407 See Meltzer, 42 Va J Intl L at 536 (cited in note 380) (noting that the line between statutory interpretation and federal common law is "indistinct"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1, 3-5 & n 19 (1985)
(noting the difficulty of defining "federal common law," and using the phrase broadly to
refer to any rule of decision that has the status of federal law and "is not explicitly set
forth in a textual command").
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individual federal statutes.408 In any event, the modern Supreme
Court has tended to use the rhetoric of statutory interpretation
for the questions discussed in this Section, and it has attributed
the answers to the individual federal statute that creates the
cause of action.
C.

Common-Law Defenses to Statutory Crimes

Federal criminal law provides many additional examples of
courts reading crosscutting doctrines of common law into individual federal statutes or statutory provisions. The most famous
illustration is Morissette v United States,409 where the Supreme
Court confronted a provision making it a crime for anyone to
"embezzle[ ], steal[ ], purloin[ ], or knowingly convert[ ] to his
use ... any ... thing of value" belonging to the federal government.410 Describing the crimes defined by this provision as "larceny-type offenses" of a sort familiar to the common law, the
Court interpreted the provision as implicitly incorporating the
intent requirement associated with such offenses at common
law.411 As Justice Robert Jackson explained,
[Wihere Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice,
it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning
from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey
to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.412
While the content of the intent requirement that the Court
enforced in Morissette came from the common law, the Court
plainly did not think of the common law as operating of its own
force. To the contrary, the intent requirement suggested by the
common law governed Morissette's case only because the Court
understood the statutory provision in question to adopt it. Two
considerations may have made that way of thinking seem especially natural. First, the Court was trying to identify the elements of a crime created by Congress, and that topic might seem
408 See, for example, Jansen, 123 F3d at 506-07 (Posner concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring interchangeably to "federal common law" and "filling a statutory gap, a standard office of interpretation").
409 342 US 246 (1952).
410 Id at 249 n 2, quoting 18 USC § 641.
411 Morissette, 342 US at 260-63.
412 Id at 263.
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to lie entirely within the domain of the provision defining the
crime. Second, to the extent that the words chosen by Congress
really were terms of art at common law, the provision supplied a
textual hook for the importation of common-law concepts.413
Even when neither of these considerations is at work,
though, the Court still uses Morissette's locution: the Court
speaks of the common law of crimes as operating in federal criminal law only through incorporation into individual statutes. The
most telling examples involve principles that served as affirmative defenses at common law and that were not limited to one
particular type of crime. Think, for instance, of self-defense, or
defense of others, or duress, or "public authority" (the defense
for undercover operatives engaging in conduct that would otherwise be criminal'4). These defenses were generic, in the sense
that they could defeat liability for a broad array of crimes. In
practice, moreover, the typical federal statute that defines a
crime does not explicitly address these generic defenses.4'5 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has imported these defenses into
federal criminal law entirely under the rubric of individual statutes. As the Fourth Circuit recently concluded, Supreme Court
precedent suggests that "any inquiry into whether a commonlaw defense to a federal criminal statute may be recognized
must focus on the particular circumstances and in the end turn
on whether it can be said that Congress contemplated the defense when it enacted the statute."416

413 See, for example, McCann v United States, 2 Wyo 274, 298 (1880) (asserting,
with respect to a predecessor of the statute at issue in Morissette, that "[larceny is a
technical common law term" and "stealing is its technical common law synonym'). For a
subsequent case attempting to distinguish Morissette on this basis, see Carter v United
States, 530 US 255, 265 (2000) (asserting that "a 'cluster of ideas' from the common law
should be imported into statutory text only when Congress employs a common-law
term").
414 Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation
in Crime, 62 Stan L Rev 155, 169-71 (2009).
415 See, for example, United States v Mooney, 497 F3d 397, 403 (4th Cir 2007)
("[Federal] statutes rarely enumerate the defenses to the crimes they describe, and defenses continue to remain doctrines of the common law, the background against which
Congress enacts federal crimes").
416 United States v Gore, 592 F3d 489, 492-93 (4th Cir 2010) (discussing how 18
USC § 111, which criminalizes forcibly assaulting or resisting a federal officer while the
officer is performing official duties, should be understood to handle self-defense).
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Casting the question in these terms does not necessarily dictate a particular answer.417 Many interpreters are willing to read
common-law defenses into individual federal statutes even in
the absence of any textual hook. In United States v Bailey,418 for
instance, the Supreme Court seemed receptive to the idea that
18 USC § 751(a), which criminalizes escaping from federal custody, implicitly incorporates a narrow defense of duress or necessity. To be sure, the statute makes no mention of any such
defense, and the Court acknowledged that "we are construing an
Act of Congress, not drafting it."419 Citing Morissette, however,
the Court asserted that because "Congress . .. legislates against

a background of Anglo-Saxon common law" when it enacts federal criminal statutes, "a defense of duress or coercion may well
have been contemplated by Congress when it enacted
§ 751(a)."420 The Court ruled against the defendants in Bailey
not because it refused to read a duress or necessity defense into
§ 751(a) but because the defendants did not satisfy what the
Court took to be the prerequisites for that defense in this context.421
With the rise of modern textualism, some members of the
Court may now be less willing to read implied exceptions into
federal criminal statutes. Thus, Justice Clarence Thomas's majority opinion in United States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative422 reserved judgment on "whether necessity can ever be
a defense when the federal statute does not expressly provide for
it."423 But rather than signaling a general reluctance to read any
common-law defenses into federal criminal statutes, the Court's
skepticism may have been specific to the necessity defense.424 In
417 Consider United States v Baker, 523 F3d 1141, 1143 (10th Cir 2008) (McConnell
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Mhe current state of our jurisprudence
regarding implicit affirmative defenses is in disarray.').
418 444 US 394 (1980).
419 Id at 415-16 n 11.
420 Id. See also id at 425 (Blackmun dissenting) ("Given the universal acceptance of
these defenses in the common law, I have no difficulty in concluding that Congress intended the defenses of duress and necessity to be available to persons accused of committing the federal crime of escape.").
421 See id at 412-13.
422 532 US 483 (2001).
423 Id at 491.
424 See id at 490 ("Even at common law, the defense of necessity was somewhat controversial."). See also Michael H. Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance
to Enacting Choice-of-Evils Defenses to CriminalLiability, 82 Tulane L Rev 191, 194-96,
198-200 (2007) (arguing that academics have overstated both the scope and the ubiquity
of the necessity defense).
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any event, Oakland Cannabis continued to portray these questions as matters of statutory interpretation.
The Court confirmed that way of thinking in Dixon v United
States.426 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968426 made it a federal crime "for any person who is under indictment ... [for] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year ... to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."427 The same federal statute also forbade false
statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm.428
When Keshia Dixon was prosecuted for these crimes, the district
court allowed her to assert a duress defense,429 but the judge
held that she bore the burden of persuasion with respect to that
defense, and the jury concluded that she had failed to carry this
burden. On appeal, the Supreme Court cast its analysis entirely
in terms of the meaning of the 1968 statute: because "federal
crimes 'are solely creatures of statute,"' the Court said that "we
are required to effectuate the duress defense as Congress 'may
have contemplated' it in the context of these specific offenses."430
In a bow to Oakland Cannabis, the Court did not definitively
hold that the statute accommodated a duress defense.431 But the
Court agreed with the district judge that if such a defense was
indeed available, the burden of persuasion lay with the defendant. The Court reasoned that in 1968, when Congress enacted
the statute, the common law had long been understood to give
defendants the burden of proving affirmative defenses, and the
Supreme Court had already applied this principle to federal

548 US 1 (2006).
Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 197.
Omnibus Crime Control Act § 902, 82 Stat at 231, codified as amended at 18
USC § 922(n).
428 Omnibus Crime Control Act § 902, 82 Stat at 229, codified as amended at 18
USC § 922(a)(6).
429 Duress and necessity are closely related defenses. See Bailey, 444 US at 409-10
(indicating that at common law, "the defense of duress covered the situation where the
coercion had its source in the actions of other human beings" while "the defense of necessity . . . covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered
illegal conduct the lesser of two evils").
430 Dixon, 548 US at 12, quoting Liparota v United States, 471 US 419, 424 (1985)
and Oakland Cannabis,532 US at 491 n 3.
431 See Dixon, 548 US at 13-14 & n 7. The Court framed the question that it was
deciding as follows: "Assuming that a defense of duress is available to the statutory
crimes at issue, . . . we must determine what that defense would look like as Congress
'may have contemplated' it." Id at 13, quoting Oakland Cannabis,532 US at 491 n 3.
425
426
427
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crimes in McKelvey v United States.432 According to the majority
in Dixon,
Even though the Safe Streets Act does not mention the defense of duress, we can safely assume that the 1968 Congress was familiar with both the long-established commonlaw rule and the rule applied in McKelvey and that it would
have expected federal courts to apply a similar approach to
any affirmative defense that might be asserted as a justification or excuse for violating the new law.
Dixon begged to differ; in her view, "it has been well established in federal law that the Government bears the burden of
disproving duress beyond a reasonable doubt."43 But the majority emphasized that her briefs "cite[d] only one federal case decided before 1968 for th[is] proposition," and that case was distinguishable.4"r To be sure, the Model Penal Code (promulgated
by the American Law Institute in 1962) had proposed to put the
burden of disproving excuses like duress on the government, but
"no [ ] consensus existed [on this point] when Congress passed
the Safe Streets Act in 1968," and "there is no evidence that
Congress endorsed the Code's views or incorporated them into
the Safe Streets Act."486 In dicta, indeed, the Court opined that
even today, federal courts are not so unified in support of the
Model Penal Code's approach as to warrant reading recently enacted federal statutes to deviate from the traditional commonlaw rule437 In any event, the Court thought that the proper
background rule for understanding the 1968 statute was apparent: "In the context of the firearms offenses at issue-as will
usually be the case, given the long-established common-law
rule-we presume that Congress intended the petitioner to bear
the burden of proving the defense of duress by a preponderance
of the evidence."488
482 260 US 353 (1922).

4s Dixon, 548 US at 13-14.
434 Id at 14 (describing petitioner's argument).
45 Id (explaining that in the disputed case, duress had not been operating as an affirmative defense, but instead had gone to the specific-intent requirement of the crime
with which the defendant had been charged-an issue on which the government bore the
burden of proof).
436 Id at 15-16.
487 See Dixon, 548 US at 14-15.
48 Id at 17. In separate opinions, five Justices distanced themselves from the

Court's emphasis on the date of the particular statute under which Dixon was being
prosecuted. See United States v Leahy, 473 F3d 401, 407 (1st Cir 2007) (concluding as a
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Admittedly, the lower federal courts do not use the rhetoric
of statutory interpretation quite so consistently. Opinions addressing crimes created by federal statutes often refer to "common-law defenses" and "federal common law."439 But the courts
that use this locution may simply mean that the content of the
principles they are applying is not dictated by statutory text.
Rather than suggesting that the common law applies of its own
force in this context, these courts may well see themselves as
imputing common-law principles to particular statutes. 440 In any
event, that is the view suggested by the Supreme Court,"' and
most lower federal courts seem to accept its framing of the issue.442 Thus, standard doctrine about common-law defenses to
result that there was not a true majority for "the date-centric methodology employed in
[the Court's] opinion"). But most of these Justices still approached the key questions under the rubric of statutory interpretation. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Scalia,
argued that each federal criminal statute should be understood against the backdrop of
the pattern that Congress had implicitly established "when Congress began enacting
federal criminal statutes." Dixon, 548 US at 19-20 (Alito concurring). Justices Anthony
Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and David Souter seemed to envision a more dynamic incorporation of the common law, but they too cast their positions in terms of "congressional
intent." Id at 17-18 (Kennedy concurring); id at 21-22 (Breyer dissenting).
439 See, for example, United States v Desinor, 525 F3d 193, 199 (2d Cir 2008) (asserting, in the context of a prosecution under 21 USC § 848(e)(1)(A) for a narcotics conspiracy resulting in murder, that "the law pertaining to self-defense is a matter of federal
common law"); United States v Dodd, 225 F3d 340, 345 (3d Cir 2000) (asserting, before
Dixon, that "[w]here courts have engrafted a traditional common-law defense onto a
statute that itself is silent as to the applicability of traditional defenses, it is within the
province of the courts to determine where the burden of proof on that defense is most
appropriately placed," and adding that "[t]his is a question of federal common law");
United States v Newcomb, 6 F3d 1129, 1134 (6th Cir 1993) ("In Bailey, the Court ...
firmly stated that common-law defenses may be employed as defenses to a statutory
crime.").
440 See notes 407-08 and accompanying text. See also Dodd, 225 F3d at 345 (observing that in the context of a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm, necessity "is a judge-made defense," but indicating that courts "have engrafted [it] ... onto
[the] statute').
41 In addition to the cases already discussed in this Section, see, for example, Brogan v United States, 522 US 398, 406 (1998) (indicating that the public-authority defense
reflects "a background interpretive principle of general application"--one that applies to
each federal criminal statute as a matter of "assumed legislative intent").
442 See, for example, Leahy, 473 F3d at 405 ("[The question turns on what is essentially a matter of statutory interpretation-what Congress intended."). See also Sara
Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum L Rev 1433, 1517
(1984) ("Since Congress legislated against a common law background and generally
adopted the common law approach to criminal liability, the federal courts have generally
assumed that Congress intended to carry forward the traditional common law defenses."); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 2467-70 (2003)
(noting that textualists offer this account of a host of generic defenses, which they justify
in terms of interpretive presumptions applicable to each individual criminal statute).
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federal crimes is another manifestation of what I am calling the
"federal model" for the interaction between statutes and the
common law, under which principles of unwritten law operate
through incorporation into individual statutes.
Where federal criminal law is concerned, indeed, this way of
talking long predates Erie.443 That should come as no surprise.
In other fields, pre-Erie federal courts could apply principles of
general law (and could exercise independent judgment about the
content of those principles) without having to attribute the resulting rules of decision to federal statutes. But when courts
were addressing the law of federal crimes, federal statutes arguably were the only game in town. Ever since the early nineteenth century, courts have held that the definition of federal
crimes is a matter of written federal law; there are no federal
common-law crimes."' And if the common law does not operate
of its own force to define crimes against the United States, one
might well conclude that it also does not operate of its own force
to supply defenses to the crimes that Congress defines. On that
way of thinking, whenever federal courts wanted to give effect to
longstanding principles from the common law of crimes, they
had to read those principles into particular federal statutes.
Of course, federal courts were not always eager to preserve
common-law defenses. Take the defense of marital coercion: at
common law, married women were excused from criminal responsibility for most things done under their husband's constraint, and whatever a wife did in her husband's presence was
usually presumed to be the product of such constraint.445 Starting in the late nineteenth century, some jurists expressed reluctance to read federal criminal statutes as accommodating this
defense. In the words of one federal judge,
This statute against counterfeiting says "every person who
falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits any coin," etc., shall be
punished. It makes no exception in favor of married women,
and it may well be doubted if the courts can engraft an

"3 See, for example, The William Gray, 29 F Cases 1300, 1302 (CC D NY 1810)
(considering whether to declare a forfeiture under one of the federal Embargo Acts, and
speaking of the necessity defense as an implied exception that operates "in the interpretation of penal statutes).
4" See, for example, United States v Hudson, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
45 See Bishop, 1 Commentaries on the Criminal Law §§ 276-82 (cited in note 182).
See also Anne Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal L Rev 1, 30-43 (1994) (analyzing both
the legal excuse and the evidentiary presumption).
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exception on the statute. I am inclined to believe it is the
logical result of the doctrine that our crimes are statutory,
and that we have no common law of crimes, except so far as
the statutes have adopted it, in matters of evidence and
practice, that no exemption exists unless congress defines
and declares it.446

As one might expect, though, when common-law defenses
seemed less musty, judges worked harder to read them into federal statutes."7
D. Contrasting State Approaches
This Part's main goal has been to trace the development, in
an array of different fields, of what I am calling the "federal
model" for the interaction between federal statutes and the unwritten law. But it is also worth considering how state courts
have handled parallel questions about state statutes. Generalizations about state law are tricky, and I certainly cannot claim
that each of the fifty states neatly follows the "state model" in
each of the fields that this Part has surveyed. Still, the state
model retains considerable force.
With respect to private causes of action for damages caused
by the violation of statutory duties (the issue considered in Part
III.A), Professor Foy has already noted that state jurisprudence
differs significantly from federal jurisprudence.448 To be sure,
many state courts cite federal precedents when deciding whether to interpret individual state statutes as creating private causes of action by implication.449 Even in the absence of a statutory
cause of action, however, many state courts also recognize the
possibility that common-law doctrines like "negligence per se"
might operate directly to supply relevant causes of action as a
44 United States v De Quilfeldt, 5 F 276, 279 (CC WD Tenn 1881) (citations omitted). Despite his inclination, the judge refused to rule against the defendant on this theory "without consultation with my brother judges on this bench." Id. In later cases, however, federal courts followed his inclination. See, for example, United States v
Swierzbenski, 18 F2d 685, 685 (WDNY 1927); United States v Hinson, 3 F2d 200, 200
(SD Fla 1925).
4' See, for example, 'he William Gray, 29 F Cases at 1302.
44 See Foy, 71 Cornell L Rev at 566-68 (cited in note 340).
449 Different states have emphasized different federal precedents. Compare Bennett
v Hardy, 784 P2d 1258, 1261-62 (Wash 1990) (borrowing the test from Cort v Ash, 422
US 66 (1975), and proceeding to infer a private cause of action), with Baldonado v Wynn
Las Vegas, LLC, 194 P3d 96, 101-02 (Nev 2008) (citing post-Cort federal precedents too
and refusing to infer a private cause of action).
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matter of unwritten law.450 That possibility reflects the difference between the state model and the federal model. Even where
principles of negligence per se seem relevant, modern courts
usually can recognize private causes of action for damages as a
matter of federal law only by reading them into particular federal statutes. By contrast, courts often can recognize such causes
of action as a matter of state law unless a particular statute is
properly interpreted to eliminate them.
The state model applies less neatly with respect to the details of whatever causes of action statutes do create (the issue
considered in Part III.B). But that is partly because most state
legislatures have enacted generic statutes to handle some of
those details. For instance, almost all states have long had
crosscutting "survival statutes" that make most state-law causes
of action survive the deaths of the original parties.451 Likewise,

because of dissatisfaction with the common law's traditional
stinginess toward interest, most states have enacted crosscutting statutes about the kinds of claims that do or can bear interest before judgment.52 When courts entertaining causes of action created by state law face questions about survival or
prejudgment interest, they look to these crosscutting statutes
rather than the unwritten law. Nonetheless, the state model on
these matters remains distinct from the federal model in the following sense: state courts typically do not treat questions about
either survival or prejudgment interest as lying within the domain of each individual statute that creates a cause of action.
Crosscutting statutes also affect the states' treatment of criminal defenses (the issue considered in Part III.C). Although many
states have enacted statutes explicitly abolishing common-law
450 See, for example, Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc v Roloff, 630 P2d 840, 844 (Or 1981)
(noting a distinction between "cases in which liability would be based upon violation of a
statutory duty when there is also an underlying common law cause of action" and "cases
in which liability would be based upon violation of a statute when there is no underlying
common law cause of action"). For rhetoric that is less tethered to traditional views of
the common law, see National Trust for HistoricPreservationv City of Albuquerque, 874
P2d 798, 801 (NM App 1994) (arguing that unlike federal courts, "[a] state court ... may
look beyond legislative intent in exercising common-law authority to recognize a private
cause of action").
451 See Dan B. Dobbs, 2 Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damage8-Equity-Restitution423
(West 2d ed 1993) ("Almost all states appear to have both [wrongful] death and survival
statutes in some form."); Anthony J. Sebok, The InauthenticClaim, 64 Vand L Rev 61, 75
(2011) (noting that "the advent of survivorship statutes in the nineteenth century essentially suspended the common law doctrine" that personal claims died with the person).
452 See Anthony E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw U L Rev 192, 193 & n 6 (1982) (citing generic statutes from most states).
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crimes,4@5 only a few have explicitly abolished common-law defenses too.454 In most states, though, the legislature has codified the
principal generic defenses that were recognized at common law.4**
Where such codification has occurred, these defenses need not be
thought of as operating through incorporation into each individual
criminal statute, but they also do not operate as a matter of common law.
In states that have not comprehensively codified the generic
defenses, however, it remains possible for common-law defenses to
survive as such. Some of these states' courts may not have a consistent position about whether common-law defenses operate directly or only by incorporation into individual statutes.456 But the
former possibility seems to be alive and well in many states. Rather than reading each statute that defines a crime as implicitly
453 See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and FairAdjudication: Two Kinds of Legality,
154 U Pa L Rev 335, 338-39 (2005) (providing a partial list).
454 See Ariz Rev Stat § 13-103 ("All common law offenses and affirmative defenses
are abolished."); Tenn Code Ann § 39-11-203(e)(2) ("Defenses available under common
law are hereby abolished."). In contrast to Arizona and Tennessee, some states that have
abolished common-law crimes have explicitly preserved the possibility of common-law
defenses. See, for example, Conn Gen Stat § 53a-4 ("The provisions of this chapter shall
not be construed as precluding any court from recognizing ... other defenses not inconsistent with such provisions."); NJ Stat Ann §§ 2C:2-5, 2C:3-2 (preserving defenses
where "neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions
or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the [defense] claimed does not otherwise plainly appear'); Wis Stat § 939.10
("Common law crimes are abolished. The common law rules of criminal law not in conflict with chs. 939 to 951 are preserved."); Wyo Stat § 6-1-102 ("Common-law defenses
are retained unless otherwise provided by this act.").
455 See Paul H. Robinson, 1 Criminal Law Defenses vii-viii (West 1984).
456 Compare People v Riddle, 649 NW2d 30, 38 (Mich 2002) (concluding that when
Michigan codified the common-law crime of murder in 1846, it implicitly codified the
then-existing concept of self-defense too) and People v Reese, 815 NW2d 85, 93 (Mich
2012) (following Riddle's view that "[w]hen the Legislature codifies a common law offense [it] thereby adopts the common law defenses to that offense" as they were understood at the time of codification), with People v Dupree, 788 NW2d 399, 405-06 (Mich
2010) (noting that Michigan's felon-in-possession statute "does not address the availability of common law affirmative defenses, including self-defense," and concluding that "the
affirmative defense of self-defense remains available"). Going forward, much of Michigan's law of self-defense is definitely statutory, because the state legislature enacted a
broad self-defense act in 2006. See 2006 Mich Pub Act No 309, codified at Mich Comp
Laws § 780.971 et seq. But that very statute suggested that the common-law defense had
previously operated directly (and would continue to do so in certain respects). See Mich
Comp Laws at § 780.974 ('This act does not diminish an individual's right to use deadly
force or force other than deadly force in self-defense or defense of another individual as
provided by the common law of this state in existence on October 1, 2006."); Dupree, 788
NW2d at 407 (noting that with respect to conduct that occurred in 2005, "the traditional
common law affirmative defense of self-defense in existence before the enactment of the
[Self-Defense Act] governs").
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incorporating common-law defenses, many state-court opinions
are cast as if the common law can directly supply defenses to
statutory crimes (unless a particular statute abrogates those
defenses).57
CONCLUSION

The central thesis of this Article is twofold. First, federal
courts have changed how they think about various questions
that are connected with the implementation of federal statutes
but that the statutes do not explicitly address; individual federal
statutes are now presumed to encompass many questions that
might once have been thought to lie beyond their domains. Second, the statutification of these questions is at least partly attributable to pressures created by the Erie doctrine (or, where
penal statutes are concerned, by the doctrine that there is no
federal common law of crimes).
As a practical matter, the consequences of treating more
questions as matters of statutory interpretation depend on the
interpretive techniques that courts proceed to use. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Oakland Cannabis, which suggested that the
typical federal criminal statute might leave no room for the common-law defense of necessity,45* raises one possibility: courts
might hew closely to the literal language of the individual statute
in question and refuse to infer any exceptions or embellishments
on the strength of general principles of unwritten law. To the extent that courts take this approach, the statutification of issues at
the federal level is very significant indeed. But if courts decide instead to read federal statutes against the backdrop supplied by
principles of unwritten law, so that each individual federal statute is understood as implicitly incorporating those principles into
its text, the practical consequences of the federal model will be
less dramatic. In this situation, indeed, the difference between
457 See, for example, Smith v State, 424 S2d 726, 732 (Fla 1982) (indicating that "the
common-law defense of withdrawal" from joint criminal activity can be a valid defense in
a prosecution for premeditated murder); State v Hastings, 801 P2d 563, 564-65 (Idaho
1990) (concluding that the defendant should have been allowed "to introduce evidence
relating to the common law defense of necessity," and tracing the validity of that defense
to Idaho's reception of the common law rather than to the individual statute under which
the defendant was being prosecuted); Humphrey v Commonwealth, 553 SE2d 546, 550 (Va
App 2001) (noting that the common law applies in Virginia unless abrogated by the legislature, and concluding that the state statute forbidding convicted felons to possess firearms
"does not indicate an intention to abrogate the common law defense of necessity").
458 See text accompanying note 423.
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the state and federal models may seem largely theoretical: the
key difference is not about whether principles of unwritten law
matter, but simply about whether courts should think of those
principles as operating directly or only through incorporation into individual statutes.459
Even that difference, however, has some practical consequences. When courts think of the unwritten law as operating
directly, the rules of decision that they apply will naturally keep
up with changes in the content of that law. But if courts think of
the unwritten law as operating only because a particular statute
implicitly incorporates it, another option becomes perfectly plausible: courts may well read the statute as adopting (and freezing
into place) the background rules of unwritten law that existed
when the statute was enacted.
Of course, that conclusion is not inevitable; even if courts interpret a statute to incorporate the unwritten law on some point,
they are capable of deciding that the incorporation is dynamic
rather than static. For instance, the federal Supreme Court has
said that in certain respects the Sherman Act of 1890 incorporates evolving principles of common law,460 and the Court has
indicated that the same might be true of the statute that we
know as 42 USC § 1983 (which Congress enacted as part of the
Revised Statutes of 1874 and which traces back to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871).46, Even under those so-called "common-law

459 Compare Microsoft Corp v i4i LP, 131 S Ct 2238, 2245-47 (2011) (holding that
when the Patent Act of 1952 declared that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid" and "[t]he
burden of establishing invalidity . . . shall rest on a party asserting such invalidity,"
Congress implicitly incorporated the established standard of proof for satisfying this
burden, which required clear and convincing evidence), with id at 2254 (Thomas concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the statute does not address the standard of proof,
but reaching the same result as the majority on the theory that "the common-law rule"
operates of its own force).
4oo See Business Electronics Corp v Sharp Electronics Corp, 485 US 717, 732 (1988)
("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential.
It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law
had assigned to the term in 1890."); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc,
551 US 877, 888 (2007) (quoting and reaffirming this passage from Business Electronics).
461 See, for example, Smith v Wade, 461 US 30, 34-35 n 2 (1983) (criticizing the dissent's "unstated and unsupported premise that Congress necessarily intended to freeze
into permanent law whatever [tort] principles were current in 1871, rather than to incorporate applicable general legal principles as they evolve," and adding that "if the prevailing view on some point of general tort law had changed substantially in the intervening century (which is not the case here), we might be highly reluctant to assume that
Congress intended to perpetuate a now-obsolete doctrine").
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statutes,"462 however, the Court often has emphasized the particular understandings of the common law that existed when the
statutes were enacted.46 This tendency is even more pronounced
with respect to other old statutes, like the FELA. As we saw in
Part III.B, the Court has held that the FELA implicitly incorporates early twentieth-century conceptions of the proper measure
of damages, with the result that prejudgment interest is unavailable on FELA claims even today.4** Likewise, in determining
462 See Leegin, 551 US at 899 (using this label for the Sherman Act); William N.
Eskridge Jr, Public Values in StatutoryInterpretation,137 U Pa L Rev 1007, 1052 (1989)
(noting that the category of "common law statutes" also includes § 1983). See also Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegationsto Courts: Are "Common-Law
Statutes" Different? *1, in Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed, Intellectual Property and the
Common Law (forthcoming 2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042146 (visited
May 9, 2013) (agreeing that the Sherman Act and § 1983 are often described as "common-law statutes" but observing that this category lacks clear boundaries).
463 For examples involving the Sherman Act, see Copperweld Corp v Independence
Tube Corp, 467 US 752, 775 n 24 (1984) ("[I]t is far from clear that intracorporate conspiracies were recognized at common law in 1890."); Texas Industries,Inc v Radcliff Materials, Inc, 451 US 630, 644 n 17 (1981) ("[W]hen the Sherman Act was adopted the
common law did not provide a right to contribution among tortfeasors participating in
proscribed conduct. One permissible, though not mandatory, inference is that Congress
relied on courts' continuing to apply principles in effect at the time of enactment."). For
an example involving § 1983, see Filarsky v Delia, 132 S Ct 1657, 1662-66 (2012) (identifying the immunities and defenses that § 1983 should be understood to recognize by applying a two-step approach that "begins with the common law as it existed when Congress passed § 1983 in 1871" and then asks whether anything specific to § 1983 "counsels
against carrying forward the common law rule'). See also Rehberg v Paulk, 132 S Ct
1497, 1502-05 (2012) (suggesting that history does affect the Court's understanding of
immunities under § 1983, but at a fairly high level of abstraction); David Achtenberg,
Immunity under 42 U.S.C. f 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw U L Rev 497, 500-01 (1992) (identifying five different approaches that
have been used in different opinions by different Justices: (1) a "literalist" approach that
refuses to recognize any immunities because the text of § 1983 does not mention any,
(2) a modified form of literalism that recognizes only those immunities that were "so
deeply entrenched in the common law [at the time of enactment] and so consistent with
the purposes of § 1983 that it was impossible to believe that Congress ... intended to
abrogate them," (3) a "static incorporation" approach that reads in "every immunity
which was recognized in common-law tort actions in 1871" unless a particular immunity
would subvert the statute's purposes, (4) a "dynamic incorporation" approach that tracks
developments in "the general common law of torts," and (5) a "delegation" approach that
reads the statute as implicitly "authoriz[ing] the Court to develop principles of immunity
under § 1983 based solely on its own view of sound public policy").
464 See text accompanying notes 384-86 (discussing Monessen). For a case discussing the logical implications of Monessen's theory of static incorporation, see Wickham
ContractingCo v Local Union No. 3, InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers
AFL-CIO, 955 F2d 831, 837 (2d Cir 1992) (holding that Monessen's interpretation of the
FELA does not foreclose the award of prejudgment interest in a suit under § 303(b) of
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub L No 80-100, ch 120, 61 Stat 136,
159, and explaining that "[b]y the 1940s, the common law rule against prejudgment interest in cases of unliquidated damages and tort actions had eroded severely'). See also
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the scope of liability under the FELA for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the Court has chosen among tests that were
familiar to the common law in 1908 rather than applying the
test that is most widely used now. 4 6 5
Reading each federal statute to incorporate common-law
principles as they were understood at the time of enactment is
one possible response to the interpretive challenge posed by the
federal model: now that individual federal statutes are routinely
presumed to encompass issues that they do not specifically address, courts need some way of figuring out what the statutes
say about those issues. But the presumption against extraterritoriality illustrates another possible response to the statutification of such issues. When courts apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality, they are not hewing to the literal meaning of
statutory language; they are inferring geographic limitations
that the text does not make apparent. But they also are not
reading each individual federal statute to incorporate (on either
a static or a dynamic basis) exactly the same kinds of principles
of unwritten law that might once have been thought to operate
of their own force. Instead, courts are deploying a different kind
of interpretive technique: in the absence of contrary guidance
from Congress, they are using a specialized canon of construction to impute meaning to the statute.
At first glance, one might wonder whether this technique is
really any different from static incorporation of the common law.
After all, while the content of the presumption against extraterritoriality departs from the kinds of choice-of-law rules that are
most prevalent today, it can certainly be seen as the interpretive
analogue of traditional choice-of-law rules.466 By articulating a
canon separate and apart from the underlying choice-of-law
Kansas v Colorado, 533 US 1, 10-11 (2001) (describing changes over time in doctrines
about prejudgment interest).
465 See COnsolidatedRail Corp v Gottshall, 512 US 532, 554-55 (1994) ("As we did
in Monessen, we begin with the state of the common law in 1908, when FELA was enacted."). Admittedly, Gottshall ultimately read the FELA to incorporate the "zone of danger"
test rather than the stricter "physical impact" test, even though the latter was still the
majority rule in 1908. But the Court emphasized that "the zone of danger test had been
adopted by a significant number of jurisdictions" by 1908, and the Court argued that it
would have been considered "more consistent ... with FELA's broad remedial goals" because "it was recognized [in 1908] as being a progressive rule of liability." Id at 555.
While the Court added that "the physical impact test has considerably less support in
the current state of the common law than the zone of danger test," the majority specifically refused to apply the test that currently has the most such support, in part because
"it was not developed until 60 years after FELA's enactment." Id at 556.
466 See note 14.
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rules, however, courts have gone a step beyond static incorporation of the common law. Instead of gauging the applicability of
each federal statute according to the choice-of-law principles
that were widely accepted when that particular statute was enacted, courts use the same canon across the board. Thus, courts
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality even to recently enacted federal statutes. As Part I suggested, this interpretive
approach has the potential to produce significantly different results than the courts would reach if they treated the relevant issues as matters of unwritten law and used some version of modern choice-of-law rules to answer them.
Experience with the presumption against extraterritoriality
also illustrates a more subtle consequence of thinking of these
issues under the rubric of statutory interpretation. When courts
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to a statute,
they do not always simply read the statute as they otherwise
would and then excise the specific applications that they deem
extraterritorial. Instead, the presumption against extraterritoriality can affect the glosses that courts put on language in the
statutory text, and those glosses can affect how the statute operates even in settings where its application would not be considered extraterritorial.
For a nice example, we can return to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act in Morrison. Recall that § 10(b) of the Act broadly prohibits deceptive behavior
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered.""6 Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Morrison applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to that linguistic formulation and came up with the following gloss: § 10(b) covers only (1) the purchase or sale of any security registered on
an American stock exchange and (2) the purchase or sale in the
United States of any security not so registered.46* In defense of
this gloss, Justice Scalia argued that the statute's text focused on
"purchase-and-sale transactions" and that his application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality reflected this focus.469 By
contrast, he emphasized, there was no "textual support" for the
See note 251 and accompanying text.
See Morrison, 130 S Ct at 2884, 2888.
See id at 2884. See also id at 2886 (describing the Court's gloss as a "transactional test" that asks "whether the purchase or sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange").
467

468
469
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test proposed by the government, 470 under which § 10(b) would
apply "whenever a securities fraud includes significant conduct
in the United States that is material to the fraud's success."471
Even if a particular sale ends up being consummated overseas, of course, reading § 10(b) to forbid fraudulent conduct in
the United States would not necessarily be causing the statute
to operate extraterritorially. As deployed by the Court in Morrison, then, the presumption against extraterritoriality had a
spillover effect: the implied limitation that the Court read into
§ 10(b) averted the possibility of extraterritorial applications of
the statute, but it also affected what § 10(b) meant for other situations. That effect grew out of the Court's approach. In keeping
with the fact that the Court was thinking of the key issues entirely under the rubric of statutory interpretation, the Court was
trying to attribute rules of applicability to the statute itself, and
it gravitated toward reading those rules into the framework that
the text supplied. If the Court had instead conceived of itself as
using general choice-of-law analysis to determine when American anti-fraud laws do and do not apply, the Court might well
have ended up drawing different lines. Again, then, the statutification of the relevant issues affected not only the style of the
Court's analysis but also the substance of its conclusions.
In calling attention to the practical consequences of using
the rubric of statutory interpretation for such issues, I am making an analytical point rather than a normative one. I consider it
significant that modern courts read individual federal statutes
to encompass issues that might previously have been thought to
lie within the province of unwritten law. But I have made no arguments about whether the emergence of this federal model is
good or bad. My point is simply that it deserves notice from people who want to understand the architecture of our legal system.
The interaction between statutes and the unwritten law has
been a constant subject of academic inquiry in the United
States, drawing sophisticated commentary from distinguished
scholars and jurists alike.472 We should be aware that from the
Id at 2886.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Morrison
v National Australia Bank Ltd, No 08-1191, *8 (US filed Feb 26, 2010) (available on
Westlaw at 2010 WNL 719337). See also notes 219-20 and accompanying text (describing
the Second Circuit's "conduct test").
472 For a taste, see Bishop, 1 Commentaries on the Written Laws §§ 12325, 131-44
(cited in note 58); Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich L Rev 875 (1991);
470
471
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mid-twentieth century on, the federal model for this interaction
has diverged from the state model.

Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv L Rev 383 (1908); Harlan F.
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Hary L Rev 4 (1936); Peter L. Strauss,
On Resegregatingthe Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 S Ct Rev 429.
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